The written acknowledgment required must be a direct and unequivocal admission of a pre-existing debt for which the party signing the admission is liable. Noble v. Bodovitz, 175 Okla. 432, 52 P.2d 1046; Olatmanns v. Glenn, 78 Okla. 70, 188 P. 887; American Surety Co. of New York v. Steele, 84 Okla. 166, 203 P. 1043. The acknowledgment when made in the manner above provided tolls the statute and starts it running anew from the date of the admission.

The action was filed April 19, 1940, within five years from the date of the letter. The plaintiff cites and relies upon Markovitch v. McGowan, 183 Okla. 272, 81 P.2d 311; Baker v. Christy, 172 Okla. 32, 44 P.2d 16; American Surety Co. of New York v. Steele, 84 Okla. 166, 203 P. 1043, and various decisions from other jurisdictions. Defendants rely upon some of the same cases, and upon Noble v. Bodovitz, 175 Okla. 432, 52 P.2d 1046, and Olatmanns v. Glenn, 78 Okla. 70, 188 P. 886. The rule to be applied in testing the sufficiency of written acknowledgments of debt to toll the statute of limitations is that "all that is necessary to satisfy the statute is for the debtor to manifest in writing an acknowledgment of the existing liability, debt, or claim, and no particular form is necessary."

Baker v. Christy, supra; Markovitch v. McGowan, 183 Okla. 272, 81 P.2d 311; Ryan v. United States, 136 U.S. 68, 34 L.Ed. 447, 10 S.Ct. 913. A memorandum, however, must express the essential elements of the contract with reasonable certainty so that it constitutes a direct and unequivocal admission of a present debt for which the party signing the admission is liable. Noble v. Bodovitz, 175 Okla. 432, 52 P.2d 1046; American Surety Co. of N.Y. v. Steele, 84 Okla. 166, 203 P. 1043; Olatmanns v. Glenn, supra. The check pleaded by plaintiff neither contained any indication of what it was given for nor was it mentioned in any writings between the parties which made reference thereto or connected it in any manner.

There is a distinction between an acknowledgment made before the bar of the statute has attached, and an acknowledgment made thereafter. Cowhick v. Shingle, 5 Wyo. 87; Smith v. Smith, 39 Wyo. 107; Bell v. Morrison, 1 Peters 351; Moore v. Bank, 6 Peters 86; Andrew v. Kennedy, 45 P. 485; Clatsman v. Glenn, 188 P. 888; American Surety Company v. Steele (Okla.) 203 P. 1043; Hanson v. Towle, 19 Kan. 273. The acknowledgment must be an unqualified admission of an existing debt. Elder v. Dyer, 26 Kan. 604; Corbett v. Hoss (Kan.) 157 P. 1195; Liberman v. Gurensky, 67 P. 998; Bank v. Guse, 98 P. 1127. Modern interpretation favors a more liberal construction of such statutes.

" See, also, American Surety Company of New York v. Steel, 84 Okla. 166, 203 P. 1043; Eichman v. Culver, 169 Okla. 495, 37 P.2d 640; Street v. Moore, 172 Okla. 336, 45 P.2d 73. In 17 R. C. L. section 310, we find the general rule stated as follows:

It is plaintiff's contention that this written instrument duly signed by the defendants is a sufficient acknowledgment or promise in writing within the provisions of section 107, O. S. 1931, to take the cause out of the bar of the statute of limitations. This section of our statute on the question of a written acknowledgment of a debt has received consideration of this court in the cases of Olatmanns v. Glenn, 78 Okla. 70, 188 P. 886, and American Surety Co. of New York v. Steele, 84 Okla. 166, 203 P. 1043. The court in the Olatmanns Case, supra, held in syllabus 2 thereof as follows:

The law is well settled that a new acknowledgment of a debt, in order to be effective under the statute, must be clear, unequivocal, and unqualified, and must be an admission of a present liability or claim. McKennon v. McKennon, 104 Okla. 228, 231 P. 91; American Surety Co. v. Steele, 84 Okla. 166, 203 P. 1043. We conclude that the action taken by the board in 1930 is wholly immaterial to the controlling question.

The plaintiff in error contends, however, that the evidence of plaintiff was sufficient to entitle it to go to the jury with this question. In support of this contention, plaintiff in error cites American Surety Co. of New York v. Steele, 84 Okla. 166, 203 P. 1043; Preston v. Hockaday Hdw. Co., 137 Okla. 283, 279 P. 333; and Thompson v. Martin, 138 Okla. 138, 280 P. 589, construing section 191, C. O. S. 1921, supra. From an examination of these authorities it is obvious that the statute of limitation may be tolled in three ways: First, by payment of part of the principal or interest; second, by an acknowledgment in writing of an existing liability, signed by the party to be charged; or third, by a promise of payment in writing signed by the party to be charged; and it is sufficient that any one of these conditions shall exist.

"In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same shall have been made, an action may be brought in such case within the period prescribed for the same, after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby." In the case of American Surety Co. v. Steele, 84 Okla. 166, 203 P. 1043, it was held that, according to the provisions in the above section, there were three methods by which a contract, after it has become barred, as well as before, may be taken out of the operation of the statute: (1) By payment of a part of the principal or interest; (2) by an acknowledgment in writing of an existing liability, debt or claim, signed by the party to be charged; and (3) by a promise of payment in writing signed by the party to be charged. And it is sufficient that any one of the conditions shall exist.

"In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt, or claim, or any promise to pay the same shall have been made, an action may be brought in such case within the period prescribed for the same, after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing signed by the party to be charged thereby." And cites the case of American Surety Company of New York v. Steel, 84 Okla. 166, 203 P. 1043, construing same. From an examination of that authority and others cited, it is obvious that the statute of limitation may be tolled, but it is also clear that there must be an express declaration, admission, or agreement, clear and unequivocal, or it may be tolled by payment of interest or part of the principal, the payment must be made in a legitimate manner, and by some one duly authorized to make it, and out of a fund legally available for such purposes. Many authorities are cited on this question, both by appellant and appellees, but we think the facts as disclosed by the record are decisive of the matter.