Opinion
Case No. 4:01CV382RWS
March 5, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In the course of his training as a newly-hired pilot for Trans States Airlines, John Ampleman sustained an injury to his knee and was unable to complete the training program. Shortly after Ampleman informed his employer of the injury and sought medical treatment, Trans States Airlines terminated Ampleman from his employment. Ampleman then brought suit on four counts against Trans States Airlines, alleging, in part, that Trans States Airlines violated the Missouri Service Letter Statute, § 290.140 R.S.Mo. by failing to provide a service letter upon Ampleman's request. Ampleman now files a motion for partial summary judgment as to this count. Because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Trans States Airlines issued a service letter to Ampleman in compliance with § 290.140, the court will deny the motion for partial summary judgment.
I. Facts
On June 26, 2000, John Ampleman was hired as a pilot by Trans States Airlines. Trans States Airlines requires newly hired pilots to train in a flight simulator. During the course of simulator training, certain emergency procedures are practiced. One such procedure, performed in response to a sudden loss of power in one engine, requires that the pnot apply heavy pressure on the opposite rudder pedal in order to keep the aircraft flying in a straight line. During Ampleman's simulator sessions on September 21 and September 23, 2000, the instructor cut the right engine in order to simulate a sudden loss of power in that engine. Ampleman responded both times by applying heavy pressure on the left rudder pedal. Ampleman claims that as a result of these exercises, he sustained an injury to his left knee.
Following the simulator session of September 23, Ampleman informed Bryan Bowie, the chief instructor for the simulator, that he would be unable to complete the training scheduled for September 24 as a result of the injury to his knee. Two days later, Ampleman notified Bowie that he intended to seek medical treatment for his injury. On September 27, Ampleman received a termination letter stating as the reason for his termination that he had failed to complete the training program.
Ampleman then filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, which, as amended, alleges four counts. Ampleman claims that Trans States Airlines (1) terminated his employment in retaliation for his having exercised his rights under the Worker's Compensation Law, § 287 R.S.Mo.; (2) failed to provide a service letter upon request, as required by § 290.140 R.S.Mo.; (3) breached the terms of his employment contract; and (4) breached the terms of its Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Air Line Pilots Association. Trans States Airlines removed the case to this Court on the basis that resolution of Count IV of the amended petition raises a federal question under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
Ampleman now brings a motion for partial summary judgment as to Count II. Ampleman argues that the pleadings and affidavit on file fail to show a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Trans States Airlines complied with § 290.140 R.S.Mo. Trans States Airlines responds that § 290.140 R.S.Mo. does not apply in this case because it is preempted both by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and by the Pilot Records Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44936.
II. Standard for Summary Judgment
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. The Court will grant a motion for summary judgment where there is no genuine issue of material fact and where the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See generally, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. There is, however, no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party must support its motion with affidavits or other materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. The burden is not on the moving party to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof Id. at 325. Instead, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. As long as the record before the court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment should be granted. Id. at 323.
When faced with a motion for summary judgment meeting the standard set forth above, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings alone, but must introduce affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file designating specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Jetton v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 121 F.3d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1997); Noll v. Petrovsky, 828 F.2d 461, 462 (8th Cir. 1987). Further, a plaintiff facing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact on each essential element of his claim.Id.
III. Discussion
The Missouri Service Letter Statute, § 290.140 R.S.Mo. provides as follows:
1. Whenever any employee of any corporation doing business in this state and which employs seven or more employees, who shall have been in the service of said corporation for a period of at least ninety days. shall be discharged or voluntarily quit the service of such corporation and who thereafter within a reasonable period of time, but not later than one year following the date the employee was discharged or voluntarily quit, requests in writing by certified mail to the superintendent, manager or registered agent of said corporation, with specific reference to the statute, it shall be the duty of the superintendent or manager of said corporation to issue to such employee, within forty-five days after the receipt of such request, a letter, duly signed by such superintendent or manager, setting forth the nature and character of service rendered by such employee to such corporation and the duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause, if any, such employee was discharged or voluntarily quit such service.
2. Any corporation which violates the provisions of subsection I of this section shall be liable for compensatory but not punitive damages but in the event that the evidence establishes that the employer did not issue the requested letter, said employer may be liable for nominal and punitive damages; but no award of punitive damages under this section shall be based upon the content of any such letter.
§ 290.140 R.S.Mo.
Ampleman argues that, by the terms of § 290.140 R.S.Mo., he was entitled to receive a service letter from Trans States Airlines. He points out that Trans States Airlines employed more than seven employees, that he was employed for more than ninety days, that he requested a service letter within one year after his termination, that he addressed his request to a manager of Trans States Airlines, and that the request made specific reference to the statute. Ampleman contends that because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Trans States Airlines provided a service letter as requested, he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Trans States Airlines responds that Ampleman is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because his claim under § 290.140 R.S.Mo. is preempted by both the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and the Pnot Record Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44936. Moreover, Trans States Airlines argues, even if the Service Letter Statute is not preempted by the Railway Labor Act or the Pnot Record Improvement Act, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether it issued a service letter in compliance with § 290.140.
