Opinion
No. CV 116015127
February 14, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO TRANSFER VENUE
This collection action was commenced by service of a writ, summons and complaint made returnable to the judicial district of Fairfield. The plaintiff is a foreign corporation. The defendant resides in Stamford. This action involves a "consumer transaction" as that term is defined at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-345(d). The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue. In the alternative, the defendant asks this court to transfer venue to the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk. The plaintiff objects on the grounds that venue is proper in either the judicial district of Fairfield or the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the motion to dismiss but agrees that venue is not proper in this judicial district and orders that the matter be transferred to the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk.
"Consumer transaction" is defined as "a transaction in which a natural person obligates himself to pay for goods sold or leased, services rendered or moneys loaned for personal, family or household purposes."
Unfortunately, the plaintiff cites only the Judicial Branch website which is not authoritative and so advises its users. However the statutory "authority" for his position appears to be § 5l-345(a)(3)(E), discussed infra.
Discussion
Practice Book § 10-31 provides that a motion to dismiss may assert improper venue. See Practice Book § 10-31; Mercer v. Rodriguez, 83 Conn.App. 251, 267 n. 15 (2004). "Venue is not a jurisdictional question but a procedural one," Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 263 (1990), and it concerns the location of the trial and the convenience of the parties. Haigh v. Haigh, 50 Conn.App. 456, 465 (1998).
Venue in civil actions is governed by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-345. Venue for actions involving "consumer transactions," such as this case, is governed by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-345(d). Section 345(d) provides in pertinent part: " In all actions involving consumer transactions, civil process shall be made returnable to the judicial district where the consumer resides or where the transaction occurred." (Emphasis added.)
Venue for cases involving foreign corporations as the plaintiff is governed by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-345(c) which also provides for venue "where the defendant resides."
However, Section 345(a) provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in . . . subsections (b) to (g) inclusive of this section, all civil process shall be made returnable to a judicial district as follows: . . . (3) If either or both the plaintiff or defendant are residents of this state, to the judicial district where either the plaintiff or defendant resides, except: . . . (E) If either the plaintiff or the defendant resides in the town of . . . Stamford . . . the action may be made returnable at the option of the plaintiff to either the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk or the judicial district of Fairfield.
Insofar as Section 345(a) provides an exception to its application for matters falling within 345(d), the defendant argues that under the unambiguous and clear language of Section 345(d), venue for this action is the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant resides. This court agrees.
There is no claim that the "transaction occurred" within the Fairfield judicial district.
The starting point for determining proper venue in this case is Section 345(d). The directive of this statute, for this case, is that the process be returnable to the "judicial district where the consumer resides." The question then is the meaning of "the judicial district where the consumer resides."
While Section 345(c) might otherwise be applicable, subsection (c) specifically excepts from its provisions actions made returnable under subsection (d).
The rules of statutory interpretation are well-settled. "When interpreting a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. General Statutes § 1-2z." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Angelo Development Construction Co. v. Cordovano, 278 Conn. 237, 243, 897 A.2d 81 (2006); Suffield Development v. National Loan In., 97 Conn.App. 541, 575, 902 A.2d 1073 (2006). "Where . . . the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts may not by construction supply omissions in a statute, or add exceptions merely because it appears to them that good reasons exist for doing so." Simko v. Zoning Board of Appeals, CT Page 4686 205 Conn. 413, 418, 533 A.2d 879 (1987), modified on other grounds, 206 Conn. 374, 538 A.2d 202 (1988).
Constante v. Pecora, 49 Conn. L. Rptr. 134 (January 6, 2010) (Arnold, J.).
Looking first to the text of the statute and its relationship to other statutes, this court finds that the language is clear and unambiguous. Proper venue in this action is where the transaction occurred or the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant resides.
Section 345(a) by its express terms does not apply to actions for which venue is determined by subsections (b) through (g) inclusive. Therefore, the only provision which allows for the option of returning process to either Stamford-Norwalk or Fairfield (subsection (a)(3)(E)), does not apply here.
Further, throughout the entirety of the venue statute, CGS § 51-345, the legislature repeatedly uses the phrase "where the [party] resides." See, e.g. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-345(c)(1), (c)(3); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 345(e). Indeed, in Section 345(a)(3), venue "if either or both of the plaintiff or defendant are residents of this state," shall be where "either the plaintiff or defendant resides." Following this mandate is the exception which provides for venue in either Stamford-Norwalk or Fairfield if either party "resides" in Stamford. Thus, even within the statute upon which the plaintiff ostensibly relies, the phrase "where the [party] resides" has but one unequivocal meaning. "Reside" means "to dwell permanently or continuously; occupy a place as one's legal domicile." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed.) (2009), p. 1060.
In sum, if the legislature had intended to include, for actions involving consumer transactions, the "choice of venue" provisions outlined in Section 345(a)(3), it surely could have done so. It did not. In this case, the consumer is the defendant. The defendant resides in Stamford. The judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk encompasses the town of Stamford. See, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-344. Pursuant to Section 51-345(d) proper venue in this case is the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk.
This court found no other decision which addressed the relationship between (or the applicability of) Section 345(a)(3) and its "choice of venue" provisions, to Section 345(d), or any of the other venue provisions "excepted" from the application of Section 345(a).
The motion to dismiss is denied but the matter will be transferred to the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk. See, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-351; Sprague v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 3 Conn.App. 484 (1985).
SO ORDERED this 10th day of February 2011.