American Insurance Union v. Woodard

13 Citing cases

  1. American Ins. Union v. Mead

    274 P. 475 (Okla. 1929)   Cited 1 times

    Same — Measure of Damages for Unauthorized Cancellation of Policy. In a suit for damages for the unauthorized cancellation of an insurance policy, the measure of damages will be determined as set out in the case of American Insurance Union v. Woodard, 118 Okla. 248, 247 P. 398, and, where there is no evidence to the contrary, it will be assumed that the full amount of the face of the policy will be due at the date of the death of the policyholder, although the amount to be paid is based upon one assessment to be made against a roll of 1,000 members to which the policyholder belongs. Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 1.

  2. Franklin v. Northern Life Ins. Co.

    104 P.2d 310 (Wash. 1940)   Cited 11 times

    The rule bottomed upon the difference between the cost of the repudiated policy and the cost of new insurance is not applicable, in view of the fact that appellant is no longer an insurable risk. Addressing itself to the question of the measure of damages recoverable by the assured for the wrongful breach of contract of insurance, the supreme court of Oklahoma, in American Ins. Union v. Woodard, 118 Okla. 248, 247 P. 398, 400, 48 A.L.R. 102, said: "The rule governing the measure of damages recoverable by the assured for the wrongful breach of the contract of insurance is not uniform among the several courts.

  3. Combs v. International Ins. Co.

    354 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2004)   Cited 348 times
    Holding that, where a state's supreme court has not ruled on a particular issue, federal courts should predict how the supreme court would rule

    Furthermore, courts have frequently recognized anticipatory repudiation in insurance coverage disputes, and insurance policies are unilateral agreements. See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 56 S.Ct. 615, 80 L.Ed. 971 (1936); Lovell v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 U.S. 264, 4 S.Ct. 390, 28 L.Ed. 423 (1884); Caminetti v. Manierre, 23 Cal.2d 94, 142 P.2d 741 (1943); Scott v. Life Cas. Ins. Co., 34 Ga.App. 479, 129 S.E. 903 (Ga. 1925); Van Werden v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 99 Iowa 621, 68 N.W. 892 (Iowa 1896); Ebert v. Mut. Res. Fund L. Ass'n, 81 Minn. 116, 83 N.W. 506 (1900); McKee v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 383 (1859); Garland v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 179 N.C. 67, 101 S.E. 616 (1919); Fischer v. Hope Mut. Life Ins. Co., 69 N.Y. 161 (1877); Am. Ins. Union v. Woodard, 118 Okla. 248, 247 P. 398 (1926); Gaskill v. Pittsburgh Life Trust Co., 261 Pa. 546, 104 A. 775 (1918); Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Taylor, 99 Va. 208, 37 S.E. 854 (1901); Merrick v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 124 Wis. 221, 102 N.W. 593 (1905). The long list of cases involving the alleged anticipatory repudiation of an insurance contract includes disputes, like this one, that involve the alleged renunciation of a D O policy. See, e.g., Fed. Sav. Loan Ins. Corp. v. Oldenburg, 671 F.Supp. 720, 724 (D.Utah 1987) (finding insurer had anticipitorily repudiated a D O insurance contract through letter that "was a definitive statement of an intent not to perform sent to the insured while there was a claim pending"); Xebec, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d at 740 (finding, in litigation over a directors and officers insurance policy, that case law does not "establish that there can never be an anticipatory repudiation of an insurance contract"). If a breach occurred, Defendant's response to the Renne letter breached the insuran

  4. Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co.

    Civil Action WMN-09-706 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2012)   Cited 1 times

    See, e.g., Day v. Conn. General Life Ins. Co., 45 Conn. 480 (Conn. 1878) (insurer wrongfully refused to accept payment of annual premium); American Ins. Union v. Woodard, 118 Okla. 248 (Okla. 1926) (insurer wrongfully cancelled policy when insured was no longer insurable); Clemmitt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 76 Va. 355 (Va. 1882) (insurer wrongfully refused to collect premiums after war ended); Merrick v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co, 124 Wis. 221 (Wis. 1905) (insurer conceded that it wrongfully refused to accept further payment of premiums). The Court notes that none of the cases cited in support of Mr. Goldstein's choice of remedies argument came from a Maryland court or applied Maryland law, despite the present case being governed by Maryland substantive law pursuant to applicable choice of law principles.