A. The Railway Labor Act Does Not Preempt Ampleman's Claim under the Service Letter Statute, § 290.140 R.S.Mo.
The Railway Labor Act, made applicable to air carriers by 45 U.S.C. § 181, governs the resolution of certain employment disputes. The Act purports, among other things, to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions and all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
Trans States Airlines argues that the Railway Labor Act preempts Ampleman's state law service letter claim. Citing Stewart v. Burlington Northern Railroad Company, 743 S.W.2d 418 (Mo.App. 1987), Trans States Airlines contends that the Railway Labor Act preempts the Missouri Service Letter Statute where the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the parties provides greater protection than the statute. Where the collective bargaining agreement provides for an employee to be given notice and the reasons for his discharge, any state law claim arising under § 290.140 is preempted inasmuch as the collective bargaining agreement has the "imprimature of the federal law upon it."State of California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 561, 1 L.Ed.2d 1034, 77 S.Ct. 1037 (1957). Trans States Airlines claims that the collective bargaining agreement entered into with Ampleman furnishes greater protections to discharged employees than the Service Letter Statute. Under the collective bargaining agreement, a discharged employee shall not only receive notice of his discharge and the causes for his discharge, but also have the right to appeal the action.
The Court finds, however, that the Railway Labor Act does not preempt the Service Letter Statute in this case. Although the collective bargaining agreement indeed provides certain procedural protections to discharged employees, such protections extend only to pilots who have been employed with Trans States Airlines for more than one year. It is undisputed that Ampleman had been employed with Trans States Airlines for less than one year. Therefore, the relevant provisions in the collective bargaining agreement do not apply to Ampleman. Because the procedural protections set forth in the agreement do not apply to Ampleman, Ampleman's claim under the Service Letter Statute is not preempted by the Railway Labor Act.
B. The Pilt Record Improvement Act Does Not Preempt Ampleman's Claim Under the Service Letter Statute, § 290.140 R.S.Mo.
The Court also finds that Ampleman's claim under § 290.140 is not preempted by the Pnot Record Improvement Act. Section 44936(f) of the Pnot Record Improvement Act requires an air carrier to obtain employment records from other air carriers before hiring an individual as a pilot. Section 44936(g) exempts from liability those air carriers who supply such records, but on its fact applies only to air carriers who furnish records for other air carriers, not to air carriers who furnish records for individuals. Because this case concerns an instance in which an air carrier furnished an employment record to an individual, the Pnot Record Improvement Act does not apply and therefore does not exempt Trans States Airlines from liability involving Ampleman's service letter claim.
C. There are Genuine Issues of Material Fact Regarding Whether Trans States Airlines Issued a Service Letter in Compliance with § 290.140.
Although the Court finds that Ampleman's service letter claim is not preempted by the Railway Labor Act or the Pnot Record Improvement Act, the Court nonetheless cannot grant Ampleman's motion for summary judgment in this matter because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Trans States Airlines issued a service letter in compliance with § 290.140.
The Missouri Service Letter Statute entitles an employee to receive a service letter if the statutory prerequisites are satisfied. A service letter issued in compliance with § 290.140 includes the following: 1) the nature and character of service rendered by the employee to the corporation; 2) the duration of the employment service; 3) the true cause, if any, for which the employee was discharged or voluntarily left service; and 4) the signature of the superintendent or manager. Failure to satisfy any of the requirements of § 290.140 constitutes a refusal to issue a service letter. J J Homebuilders v. Hasty, 989 S.W.2d 614 (Mo.App. 1999). As stated above, Ampleman satisfied the statutory prerequisites and properly requested a service letter from a manager at Trans States Airlines. Trans States Airlines replied to the request within the forty-five day period with letter signed by its Director of Legal Affairs.
Ampleman argues that the letter did not satisfy the requirements of the statute. Specifically, Ampleman contends that the letter did not state the duration of employment, did not adequately address the nature of his employment, and did not report the true reason for his discharge. Trans States Airlines, however, counters that the letter issued in response to Ampleman's request did, in fact, satisfy the requirements of § 290.140. The letter identified the duration of the employment (by stating the date of termination and that Ampleman was in the initial hire period), the nature of the employment (by referring to Ampleman as a newly-hired pnot in training), and the true causes for the discharge (by reporting that Ampleman failed to complete the Trans States Airlines ATR initial new hire training program).
The Court finds that a rational fact finder could determine on the basis of this evidence that Trans States Airlines issued a service letter in compliance with the Service Letter Statute. For this reason, summary judgment on Ampleman's claim for damages arising under § 290.140 must be denied.
IV. Conclusion
Because the Court concludes that Ampleman's claim under § 290.140 is not preempted by the Railway Labor Act or the Pnot Record Improvement Act and because the Court has found that there are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Trans States Airlines issued a service letter in compliance with Service Letter Statute, Ampleman is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his § 290.140 claim. Summary judgment will therefore be denied.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.