This court held in several decisions that it does not act as a collection agency for clerks of trial courts. City of Atlanta v. Akins, 116 Ga. App. 230 (1) ( 156 S.E.2d 665); Hornsby v. Rodriguez, 116 Ga. App. 234 ( 156 S.E.2d 830); American Cas. Co. v. Smith, 116 Ga. App. 332 (1) ( 157 S.E.2d 504). Moore Ford Co. v. Cambron, 116 Ga. App. 332 (1) ( 157 S.E.2d 312); These decisions were overruled by the Supreme Court in Howard v. Mitcham, 224 Ga. 288 ( 161 S.E.2d 291). Fortunately, however, they were rehabilitated when the Supreme Court subsequently overruled its Howard decision in J. D. Jewell, Inc. v. Hancock, 226 Ga. 480, 482 ( 175 S.E.2d 847). The motion to dismiss is denied. 2.

2A Larson's, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 72.31 at p. 14-47.Blair v. Smith, supra, 201 Ga. 747; BLI Const. Co. v. Knowles, supra, 123 Ga. App. 588, and American Cas. Co. v. Smith, 116 Ga. App. 332 ( 157 S.E.2d 312) (1967), are overruled insofar as they conflict with our holding in this case. We are not unaware that the same commentator has pointed out that statutory employer statutes are customarily worded in terms of "subcontractors," as is Georgia's, and that for the most part that term is held not to encompass independent contractors.

covers workers' compensation benefits from his immediate employer, hence the general contractor as a statutory employer liable to pay workers' compensation benefits under Code Ann. § 114-112 (Ga. L. 1969, p. 671) it should receive the correlated benefit of tort immunity under Code Ann. § 114-103 (Ga. L. 1974, pp. 1143, 1144; 1980, pp. 1145, 1146) and Code Ann. § 114-112, supra. While there was a dissent in Wright Assoc. v. Rieder, 247 Ga. 496, supra, it was a 6 to 1 decision by our Supreme Court in which instance it overruled, insofar as conflicting with Wright Assoc. v. Rieder, supra, the earlier Supreme Court decision in Blair v. Smith, 201 Ga. 747 ( 41 S.E.2d 133) (1947 — establishing a different view); BLI Const. Co. v. Knowles, 123 Ga. App. 588 ( 181 S.E.2d 879) (1971 — establishing that an employee of an independent subcontractor could recover workers' compensation benefits from the principal contractor and maintain an action in tort against the principal contractor), and also American Cas. Co. v. Smith, 116 Ga. App. 332 ( 157 S.E.2d 312) (1967 — reaching the same decision as Blair and Knowles). Accordingly, based upon Wright Assoc. v. Rieder, supra, even though the trial court rendered its decision based upon a wrong reason, we must affirm.

The basic relationship of employer and employee, as defined by statute, is essential as well as being the type of employee entitled to coverage under the Act and is a jurisdictional requirement. Parker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 174 Ga. 525 ( 163 S.E. 159). If the relationship is one of independent contractor and contractor, there is no coverage. American Casualty Co. v. Smith, 116 Ga. App. 332 (2) ( 157 S.E.2d 312); Sanders Truck Transportation Co. v. Napier, 117 Ga. App. 561 ( 161 S.E.2d 440). Determination of that relationship is one of fact. Liberty Lumber Co. v. Silas, 49 Ga. App. 262 (2) ( 175 S.E. 265); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Moates, 102 Ga. App. 778 ( 117 S.E.2d 924); Lyons v. Employers Mut. c Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 268 ( 193 S.E.2d 244). Code § 114-607, supra, provides in pertinent part: "A policy of insurance issued under this Title shall always first be construed as an agreement to pay compensation: and ... an insurer who issues to an employer subject to this title a policy of compensation insurance covering an employee or employees ordinarily exempt from its provisions shall not plead the exemption as a defense."

The court erred in overruling the motion for a judgment n. o. v. filed by American Family Life Assurance Company. The contract shows clearly on its fact that it does not give the employer the right to control the time, manner and method of executing the work as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity with the contract; nor did the contract reserve the right of control. Blair v. Smith, 201 Ga. 747, 748 ( 41 S.E.2d 133); American Cas. Co. v. Smith, 116 Ga. App. 332 (2) ( 157 S.E.2d 312). The was no evidence whatever to show that the employer assumed, outside of the contract, control of the time, manner and method of executing the work. Where the contract of employment clearly denominates the other party as an independent contractor, that relationship is presumed to be true unless the evidence shows that the employer assumed such control.

(Citations omitted.) In City of Atlanta v. Akins, 116 Ga. App. 230 (1) ( 156 S.E.2d 665) and American Cas. Co. v. Smith, 116 Ga. App. 332 (1) ( 157 S.E.2d 312), motions to dismiss the appeals for nonpayment of costs in the court below were denied on the ground, simply stated, that payment of costs is a problem to be policed by the trial courts; that it does not affect the jurisdictional basis of this court and that so long as the appeal is timely filed in this court its jurisdiction in this regard is perfected, irrespective of whether or not the costs below have been paid. However, the decisions above referred to have been effectively overruled, on the point under discussion, by Howard v. Mitcham, 224 Ga. 288 ( 161 S.E.2d 291).

If the relationship is that of independent contractor and contractee there is no coverage. Richards v. Marco Realty Co., 57 Ga. App. 242 ( 194 S.E. 880); American Cas. Co. v. Smith, 116 Ga. App. 332 (2) ( 157 S.E.2d 312). The burden of showing the employer-employee relationship and of showing that the employer was subject to the provisions of the Act by virtue of having the requisite number of employees or that he had voluntarily accepted its provisions rests upon the claimant.

1. The motion to dismiss, on the ground that appellant had not paid all costs or filed a pauper's affidavit prior to the timely transmission of the record, is denied. See City of Atlanta v. Akins, 116 Ga. App. 230 (1) ( 156 S.E.2d 665); American Cas. Co. v. Smith, 116 Ga. App. 332 (1). 2.