Since RTC, like the FDIC, is an instrumentality and agency of the United States, Mr. Plumlee cannot pursue his counterclaim unless federal law specifically authorizes such action. See, e.g., FDIC v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Illinois, 877 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom., American Ins. Co. v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 865, 107 L.Ed.2d 948 (1990); FDIC v. La Rambla Shopping Center, 791 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1986); Safeway Portland Employees' Federal Credit Union v. FDIC, 506 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1974). The FTCA provides a partial waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity, but only under the conditions and exceptions specified in the Act.

Citing a long line of decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for the proposition that, when jurisdiction under subsection (a) of § 1581 is or could have been available, jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(i) may not be invoked unless relief under section 1581(a) would be "manifestly inadequate," see Am. Signature Inc. v. United States, 31 CIT ___, 477 Fed. Supp. 2d 1281, 1287 (2007), Defendant argues that Plaintiff may not, in this matter, invoke jurisdiction under section 1581(i), but must first utilize its protest remedy and obtain jurisdiction pursuant to section 1581(a). Defendant also relies on 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) which states that "the Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administrative remedies." Finally, Defendant notes that under the rule announced in the court's decision in American Motorists Ins. Co. v. United States, 14 CIT 298, 737 F. Supp. 648 (1990), Plaintiff's complaint is untimely because a protest denying liability under an import bond must be filed within the 180-day period of the Customs decision challenged thereby. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c) (2004).

It is no mere "courtesy" or formality. Cf. 19 C.F.R. § 159.9(d) ("Customs will endeavor to provide importers . . . with Customs Notice Form 4333-A, `Courtesy Notice,. . . . This notice shall serve as an informal, courtesy notice and not as a direct, formal and decisive notice of liquidation.") (emphases added). Cf. New Zealand Lamb Co. v. United States. 40 F.3d 377, 381-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that, where bulletin notices made no mention of interest, jurisdictional 90-day period for filing of protest did not begin to run until Customs sent importer a bill for interest; proper notice requires that party assessed be "informed of all elements of the charge: liability and quantum, either or both of which it may wish to protest"); Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. United States. 14 CIT 298, 303, 737 F. Supp. 648, 652 (1990) (sustaining adequacy of notice provided by Formal Demand on Surety — equivalent to a bill sent to an importer, see n. 8, supra — where demand specified, inter alia, "the amount due — listing separately for each bill the total amount, principal amount, and interest amount due, and the `age category' of the bills — either 60, 90, or 120 days, or longer") (emphases added); The A.W. Fenton Co. v. United States. 55 Cust. Ct. 74, 80 (1965) (in context of Tariff Act of 1930, linking importer's need to know more than merely the "approximate" sum due if he is to be required to make payment; noting "rational basis" for not requiring pre-payment of duties as prerequisite to protest by importer for reappraisement because such an importer "has not had his duty liquidated and does not know, except approximately, and not always that, what the liquidation duty will be."). Mr. Atteberry has repeatedly explained that he did not pay the outstanding duties and interest prior to filing this action because

This action raises the significant legal issue of whether a defendant surety in an action brought by the government under § 1582 may, as an affirmative defense to duty liability under its bond, collaterally challenge the legality of a liquidation, which by the terms of § 1514 is "final and conclusive" as to all persons if not timely protested, where the surety failed to file such protest. It is beyond contravention that under the express terms of § 1514, a liquidation or reliquidation is "final and conclusive" against all persons, including a surety on an entry bond, unless timely protested.See Utex International, Inc., supra; AN. Deringer, supra; American Motorists Ins. Co. v. United States, 14 CIT 298, 737 F. Supp. 648, 649 (1990); Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc., supra; Juice Farms, Inc., supra; United States v. Ataka America, Inc., 17 CIT ___, 826 F. Supp. 495 (1993); SCA Int'l, Inc., supra; Washington Int'l Ins. Co. v. United States, 13 CIT 112, 707 F. Supp. 561 (1989); Computime, Inc. v. United States, 8 CIT 259, 601 F. Supp. 1029 (1984), aff'd, 772 F.2d 874 (Fed. 1985); and Schmitt Co. v. United States, 71 Cust.Ct. 194, 371 F. Supp. 1079 (1973). Hereinafter, the term "liquidation" shall be used to include a "reliquidation" since under § 1514 both are "final and conclusive" unless a timely protest is filed.