Opinion
8:24-cv-00878-FWS-SSC
05-07-2024
Ameris Bank v. R and R Lucky, Inc. et al.
Present: HONORABLE FRED W. SLAUGHTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
PROCEEDINGS: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This threshold requirement “‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States' and is ‘inflexible and without exception.'” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884). Thus, district courts “have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
“The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for ‘[f]ederal-question' jurisdiction, and § 1332, which provides for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship' jurisdiction.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 501. As relevant here, diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between the parties and an amount in controversy greater than $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (“[D]iversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from each plaintiff.”); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Jurisdiction founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires that the parties be in complete diversity and the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.”); Lee v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The diversity jurisdiction statute, as construed for nearly 200 years, requires that to bring a diversity case in federal court against multiple defendants, each plaintiff must be diverse from each defendant.”). If a party is a partnership, limited liability company, or other unincorporated association, the court must consider the citizenship of each of the partners, including limited partners, or members, must be alleged. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195-96 (1990); Johnson, 437 F.3d at 899. If a party is a corporation, the complaint must allege both its state(s) of incorporation and principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c); Harris v. Rand, 682 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2012). If a party is a natural person, the complaint must allege their state of domicile, which is their permanent home, where they reside with the intention to remain or to which they intend to return. Ehrman v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 932 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 2019).
In this case, Plaintiff Ameris Bank (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Defendants R & R Lucky, Inc. and Javneet Sandhu on April 22, 2024. (See generally Dkt. 1.) “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a pleading must contain ‘a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support.'” Harris, 682 F.3d at 850 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Plaintiff alleges that the court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 8.)
The court finds Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating complete diversity as required for diversity jurisdiction. With respect to the parties' citizenship, the Complaint alleges that: (1) Plaintiff is a Georgia state-charted banking corporation; (2) Defendant R & R Lucky, Inc. is an Arkansas corporation doing business in County of Washington, Arkansas; and (3) Defendant Sandhu is an individual residing in County of Washington, Arkansas. (See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 1-3.) However, the Complaint does not allege Defendant R & R Lucky, Inc.'s principal place of business. (See generally Dkt 1.) Because “a complaint must include allegations of both the state of incorporation and the principal place of business of corporate parties,” Harris, 682 F.3d at 850 (citations omitted), the court concludes Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged complete diversity between the parties as required for subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing by May 14, 2024, why this case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”) (citations omitted); Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Absent unusual circumstances, a party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction should be able to allege affirmatively the actual citizenship of the relevant parties.”) (citations omitted).
Failure to demonstrate a basis for the court's subject matter jurisdiction or comply with court orders will result in dismissal. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 (“The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.”); Scholastic Ent., 336 F.3d at 985 (“While a party is entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond when a court contemplates dismissing a claim on the merits . . . it is not so when the dismissal is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”); Musick, 505 F.2d at 280 (“It has long been held that a judge can dismiss sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction.”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962) (“The authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff's action with prejudice because of his failure to prosecute cannot seriously be doubted.”); Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 693, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[C]ourts may dismiss under Rule 41(b) sua sponte, at least under certain circumstances.”); Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984) (“It is within the inherent power of the court to sua sponte dismiss a case for lack of prosecution.”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.