Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrison

9 Citing cases

  1. Curtis v. Guaranty Trust Life Ins. Co.

    132 N.H. 337 (N.H. 1989)   Cited 11 times
    Noting that the insured's proposed construction of the policy language must be "reasonable," and observing that the court "will not create an ambiguity simply to resolve it against the insurer," and rejecting plaintiff's proposed construction of the policy because it would lead to "absurd" and "illogical" results

    Therefore, "[p]olicy language means what a reasonable person would construe it to mean, and policy terms can create ambiguity as to coverage only when the parties may reasonably differ about their interpretation." City of Manchester v. General Reinsurance Corp., 127 N.H. 806, 809, 508 A.2d 1063, 1065 (1986) (citations omitted); see also Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 130 N.H. 250, 252, 536 A.2d 199, 200 (1987). Simply put, "`the court will honor the reasonable expectations of the policyholder' in determining the amount of coverage."

  2. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Hurley

    76 Cal.App.4th 797 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that settlement plus credit does not satisfy exhaustion requirement in UIM context, and noting analogous application in context of excess coverage, where “California courts have consistently interpreted such provisions to mean that there is no excess coverage where the insured settles for less than the full limits of the primary policy”

    The view expressed in these cases is not unanimous, and other jurisdictions have held exhaustion clauses to be enforceable notwithstanding their potential undesirable consequences. (See, e.g., Robinette v. American Liberty Ins. Co. (S.D. Miss. 1989) 720 F. Supp. 577, 580; Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrison (1987) 130 N.H. 250, 254 [ 536 A.2d 199, 201]; Gaught v. Evans (Ala. 1978) 361 So.2d 1027, 1029.) However, the view disfavoring strict enforcement does appear to be the prevailing one.

  3. Funai v. Metropolitan Prop. Cas. Co.

    145 N.H. 642 (N.H. 2000)   Cited 5 times
    Stating that waiver requires "a clear expression by a party to do so"

    When we interpret insurance policies, "[t]he general rule is that the court will honor the reasonable expectations of the policyholder." Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 130 N.H. 250, 252, 536 A.2d 199, 200 (1987) (quotation omitted). "[W]e construe the terms of the policy as would a reasonable person in the position of the insured based on more than a casual reading of the policy as a whole."

  4. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell

    138 N.H. 229 (N.H. 1994)   Cited 13 times
    Considering applicable insurance policy's specific terms and conditions regarding "uninsured" automobile

    Coverage for the liability of an underinsured motorist exists solely because paragraph 5 (c) of the statutory endorsement defines "uninsured" to include "underinsured." See Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 130 N.H. 250, 255, 536 A.2d 199, 202 (1987). In turn, paragraph 5 (d), quoted again here, provides that an automobile is "underinsured" only if

  5. Concord Hosp. v. N.H. Med. Malpractice Under. Assoc

    137 N.H. 680 (N.H. 1993)   Cited 21 times
    Declining to review an issue because the party neither filed a cross-appeal nor moved to add the question on appeal

    See Gagnon v. N.H. Ins. Co., 133 N.H. 70, 73, 573 A.2d 137, 139 (1990). Where disputed terms are not defined in the policy or by State judicial precedent, we construe them in context, see Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 130 N.H. 250, 252, 255, 536 A.2d 199, 200, 202 (1987), and "in the light of what a more than casual reading of the policy would reveal to an ordinarily intelligent insured," Aetna Insurance Co. v. State Motors, 109 N.H. 120, 125, 244 A.2d 64, 67 (1968); see also Coakley v. Maine Bonding Cas. Co., 136 N.H. 402, 409-10, 618 A.2d 777, 781 (1992). This is an objective standard.

  6. Prudential Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dumont

    618 A.2d 839 (N.H. 1992)   Cited 2 times
    Holding that a UIM carrier may, in calculating its payment under a UIM policy, set off the amounts recovered from tortfeasors other than the underinsured motorist to the extent that those amounts represent double recovery

    The policy's "consent-to-settle" and "exhaustion" clauses relied upon by the plaintiff in this case are acceptable means of protecting this interest. See, e.g., Stevens v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 135 N.H. 26, 30, 599 A.2d 490, 493 (1991) (upholding a "consent-to-settle" clause); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 130 N.H. 250, 255-56, 536 A.2d 199, 202 (1987) (upholding an "exhaustion" clause). Therefore, because the defendant did not comply with the policy's requirements, the plaintiff's denial of coverage was not improper.

  7. Country Mutual Insurance v. Fonk

    198 Ariz. 167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 20 times
    Denying a request for attorneys' fees on appeal because the party failed to state any substantive basis for the request

    See Birchfield v. Nationwide Ins., 875 S.W.2d 502 (Ark. 1994) (legislative intent is clear that limits of liability insurance must be obtained before UIM benefits are available); Ciarelli v. Commercial Union Ins. Companies, 663 A.2d 377 (Conn. 1995) (under exhaustion language in statute, all policies applicable to accident must be exhausted before UIM coverage applies); State ex rel. Shelton v. Mummert, 879 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. 1994) (insureds had to resolve claims against tortfeasor and exhaust his liability coverage before they could make a claim under their UIM coverage); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 536 A.2d 199 (N.H. 1987) (exhaustion clause of UIM policy was consistent with applicable statute). ¶ 21 Country Mutual argues that allowing an insured who settles her claim against the tortfeasor for less than policy limits to recover under UIM coverage puts an unfair burden on the UIM carrier by shifting the expense for litigating the insured's total damages from the liability carrier to the UIM carrier. Furthermore, Country Mutual maintains that this burden should be on the liability carrier because UIM insurance is a low-cost method of providing extended protection such that the premiums do not reflect the risks assumed by the primary carrier.

  8. Danbeck v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.

    2000 WI App. 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 9 times
    Rejecting the idea that a credit was equivalent to exhausting policy limits and concluding that exhausting the limits means "entirely using up the limits"

    Thus, the cases from other jurisdictions support our conclusion that the contested language is not ambiguous. American Family also cited Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 536 A.2d 199 (N.H. 1987), as such a decision but the court there decided a different issue: whether the arbitration clause together with the exhaustion clause created an ambiguity such that the exhaustion clause was void altogether. The court decided that the interplay of the two clauses did not create an ambiguity, and the insured did have to exhaust the limits of the liability policy; but the question what "exhaustion by payment" meant was not raised or decided.

  9. Cobb v. Benjamin

    325 S.C. 573 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 36 times
    Holding a UIM carrier was entitled to credit for the full amount of primary liability coverage before the UIM coverage became payable, even when the plaintiff settled with the primary liability carrier for less than the policy limit

    Robinette v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 720 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Miss. 1989) (interpreting Miss. Code Anno. § 83-11-103 (c)(iii) (Supp. 1989) and exhaustion clause in UIM policy), aff'd, 896 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1990); Continental Ins. Co. v. Cebe-Habersky, 214 Conn. 209, 571 A.2d 104 (1990) (interpreting General Statutes § 38-175c(b)(1)); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 130 N.H. 250, 536 A.2d 199 (1987) (interpreting RSA 264:19 and UIM policy in a case where the insured's damages did not exceed the limits of the liability policy). Finally, several jurisdictions have found the exhaustion requirement void as against public policy.