  5. Lincoln Health Accident Ins. Co. v. Coslow

    12 P.2d 875 (Okla. 1932)   Cited 2 times

    The defendant complains of the instructions given to the jury. We have examined those instructions under the rules stated in American Ins. Union v. Mead, 135 Okla. 93, 274 P. 475; American Ins. Union v. Woodard, 118 Okla. 248, 247 P. 398; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 85 Okla. 64, 204 P. 269; Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Isom, 70 Okla. 277, 173 P. 841; Shawnee Life Ins. Co. v. Watkins, 53 Okla. 188, 156 P. 181; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 39 Okla. 205, 135 P. 279, and Continental Casualty Co. v. Owen, 38 Okla. 107, 131 P. 1084, and we find no reversible error therein. Finding no error in the judgment of the trial court, it is in all things affirmed.

  6. Mo. Cattle Co. v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co.

    330 Mo. 988 (Mo. 1932)   Cited 30 times
    In Missouri Cattle Loan Company v. Great Southern Life Insurance Company, 330 Mo. 988, 52 S.W.2d 1 (1932), the court refrained from holding that custom and conduct alone would give rise to a duty to notify the assignee of premiums due, finding instead that written assurances that such notices would be given to the assignee, in addition to actual conduct over a three year period when notices were given, gave rise to reasonable reliance by the assignee that notice would be given. Under those circumstances the court found the insurance company was estopped to assert forfeiture for non-payment.

    pp. 49, 49 N.E. 44; Indiana Life Endowment Co. v. Carnithan, 62 Ind. App. 567, 109 N.E. 851; Prichard v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 124 N.Y.S. 650; American Trust Company v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 173 N.C. 558, 92 S.E. 706; Heinlein v. Imperial Life Insurance Co., 101 Mich. 250, 59 N.W. 615; Mutual Relief Assn. v. Ray (Ark.), 292 S.W. 396; Supreme Council A.L.H. v. Jordan, 117 Ga. 808, 45 S.E. 33; Palmer v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 121 Minn. 395, 141 N.W. 518; Lovell v. St. L. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 U.S. 264, 28 L.Ed. 423; Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 44 L.Ed. 953; Greenwood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 27 Mo. App. 401; Smoot v. Bankers Life Assn., 138 Mo. App. 438, 120 S.W. 719; Murphy v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 199 S.W. 730; Green v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 159 Mo. App. 277, 140 S.W. 325; Davis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 47 F.2d 1051; Smith v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 64 Mo. 330; Michaelson v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 154 F. 356; American Insurance Union, 118 Okla. 248, 247 P. 398, 48 A.L.R. 102, 48 A.L.R. 107; Robertson v. Covenant Mutual Life Ins. Co., 128 Mo. App. 238, 100 S.W. 686; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 301 Mo. 87, 256 S.W. 232; Guaranty Life Ins. Co. v. Frumson, 236 S.W. 310. (b) The decree rendered herein is not invalid on the ground that it is unenforcible and assumes the management and control of the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. Gold Issue Mining Milling Co. v. Penn Fire Ins. Co., 267 Mo. 524, 184 S.W. 999; Penn Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 61 L.Ed. 610; Castagnino v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 157 F. 29; Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Douds, 261 U.S. 476, 67 L.Ed. 754; State ex rel. v. Denton, 229 Mo. 187, 129 S.W. 709; Secs. 5931 and 5936, R.S. 1929. (c) This action is not prematurely brought on the ground that the policy has not yet matured.

