Opinion
Case No. 3: 06 CV 7036.
August 25, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff American Maritime Officers ("AMO") motion to remand, as to which Defendants ("MEBA or Defendants") have filed a memorandum in opposition and a motion to dismiss. The parties have fully briefed the matter and oral argument was afforded on July 25, 2006. The Court has reviewed the exceptionally well briefed matters before it and will grant Plaintiff's motion to remand and deny Defendants' motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Briefly stated, AMO filed its two count complaint against Defendants, alleging tortious interference with AMO's contract with a third party employer, Interlake Steamship Co. ("Interlake"), which unjustly enriched Defendants and injured AMO. None of the Defendants was at the time a party to the contract between AMO and Interlake. AMO alleges that its claim is based solely on the state law of Ohio involving tortious interference with the contract. There is no question that a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") existed between AMO and Interlake and that MEBA had knowledge thereof; the issues to be determined include whether MEBA intentionally induced Interlake to breach that CBA without justification, and whether damages were suffered by AMO or a benefit reaped by MEBA as a result of such tortious conduct.
MEBA opposes the motion to remand on the basis that removal to this Court was appropriate under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185 and, in addition, the claims of Plaintiff are independently preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. and ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. While Defendants are not asserting preemption under the latter two noted statutes as independent grounds for removal, those statutes are alleged to provide alternative grounds for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims.
With that brief background, the Court will now proceed to a summary discussion of the issues so fully briefed by the parties.
DISCUSSION
There are several leading cases in both the United States Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit involving this subject, some of which cases appear to be inconsistent. In a case with very closely similar facts as this one, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a non-signatory to a CBA cannot claim preemption under Section 301 of the Taft Hartley Act for state claims of tortious interference with a contract where, as in the case at bar, the claim can be resolved without construing the terms of the CBA. Daugherty v. Parsec, Inc., 872 F.2nd 766, 770 (6th Cir. 1989). In Daugherty, a member of the union sued his employer, the union and a client of the employer, alleging that the client had interfered with his employment relationship by requesting his discharge. After remand from the Supreme Court, 486 U.S. 1089 (1989), the Sixth Circuit ruled that interference with contractual relations claims is preempted, "if, but only if" breach of contract is an essential element" of such a state law claim. In applying Ohio law, the Court held that breach of contract was not an essential element of Plaintiff's claims as "an underlying determination of the merits of the state law claim will not have to consider whether there was an actual breach of contract — only whether there was an interference by [Defendants] that in some way affected the business relationship of [Plaintiff and the contract employer]." Id. At 770.
Here, Defendant is a third party union accused of the state law tort of interference with contract. While the existence of the relationship between AMO and Interlake, the employer, arose out of a CBA, no interpretation of that contract is necessary to the determination of violation of state law, but only the mere existence of the contract. In fact, an arbitrator has found that Interlake breached its duty under the CBA by failing to bargain in good faith, and that decision was recently upheld by Chief Judge James G. Carr in Interlake v. American Maritime Officers Union, Case No. 3:05 CV 7312. The arbitrator's decision that Interlake violated the recognition and non-coercion provisions of its contract with AMO through its actions with MEBA stands as controlling authority on the issue of breach of contract. Therefore, the issue before this Court or the Court of Common Pleas involves not interpretation of the CBA but the relationship between Interlake and AMO and whether any action by MEBA constituted a tort for which AMO may seek redress under Ohio law.
The parties have cited the Court to a multitude of cases, the discussion of each of which would be superfluous to the conclusion reached herein. The leading cases in this Circuit include not only the Daugherty decision but DeCoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1994) and Mattis v. Mossman, 355 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2004). The Court in DeCoe held that if a right is asserted under state law and does not involve interpretation of the CBA, there is no 301 preemption, but if neither or only one of said criterion is satisfied, preemption applies. Such is the case here as no interpretation of the CBA is necessary.
In Mattis the plaintiff was a plant supervisor who alleged interference with a business relationship that was created pursuant to the CBA. The Sixth Circuit determined that the relationship in such case, created by the CBA, required the court to determine the question of whether the defendant interfered with the relationship created by the CBA and to do so would require delving into the rights and responsibilities of a plant supervisor pursuant to the CBA. "Undoubtedly, the supervisor would claim that his actions were consistent with his duties as a supervisor at the factory. Congress intended such questions to be addressed within the realm of federal, not state, law." Id. At 907. The court concluded that the rights alleged by the plaintiff arose out of the CBA and that determining the issues would require delving into an interpretation of the CBA. Mattis is to be differentiated from the case here at issue because no interpretation of the CBA is required to determine whether there was a violation solely of Ohio tort law.
Five months subsequent to Mattis, the Sixth Circuit decided Alongi v. Ford Motor Co., et al., 386 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 2004). There the plaintiff claimed that the employer conspired to violate Michigan's public policy by bribing the employees' negotiator with a managerial position in return for his failing to secure strong employment guarantees in the CBA. The Court of Appeals panel, consisting of two if the three judges who decided the Mattis case, determined that the matter was not completely preempted under Section 301 and that there was no removal jurisdiction since the claim did not involve an allegation that the employer violated the CBA nor did it turn on any finding that the terms of said contract were violated. The Court cited the United States Supreme Court cases of Catapiller v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) and Lividas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) in support of its position that where the matter was solely one of state law and did not involve interpretation of the CBA, no federal preemption under Section 301 is to be found.
Defendants urge this Court to take special note of its decision in International Brotherhood v. Joseph, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 23035 (N.D. Ohio 2005). In the Joseph case this Court held that the state law interference with contract claim required either an interpretation of the CBA or relied upon a right created by that CBA. That is to be distinguished from this case where the Court does not have to interpret or rely upon the CBA between AMO and a third party, Interlake.
Plaintiff has cited the Court to 78 cases and Defendant 50 cases. Many of them are duplicative and those deemed relevant have been reviewed by this Court. In reaching its decision, this Court has determined that those cases in both the United States Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit upon which Plaintiff relies are controlling as the facts therein more closely mirror those involved in the instant case. The Court has cited above but a few of those cases considered. Both Daughtrey in 1988 and Alongi in 2004, both decided by the Sixth Circuit, militate in favor of finding no federal preemption under Section 301, thus, leading the Court to grant Plaintiff's motion to remand.
MOTION TO DISMISS
Because the Court has determined to grant Plaintiff's motion to remand, it will deny Defendants' motion to dismiss because this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the same.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's motion to remand (Doc. No. 8) will be granted and Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 3) will be denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.