American Federation of Labor v. Donovan

64 Citing cases

  1. National Ass'n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps

    453 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D.D.C. 2006)   Cited 6 times

    5 U.S.C. § 553. If the agency fails to provide this notice and opportunity to comment or the notice and comment period is in adequate, the "regulation must fall on procedural grounds, and the substantive validity of the change accordingly need not be examined." AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1985). DISCUSSION

  2. National Black Media Coalition v. F.C.C

    791 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1986)   Cited 37 times
    Holding that the FCC violated the APA by relying on maps and internal studies that were not disclosed to the public for comment when it decided to abandon its minority preference in awarding broadcast licenses

    While a final rule need not be an exact replica of the rule proposed in the Notice, the final rule must be a "logical outgrowth" of the rule proposed. AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1221 (D.C.Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Lead Industries Ass'n v. Donovan, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3148, 69 L.Ed.2d 997 (1981). Clearly, "`if the final rule deviates too sharply from the proposal, affected parties will be deprived of notice and an opportunity to respond to the proposal.'"

  3. Public Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta

    427 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2006)   Cited 2 times

    If the agency fails to provide this notice and opportunity to comment or the notice and comment period are inadequate, the "regulation must fall on procedural grounds, and the substantive validity of the change accordingly need not be analyzed." AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("AFL-CIO") II. THE AGENCY HAS THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE CATEGORICALCONFIDENTIALITY DETERMINATIONS ABOUT CLASSES OF EWR DATA

  4. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission

    57 F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1995)   Cited 17 times
    Noting the agency "could hardly have done a better job" of "hid[ing] in the most unlikely place its 'notice' "

    We have repeatedly held, however, that each interested party is not required to monitor the comments filed by all others in order to get notice of the agency's proposal; hence, the comments received do not cure the inadequacy of the notice given. American Fed'n of Labor v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force, 705 F.2d at 550. Insofar as the agency means to show that despite the inadequacy of its notice, the parties had actual notice of its proposal, see Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force, 705 F.2d at 549 — which one party might well get from the comments of another party — the Commission has not demonstrated that that occurred here.

  5. National Wildlife Federation v. Norton

    386 F. Supp. 2d 553 (D. Vt. 2005)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that the FWS may not limit its analysis of a significant portion of a species' range "to areas that ensure the validity of the DPS" and finding that the FWS could not delist a gray wolf DPS on the basis that a core population was viable without addressing unoccupied portions of the gray wolf's current and historical range

    A final rule need not be identical to the proposed rule, but it must be a "logical outgrowth" of the proposed regulation. Kooritzky v. Reich, 17 F.3d 1509, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1994); American Fed'n of Labor and Congr. of Indus. Orgs. v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (hereinafter "AFL-CIO"). If the "final rule deviates too sharply from the proposal, [however], affected parties will be deprived of notice and an opportunity to respond to the proposal."

  6. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman

    943 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1996)   Cited 4 times
    Granting summary judgment to plaintiffs on all legal claims except one that plaintiffs have not appealed; defendants did not allege any genuine disputes of material fact, but instead moved only to dismiss for lack of standing

    [I]f the final rule deviates too sharply from the proposal, affected parties will be deprived of notice and an opportunity to respond to the proposal." American Fed'n of Labor Cong. of Indus. Org. v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). A determination whether notice was adequate turns on an examination of the notice given and the rule finally adopted.

  7. Consumer Federation of America v. Department of Health

    906 F. Supp. 657 (D.D.C. 1995)   Cited 2 times

    5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3). Plaintiffs recognize, as they must in light of the governing case law, that the rule which is finally adopted by an agency need not be identical to the one originally proposed and published for comment. Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1991); American Federation of Labor v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1985). However, Plaintiffs maintain that because the final regulations deviated so substantially from those originally proposed, interested persons were deprived of an opportunity to comment.

  8. Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

    225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000)   Cited 130 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Upholding FERC's 1996 reform orders

    Because FERC's notice was not clear that the liability standard was a subject or issue of the rulemaking, the IOUs claim that FERC denied their right to comment on the change. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1985); McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Citing principally our opinion in Air Transport Association of America v. DOT, 900 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the IOUs contend that the fact that they were able to raise their concerns in their petition for rehearing is not a substitute for pre-issuance notice and comment.

  9. Kooritzky v. Reich

    17 F.3d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1994)   Cited 40 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding agency violated § 553 where proposed rulemaking "contain[ed] nothing, not the merest hint, to suggest" it would amend a regulation

    The adequacy of the notice depends, according to our precedent, on whether the final rule is a "logical outgrowth" of the proposed rule. Fertilizer Inst., 935 F.2d at 1311; see also AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Because the "logical outgrowth" formulation may be merely another way of asking "how much notice is enough," Small Refiner, 705 F.2d at 547, answering the question may prove difficult in some cases.

  10. Shell Oil Co. v. E.P.A

    950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991)   Cited 82 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding Chaney inapplicable because "EPA has announced, through rulemaking, that it will not take enforcement actions in a whole class of cases" under a "permit-shield rule"

    A difference between the two will not invalidate the notice so long as the final rule is a "logical outgrowth" of the one proposed. If the deviation from the proposal is too sharp, the affected parties will not have had adequate notice and opportunity for comment. See American Fed'n of Labor v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985). RCRA defines the scope of the EPA's regulatory discretion: In formulating rules, the clearly expressed intent of Congress binds agencies as it binds courts.