  7. American Ins. Union v. Jones

    274 P. 478 (Okla. 1929)   Cited 6 times

    Under the provisions of the policy, as above set out, for the loss of one foot it is provided that the policyholder shall be entitled to the "value of the same," meaning the value of the policy. In the case of American Insurance Union v. Woodard, 118 Okla. 248, 247 P. 398, it was held by this court, upon a policy identical with the one in the case at bar, that upon reaching the maximum as provided in said policy the $1,000 becomes a fixed liability of the insurance company upon the death of the assured. We have examined the record in the case of American Insurance Union v. Woodard, supra, filed in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court, and find that the same contention was made in that case, so far as the amount of the liability was concerned, contending that it should pay whatever an assessment upon the rolls would amount to; and, while the court did not pass directly upon the proposition here presented, it did in that case fix the value of the policy without any testimony as to what one assessment upon the rolls would amount to.

  8. Laudan v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.

    15 Cal.App.2d 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936)

    This may be conceded as a general rule, but here appellants' attack seems to be directed at the complaint rather than at the evidence relating to damages or the instructions on that subject. Disregarding for the moment the fact that respondent received two retirement income policies upon the surrender of his life insurance policy, the evidence did show the amount of damage sustained by the wrongful cancellation of the policy at a time when the assured was no longer insurable and the instructions were properly drawn under the rules indicated in Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. v. Ferrenbach, 144 Fed. 342 [7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1163], American Insurance Union v. Woodard, 118 Okl. 248 [ 247 P. 398, 48 A.L.R. 102], and Ebert v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn., 81 Minn. 116 [83 N.W. 506, 84 N.W. 457]. (See, also, 48 A.L.R. 116.) From the evidence it appeared that the retirement income policies were practically valueless to respondent in his condition at the time the transaction was consummated.

  9. Protective Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n v. Duke

    91 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)   Cited 2 times

    The rule adopted for determining the measure of damages in this state for the wrongful cancellation of an insurance certificate where the insured has elected to sue for damages for wrongful breach of the contract is the value of the contract or policy at the time of the wrongful cancellation. Supreme Lodge, K. of P. v. Neeley, supra; Provident Savings Life Assurance Society v. Ellinger (Tex.Civ.App.) 164 S.W. 1024; St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Thompson, 102 Tex. 89, 113 S.W. 144, 19 Ann.Cas. 1250; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Ferrenbach (C.C.A.) 144 F. 342, 345, 7 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1163; Ebert v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 81 Minn. 116, 83 N.W. 506, 834, 84 N.W. 457; American Ins. Union v. Woodard, 118 Okla. 248, 247 P. 398, 401, 48 A.L.R. 102; and the more recent case of Grand Fraternity v. Nicosia (Tex.Civ.App.) 41 S.W.2d 684, 685, where the cases first cited were followed. There is a case in this state, Washington Life Ins. Co. et al. v. Lovejoy et al. (Tex.Civ.App.) 149 S.W. 398, which holds that the measure of damage for the wrongful cancellation of an insurance contract where the insured is at the time no longer an insurable risk is the amount of the premiums paid by the insured together with 6 per cent.

  10. Vicars v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n

    81 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. Ct. App. 1935)   Cited 2 times

    In regard to the latter class of policies, for their attempted wrongful cancellation or breach, liability for damages is very generally held to result. See for declaration of the applicable rules governing in such cases 14 R. C. L., secs. 192 and 193, pp. 1013 and 1014; American Insurance Union v. Woodard, 118 Okl. 248, 247 P. 398, reported and annotated in 48 A.L.R. 102; 32 C. J., secs. 461 to 466, pp. 1263 to 1265. However, we are not to be understood as here expressing an adverse opinion or as deciding the question as to whether or not a right to recover damages might exist for the attempted wrongful cancellation of a health and accident policy in harmony with the rule applicable to that of life insurance policies, nor as holding that the appellee in the instant case could refuse a renewal of the policy after appellant's payment of the premium to its local agent on December 30, 1933, even before the same became due.