Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-2494 (RJL).
January 13, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint alleging that he was denied employment by defendant based on his race, color, ancestry, and national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment. Because the Court finds that the undisputed material facts establish that defendant had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for hiring other applicants instead of plaintiff, summary judgment will be granted.
Factual Background
Defendant is a hotel located at 1919 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. in Washington, D.C. Amended Complaint ("Amend. Compl."), ¶ 2. In January, 2002, defendant advertised the availability of two room attendant positions in the housekeeping department. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Deft's Mtn."), Exhibit ("Ex.) 1. The job announcement stated that "[b]asic knowledge of the English language and the ability to communicate effectively with others required. Must be able to thoroughly clean 16 rooms a day. Previous experience preferred." Id. A total of 71 individuals applied for the positions. Id., Ex. 11.
On January 22, 2002, plaintiff submitted an application for a room attendant position. Id., Ex. 5. Plaintiff is a native of Afghanistan, has dark skin, and a strong accent. Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Declaration of Abdul Wakil Amiri ("Amiri Decl."), ¶¶ 2-3. On his employment application, plaintiff listed cleaning experience at two restaurants and self-employment as a street vendor. Deft's Mtn., Ex. 5. Plaintiff declined to provide references, stating that such information was "Personal." Id. The day following his application, plaintiff provided a supplement which stated that he had worked as a housekeeper at a rooming house. Id., Ex. 8. In that capacity, plaintiff cleaned 28 rooms and the entire house. Id.
It is not clear from the record that defendant's Human Resources Department actually received this supplemental information, but defendant does not dispute the fact and it does not ultimately affect the Court's disposition of the motion.
On a form titled "Applicant Disposition Summary," Dare Morgan, defendant's Human Resources Manager, offered "poor work history" and "limited/no experience" as reasons for not selecting plaintiff for a room attendant position. Id., Exs. 5 6. On February 6, 2002, defendant hired Blanca Jackson and Carol Yates for the attendant positions. Id., Ex. 6. On her application, Ms. Jackson stated that she had worked as a room attendant at the Hilton Washington Hotel from March 7, 2001 to September 18, 2001. Id., Ex. 3. Ms. Jackson also was employed as a room attendant at Hilton Charlotte from April, 1995 to 2001. Id. Ms. Yates had been a room attendant at the Hilton Hotel in Crystal City, Virginia from August, 2001 to the date of her application. Id., Ex. 4. Standard of Review
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Material facts are those that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
In considering whether there is a triable issue of fact, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The non-moving party must do more than simply "show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Moreover, "any factual assertions in the movant's affidavits will be accepted as being true unless [the opposing party] submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the assertion." Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982)). The mere existence of a factual dispute by itself, however, is not enough to bar summary judgment. The party opposing the motion must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. To be material, the fact must be capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation; to be genuine, the issue must be supported by admissible evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.; see also Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Discussion
In order to prevail in a Title VII case or a discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff initially must establish a prima facie case of prohibited discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973); Carter v. George Washington Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. Once the defendant proffers a sufficient non-discriminatory reason, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to show that defendant's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id.; Morgan v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 328 F.3d 647, 651 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 881 (2003). See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 147-49 (2000).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must establish that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for the position; and (3) someone outside his protected class was hired for the position. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The burden of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination is "not onerous." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
In its motion, defendant assumes plaintiff can establish a prima facie case. The fact that plaintiff is from Afghanistan establishes his membership in a protected class based on national origin. Plaintiff applied for the job and defendant does not dispute that he was qualified for the room attendant position. And other individuals, outside his protected class, were hired for the positions. Therefore, for the purpose of the disposition of this motion, the Court concludes plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination.
To meet its burden of showing a legitimate reason for its employment decision, the defendant need only "proffer," not prove, a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not offering the position to the plaintiff. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The reasons offered by defendant here is that the individuals selected for the positions had superior relevant experience, plaintiff had no hotel experience, and plaintiff had a poor work history. The evidence presented by the parties clearly shows that the chosen applicants had significantly more experience performing the job of a hotel room attendant than did plaintiff. Ms. Jackson had previously worked as a room attendant at the Hilton Washington. She also worked for six years at the Hilton Charlotte. Similarly, Ms. Yates, the other applicant selected, was working at the Hilton Crystal City when she was hired.
Plaintiff counters that he had comparable experience. In an affidavit, plaintiff states that he was a housekeeper for approximately one year at a rooming house. Amiri Decl., ¶ 10. In that position plaintiff cleaned 28 rooms. Id. Plaintiff's prior work history does not negate, however, defendant's asserted reason for hiring the other two applicants. It is clear that both of the applicants chosen had experience directly relevant to the position, both in terms of the tasks required and the setting, a hotel. Certainly, the fact that both applicants had been employed at Hilton Hotels was an additional legitimate reason for their selection. In any event, even if these applicants' qualifications were not superior or merely comparable to plaintiff's, he could not defeat a motion for summary judgment on this basis. See Hussain v. Principi, 344 F.Supp.2d 86, 99 (D.D.C. 2004); Tolson v. James, 315 F.Supp.2d 110, 116 (D.D.C. 2004); Walker v. Dalton, 94 F.Supp.2d 8, 16 (D.D.C. 2000); Childers v. Slater, 44 F.Supp.2d 8, 25 (D.D.C. 1999). Defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its hiring decision.
Since defendant has proffered legitimate reasons for hiring the other applicants, plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered explanation is a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. In assessing whether an employer's stated reasons for the hiring decision are a pretext, the Court should consider whether a jury could infer discrimination from the combination of (1) plaintiff's prima facie case; (2) any evidence plaintiff presents to challenge the employer's proffered explanation; (3) independent evidence of discriminatory statements or conduct by the employer; and (4) any contrary evidence by the employer of a positive record of equal opportunity employment. Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The issue is not one of the correctness or the desirability of the reasons offered, but whether the employer honestly believes in the reason offered. Fischbach v. D.C. Dep't of Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Plaintiff must show that the reason offered is a phony one. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that the following establishes that defendant's stated reason for the hiring decision is a pretext for discrimination: (1) plaintiff was informed by an employee of the Capitol Hilton Hotel that the employee had been told not to hire plaintiff for any position; and (2) employees in defendant's Human Resources department told plaintiff he should not apply to any positions with Hilton. Even if proven, these allegations would not demonstrate pretext. First, the evidence to support this is plaintiff's self-serving affidavit. This evidence alone will not foreclose the granting of summary judgment or create a genuine issue of material fact. Tolson, 315 F.Supp.2d at 116; Remedios Jose v. Hospital for Sick Children, 130 F.Supp.2d 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2000). In addition, the fact Human Resources personnel stated that they would not hire plaintiff for any position does not establish that the reason was a discriminatory one. The affidavit, in fact, does not make such an allegation. And finally, the alleged hearsay statement of an employee at a Hilton Hotel other than the one involved in the present litigation lacks indicia of credibility and is marginally, if at all, relevant and would be inadmissible hearsay. The Court finds, therefore, that plaintiff has failed to show that the reason offered by defendant for its hiring decision is pretextual.
Conclusion
The evidence presented by the parties shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Plaintiff has failed to rebut defendant's articulated non-discriminatory reason for the hiring decision. As such, plaintiff cannot establish a discrimination claim under either Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted and the case dismissed. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.