See Houston v. Doe, 136 Ga. App. 583 (1) ( 222 S.E.2d 131) (1975). Duncan's reliance on Amica Mut. Ins. v. Bourgault, 263 Ga. 157 ( 429 S.E.2d 908) (1993) is misplaced, as Amica involved the substantive question of the validity of a policy exclusion. Accordingly, the trial court erred in looking to Missouri rather than Georgia law.
The trial court conducted a hearing, then granted USAA’s summary judgment motion. In its order, the trial court expressly relied on Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bourgault , 263 Ga. 157, 429 S.E.2d 908 (1993), detailing as the rationale for its decision: [The underlying] contract for automobile insurance coverage in Kentucky [was] entitled "Kentucky Auto Policy" and explicitly indicated that ... the covered vehicle[ ] [was] to be principally garaged in ... Kentucky.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Amica Mut. Ins. v. Bourgault, 263 Ga. 157, 160(2), 429 S.E.2d 908 (1993).Here, the undisputed evidence showed that the truck Hughes was driving at the time of the accident was principally used and garaged in Georgia.
On December 10, 1992, we issued an opinion in this case in which we certified to the Georgia Supreme Court the issue of the application of O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 to insurance policies covering vehicles not principally garaged or used in Georgia. 979 F.2d 187. The Supreme Court of Georgia has responded to our request in its opinion of Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bourgault, 263 Ga. 157, 429 S.E.2d 908 (1993). That court answered our question in the negative, holding that O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 does not invalidate an exclusion in an insurance policy covering a vehicle principally garaged and used outside of Georgia.
In fact, he ultimately did so return." Id., 38-39; see Beckler v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 195 Ariz. 282, 287, 987 P.2d 768 (App. 1999) (although policy was purchased by college student's parents and issued in Nebraska, "principal location of the insured risk" was Arizona because insurance agent "understood" that covered Jeep was with student in that state for "at least nine months out of the year"); Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bourgault, 263 Ga. 157, 160-61,429 S.E.2d 908 (1993) (New York was principal location of risk for cars covered by uninsured motorists policy purchased in Georgia by residents of that state because cars were principally garaged in New York and policy was written on New York forms); Boardman v. United Services Automobile Assn., 470 So. 2d 1024, 1033 (Miss. 1985) (Nebraska was principal location of risk because "automobile liability insurance policy . . . [was] issued to a citizen of Nebraska covering his household" and each of three insured automobiles was "`principally garaged in Nebraska`"); Hartzler v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 653, 655-56 (Mo. App. 1994) (although policy was purchased in Missouri and accident occurred there, Kansas was considered "principal location of the insured risk" because policyholders lived and kept their car in Kansas and policy was labeled as "`Kansas Family Car Policy'" with references to Kansas law).
All the Justices concur. See Aldrich v. City of Lumber City, 273 Ga. 461, 464 ( 542 S.E.2d 102) (2001) (when Code sections are revised by the legislature, the language of the section as amended will be construed to state the law as it previously existed, absent the clear expression of a contrary intention);Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bourgault, 263 Ga. 157, 159 ( 429 S.E.2d 908) (1993) (same).Talbot County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Woodall, 275 Ga. 281, 282 ( 565 S.E.2d 465 (2002); Board of Trustees v. Christy, 246 Ga. 553, 555 ( 272 S.E.2d 288) (1980).
[Cit.]Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bourgault, 263 Ga. 157 (1) ( 429 S.E.2d 908) (1993). There is no indication the legislature intended to revise the definition of what constitutes a change in condition.
[Cit.]" Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bourgault, 263 Ga. 157, 159 (1) ( 429 S.E.2d 908) (1993). Here, there is no evidence that in amending the local act, legislators intended to repeal prior intra-district residency requirements.
Allstate Ins. Co., supra at 552-553 (1), 462 S.E.2d 638.In support of their argument that we should apply California law, the Newstroms cite Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bourgault, 263 Ga. 157, 429 S.E.2d 908 (1993), and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 321 Ga. App. 738, 742 S.E.2d 762 (2013). These decisions are inapposite, because they concern substantive rather than procedural issues.
(Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bourgault, 263 Ga. 157, 159 (1) ( 429 SE2d 908) (1993). (Citations and punctuation omitted.)