We have previously affirmed the Board's rejection of an employer's effort to recharacterize a consequential psychological condition claim as one for an occupational disease. American Nursing v. Yost, 108 Or. App. 243, 245, 815 P.2d 708 (1991). We do so again in this case.
Employer focuses on the emphasized language as support for its conclusion that the provisions of ORS 656.802(2) apply any time that a person seeks compensation for the effects of work-related stress. We held in American Nursing v. Yost, 108 Or. App. 243, 815 P.2d 708 (1991), and Nordstrom, Inc. v. Gaul, 108 Or. App. 237, 815 P.2d 710 (1991), that, when a claimant merely seeks to recover benefits for the consequences of a compensable injury, but does not seek to establish independently the compensability of a mental disorder, the provisions of ORS 656.802 do not apply. See Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Page, 73 Or. App. 136, 398 P.2d 61 (1985); Grace v. SAIF, 76 Or. App. 511, 709 P.2d 1146 (1985). If the condition is compensable, it is because it is related to the compensable injury, not because it is independently work-connected.