[¶ 11] Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized the rule in Detling, albeit applying their own states' standards. See Appleby v. Belden Corp., 22 Ark. App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (1987) (holding that claimant's actions in heavy housecleaning and house painting, in contravention of medical restrictions, was so unreasonable as to bar compensation for aggravation of her back injury); Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, 318 A.2d 614, 618 (Del.Super. 1974); Johnnie's Produce Co. v. Benedict Jordan, 120 So.2d 12, 13, (Fla. 1960) (holding that "[i]f a claimant, knowing of certain weaknesses, rashly undertakes activities likely to produce harmful results, the chain of causation is broken by the claimant's own negligence"); Giacoletto v. Silver Bow Pizza Parlor, 231 Mont. 191, 751 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1988) ("the degree of claimant's misconduct required to break the chain of causation must be `intentional conduct which is clearly unreasonable'"); Horne v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Processors, 119 N.C. App. 682, 459 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1995); Simpson v. H.D. Lee Co., 793 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tenn. 1990) (finding medication prescribed for compensable injury but taken in direct contravention to physician's instructions was an independent intervening cause of injury precluding additional workers' compensation benefits for employee's subsequent death); Leadbetter, Inc. v. Penkalski, 21 Va. App. 427, 464 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1995); Andren, 917 P.2d at 180. [¶ 1
In essence, negligence is the doing of some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under similar circumstances. Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, 318 A.2d 614, 617-18 (Del.Super. 1974). In the present case, the Trustee has established the duty of Southern States to conform to a standard of care in its specialized area of applying agricultural chemicals to farmers' fields.
The employer argues, however, that an employee's conduct in negligently aggravating a work-related injury outside of the workplace should be a bar. See Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 13.22(a), 3-727 (1996) ("If a claimant instead of allowing his wound to heal, deliberately engages in conduct which presents a strong probability of reopening the wound, the re-injury is not compensable.") Although this approach has been adopted in other jurisdictions, Amoco Chem. Corp. v. Hill, 318 A.2d 614 (Del.Super. 1974) (negligently playing basketball against doctor's orders broke the chain of causation); Allen v. Glenn Baker Trucking, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1994) (negligently driving against doctor's orders broke the chain of causation), it is not the law in Georgia. The legislature has articulated that "an unreasonable refusal to submit to surgery, or a neglect to follow any reasonable surgical treatment" will break the chain of causation between subsequent disability and the original work injury. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-204.
Therefore, Claimant's decision was not unreasonable. See Allen v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 124 Ariz. 173, 602 P.2d 841 (Ariz.App.Div. 1979); Amoco Chemical Corp.v. Hill, 318 A.2d 614 (Del.Super.Ct. 1974); Johnnie'sProduce Co. v. Benedict Jordan, 120 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1960); Sullivan v. B A Constr., Inc., 307 N.Y. 161, 120 N.E.2d 694 (1954); Sinclair Prairie Oil Co.v. State Indus. Comm'n, 176 Okla. 84, 54 P.2d 348 (1936); Anderson v. Westfield Grp., 259 S.W.3d 690 (Tenn. 2008); Jones v. Huey, 210 Tenn. 162, 357 S.W.2d 47 (1962).
[I]f the chain of causation could have been said to have been brown [sic] by a subsequent injury attributable to the Claimant's own negligence or fault, an intervening cause would exist and the employer would be relieved of liability. . . . .Negligence is the doing of some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under similar circumstances.Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, 318 A.2d 614 (Del. Super 1974).Id.
Id. at 810. Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, 318 A.2d 614 (Del.Super.Ct. 1974). 2001 WL 1198938 (Del.Super.Ct. 2001).
Id. at 810. Amoco Chemical Corp. V. Hill, 318 A.2d 614 (Del.Super.Ct. 1974). 2001 WL 1198338 (Del.Super.Ct. 2001).
The issue was whether the worsened back condition following the basketball game was caused by the January 1970 back injury. The court set forth the applicable rule of causation as follows: 318 A.2d 614 (Del.Super. 1974). A general rule of causation in such cases as this is stated by Larsen's Workmen's Compensation Law, ~ 1300 as follows:
¶ 11 Division One of this court and a number of other jurisdictions have adopted the Larson rule as enunciated above. Klosterman v. Industrial Comm'n, 155 Ariz. 435, 747 P.2d 596 (App. 1987); Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 124 Ariz. 173, 602 P.2d 841 (App. 1979); see, e.g., Appleby v. Belden Corp., 738 S.W.2d 807 (Ark.App. 1987) (claimant, who injured her back while working for employer, subsequently exacerbated condition by engaging in strenuous housecleaning and painting activities in contravention of physician's prohibition; such conduct held to be independent intervening cause of new injury, barring her workers' compensation claim against employer); Amoco Chem. Corp. v. Hill, 318 A.2d 614 (Del.Super. 1974) (claimant's actions in playing basketball in disregard of physician's advice regarding physical limitations for work-related back injury resulted in aggravation of injury and surgery; such conduct constituted subsequent intervening cause barring his claim for workers' compensation benefits against employer). ¶ 12 Adopting such a rule in the context of a subsequent nonindustrial injury does not directly conflict with § 23-1021, which addresses only the compensability of industrial injuries.
Ordinary care includes the failure to use care that a reasonably prudent person and careful person would use under similar circumstances. Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Hill, Del.Super., 318 A.2d 614, 617 (1974). For seven years no one on behalf of the State did anything.