V 1981).See Chief Judge Re's opinion below for complete description of relevant TSUS numbers. Amersham Corp. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 813, 814-15 (CIT 1983).Background
Second, the court concluded that even if Note 1(m) does not answer the question of whether the parts provision is more specific than the liquid crystal device provision, the same result would obtain in a straightforward relative specificity analysis mandated by the terms of heading 9013. To perform that analysis, the court stated that it must look to the provision with "requirements which are more difficult to satisfy and which describe the article with the greatest degree of accuracy and certainty," citing Amersham Corp. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 813, 824 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). The court also noted "in passing" that the relative specificity analysis it was undertaking was mandated by heading 9013 ("not . . . provided for more specifically in other headings") and General Rules of Interpretation (GRI) 1 of the HTSUS and not by GRI 3(a) ("The heading which provides the most specific description shall be preferred to headings providing a more general description.").
On that premise, it argues that the light is a visual signalling apparatus or part thereof and classifiable under item 685.70. Carling's difficulty is twofold: (1) goods are classified in the condition in which imported, and the light itself, the best witness, establishes that, as imported, it is just that, a light; and (2) item 685.70 is not a chief-use provision. The parties have devoted substantial discussion to an indication in Amersham Corp. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 813, 825 (Ct.Int' Trade 1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984), that item 685.70 requires that an article function in temporary or abnormal situations, and to the testimony of Carling's expert, Mr. Frederick Kundahl, that the imported light was designed to be operated continuously. In view of the nature of the imported merchandise in this case, we need not and therefore do not resolve the conflicting arguments rising from that discussion.
HQ 959816 appreciates that one of the purposes of FDA standards of identity "is to promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers by truthful and informative labeling of food products" and also that such standards are "helpful in defining a product but . . . not controlling in determining [its] classification . . . under the H[TSUS]."See, e.g., Nestle Re-frigeratedFood Co. v. United States, 18 CIT 661, 666 (1994) ("FDA standards of identity are not controlling for tariff classification purposes"), citing Charles Jacquin et Cie v. United States, 14 CIT 803 (1990); Alexandria Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 13 CIT 689 (1989); Joseph F. Hendrix v. United States, 82 Cust.Ct. 264, C.D. 4809 (1979). Cf. United States v. Mercantil Distribuidora, S.A., 43 CCPA 111, 116-17, C.A.D. 617 (USDA regulation interpreting meaning of "cured beef" not binding for tariff purposes); Amersham Corp. v. United States, 5 CIT 49, 56, 564 F. Supp. 813, 817 (1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (rules and regulations to protect public safety not determinative of tariff classification disputes). Indeed, as pointed out at the beginning hereof, the HTSUS subheading under review provides for peanut butter and paste eo nomine, which kind of provision has long been understood to encompass all forms of the substance within that nomenclature. Defendant's Exhibit A, p. 4.
This holding was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Siemens America, Inc., 68 C.C.P.A. 62, 68, C.A.D. 1266, 653 F.2d 471 (1981). See also Amersham Corp. v. U.S., 564 F. Supp. 813 (1983) (the court followed Siemens in finding that a radioactive substance was "crucial, essential, and indispensable to the proper functioning" of an ionizing smoke detector, and therefore, the smoke detector was an apparatus based on the use of radiations from radioactive substances under item 709.66, TSUS). 11. Notwithstanding that the "based on" language of item 709.66, TSUS, construed in Siemens is also used in the relevant subheadings of Heading 3206, HTSUS, Siemens' interpretation of item 706.66, TSUS, while instructive, is plainly not dispositive of the classification of the totally dissimilar and unrelated subject matter covered by the subheadings at issue, particularly in light of the Explanatory Notes under Heading 32.06. As the interpretation of item 709.66, TSUS, was not aided by an explanatory note in the Tariff Classification Study or other legislative history, Siemens quite properly relies solely on the common meaning of the statutory language to glean the legislative intent
When determining relative specificity, the Court looks at the provision with "requirements which are more difficult to satisfy and which describe the article with the greatest degree of accuracy and certainty." Amersham Corp. v. United States, 5 CIT 49, 66, 564 F. Supp. 813, 824 (1983). As added guidance, additional U.S. Rule of Interpretation 1(c) provides that "a provision for `parts and accessories' shall not prevail over a specific provision for such part or accessory."
The Court concludes that while Plaintiff is correct that classification of imported merchandise is determined by its condition as imported, a particular import's actual susceptibility to plaiting does not appear to be controlling under subheading 1401.90.40, HTSUS. See United States v. Citroen, 223 U.S. 407, 414-15, 32 S.Ct. 259, 260, 56 L.Ed. 486 (1912); Amersham Corp. v. United States, 5 CIT 49, 53, 564 F. Supp. 813, 815 (1983), aff'd, 2 Fed. Cir. (T) 33, 728 F.2d 1453 (1984). Defendant further urges that case law and the Explanatory Notes support the conclusion that vegetable materials such Arundo Donax are not removed from coverage under subheading 1401.90.40 by virtue of the pre-importation processing in this case.
For the purposes of interpreting the Tariff laws, the meanings and variations developed in other areas of the law cannot be determinative. Amersham Corp. v. United States, 5 CIT 49, 56, 564 F. Supp. 813 (1983), aff'd 728 F.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984). It is the opinion of the Court that Congress did not intend to make merchandise eligible for drawback with the same flexibility or openness with which merchandise is considered fungible in general commercial litigation.
Other cases cited by the government to illuminate the scope of item 685.70 TSUS involve the classifications of items, none of which are analogous to LCD's. Carling Electric Co. v. United States, 7 CIT 303, 592 F. Supp. 667 (1984), aff'd, 757 F.2d 1285 (1985) (indicator lights); Oxford Int'l Corp. v. United States, 75 Cust.Ct. 58, C.D. 4608 (1975) (taillights); Amersham Corp. v. United States, 5 CIT 49, 564 F. Supp. 813 (1983) (foil disks), and A A Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 5 CIT 183, 1983 WL 5002 (1983) (metal detectors). The court finds Intercontinental Air Freight, Inc. v. United States, 62 Cust.Ct. 214, C.D. 3731 (1969), and Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 82 Cust.Ct. 287, C.D. 4811, 475 F. Supp. 1183 (1979), aff'd, 67 CCPA 59, C.A.D. 1244, 620 F.2d 269 (1980), to be dispositive.
The meaning of a term for tariff purposes is not controlled by a definition provided by statutes, regulations, or case law involving non-tariff matters. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. United States, 791 F.2d 164 (Fed. Cir. 1986), aff'g on opinion below, 9 CIT 464, 624 F. Supp. 1553, 1555 n. 2 (1985) (citing Int'l Spring Mfg. Co. v. United States, 85 Cust.Ct. 5, 8, C.D. 4862, 496 F. Supp. 279, 282 (1980), aff'd on opinion below, 68 CCPA 13, C.A.D. 1257, 641 F.2d 875 (1981)); Amersham Corp. v. United States, 2 Fed. Cir. (T) 33, 728 F.2d 1453 (1984), aff'g, 5 CIT 49, 56, 564 F. Supp. 813, 817 (1983); South Corp. v. United States, 1 Fed. Cir. (T) 1, 8, 690 F.2d 1368, 1375 (1982) (en banc); Pharmacia Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 67 CCPA 5, 7, C.A.D. 1235, 609 F.2d 491, 493 (1979); United States v. Mercantil Distribuidora, S.A., 43 CCPA 111, 116, C.A.D. 617 (1956). Nor does the decision in Endicott Johnson demand a contrary result.