Nonetheless, because the judge ordered the husband to transfer sixty per cent of the defined contribution plan to the wife, we must consider the asserted interest of the husband's sister in that defined contribution plan. In Amrhein v. Amrhein, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 336, 560 N.E.2d 157 (1990), we considered a judicial order that the husband execute a mortgage for the benefit of the wife on property he claimed was held in trust for the benefit of his children. Id. at 339-340, 560 N.E.2d 157. Although the judge had "ample reason to doubt the reality of the trust" and find that the property was held by the husband himself, id. at 338, 560 N.E.2d 157, we concluded that such an order could not be entered without joining the children and the husband in his capacity as trustee of the purported trust.

Despite Eresian's attempt to cast this claim as one of subject matter jurisdiction, the argument is waived. See Amrhein v. Amrhein, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 336, 339 (1990). Judgment affirmed.

In the circumstances, there is an inherent conflict between Maki's interests as trustee and beneficiary, and those of the other beneficiaries. See New England Peabody Home for Crippled Childrenv.Page, 325 Mass. 663, 667-668 (1950) (ordinary rule that trustees may represent interests of beneficiaries not applicable where interests of beneficiaries and trustees conflict); Amrheinv.Amrhein, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 336, 340 (1990) (where "inherent conflict of interests between the trustee . . . and the beneficiaries" exists, beneficiaries "are entitled to be heard in order to protect their rights and should not be compelled to depend upon the defence made by the trustee" [quotation omitted]). See also Bogert & Bogert, Law of Trust and Trustees § 593, at 423-426 (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2021) ("it has been held that where the trustee has an interest adverse to that of the beneficiary . . . the beneficiaries must be brought into the action"); id. § 594, at 438 ("if there is conflict of interest between the trustee and beneficiary, or a divergence of interests between the beneficiaries, the beneficiaries may be necessary parties to a suit").

A judge has “considerable discretion” in setting alimony awards, see Hassey v. Hassey, 85 Mass.App.Ct. at 524, 11 N.E.3d 661, and is not bound strictly by the stated needs of an alimony recipient. See Amrhein v. Amrhein, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 336, 341, 560 N.E.2d 157 (1990). The decision to award an additional $110 week was not “plainly wrong [or] excessive,” see Redding v. Redding, 398 Mass. 102, 107, 495 N.E.2d 297 (1986), and “flow[ed] rationally from the findings and rulings.”

See Sampson v. Sampson, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 366, 379 n.23 (2004). Cf. Amrhein v. Amrhein, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 336, 339 (1990). We are not persuaded by the husband's argument that the judge misunderstood the nature of the business, undermining her findings that the husband was not credible.

The issue is accordingly waived. See Seekonk v. John J. McHale & Sons, 325 Mass. 271, 274, 90 N.E.2d 325 (1950); Amrhein v. Amrhein, 29 Mass.App.Ct. 336, 339, 560 N.E.2d 157 (1990) (absence of indispensable party is nonjurisdictional and may be waived). .General Laws c. 258, § 10( e ), amended by St.1993, c. 495, § 57, retains sovereign immunity against “any claim based upon the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization.”

The judge made clear that she thought the husband's testimony was less than candid. Compare Grubert v. Grubert, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 822 (1985); Amrhein v. Amrhein, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 336, 342 n. 4 (1990). She obviously suspected that many of the money-losing business transactions were shams. She thought that the husband had not lost his once sure business touch, and that, after the divorce, he would succeed in making his businesses profitable again.