Opinion
April 18, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.).
The IAS Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the plaintiff had established its entitlement to a preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendant from entering into, or inducing the breach of, any contractual agreements with persons or entities presently under contract to the plaintiff, by demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury should the relief sought be denied and a balancing of the equities in its favor (Grant Co. v Srogi, 52 N.Y.2d 496, 517).
Plaintiff has met its burden of proving by competent evidence the elements required to state a cause of action for tortious interference with contractual relations by establishing that the defendant had intentionally induced the breach of a contract between the plaintiff and a third party to plaintiff's detriment (Israel v Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 120).
Although restrictive covenants which tend to prevent an employee from pursuing a similar vocation after termination of employment are generally disfavored (Columbia Ribbon Carbon Mfg. Co. v A-1-A Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 496, 499), the restrictive covenant at issue, which relates to a commercial contract between independent contractors rather than an employment agreement and which restricts the independent contractors from competing in their local area or territory for a one year period, is, on its face, reasonably limited, both temporally and geographically, and not unduly burdensome (Meteor Indus. v Metalloy Indus., 149 A.D.2d 483, 485-486).
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining claims and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Rubin, Asch, Williams and Mazzarelli, JJ.