Messrs. J. Spratt White and Donald V. Richardson of Whaley, McCutchen, Blanton Richardson, of Columbia, for Appellant, cite: As to question of agency and party actingas insured's agent: 8 S.E.2d 511, 193 S.C. 299; 185 S.E. 541, 180 S.C. 177; 137 S.E.2d 412, 244 S.C. 411; 134 S.E. 428, 136 S.C. 458. As to suit papers beingforwarded to Appellant on instructions of insured and notat discretion of insurance agent: 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 808. As to a third party having no higher rights under apolicy of insurance than the insured would have: 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.2d 241. As to there being no provision inpolicy, issued by Appellant, extending coverage to the 1965Ford after December 20, 1965: 258 N.C. 672, 129 S.E.2d 297; 242 S.C. 322, 130 S.E.2d 913; 250 N.C. 45, 108 S.E.2d 49; 235 S.C. 178, 110 S.E.2d 255. As to Appellant's policy affording no coverage here, neitherunder the omnibus clause nor under the Statute: 203 Va. 337, 124 S.E.2d 203; 36 Ill. App.2d 272, 183 N.E.2d 22; (Colo.) 419 P.2d 663; 121 S.E.2d 10, 238 S.C. 533. As to there being no statutory requirementthat Appellant file a change of endorsement with the HighwayDepartment: 149 S.E.2d 647, 248 S.C. 307; (S.C. ) 158 S.E.2d 774; 258 N.C. 672, 129 S.E.2d 297. As to an insurer not being bound by
Thomas Dewey Wise, Esq., of Way, Burkett Wise, Charleston, for Appellant, cites: As to the Court's erring indetermining that the policy issued by Old Charleston wasin force and effect at the time of the loss, in concluding thatthere had been no cancellation of the Old Charleston policyby substitution of the new Cherokee policy, and in determiningthat there was not mutual agreement between the insuredand Old Charleston in cancelling the Old Charlestonpolicy: 276 P. 599; 245 S.C. 69, 138 S.E.2d 835; 88 S.C. 15, 70 S.E. 319; 213 S.C. 593, 50 S.E.2d 923; 191 S.E.2d 255; 17 Wn.2d 407, 135 P.2d 846; 208 Ill. 166, 70 N.E. 31; 232 S.C. 1, 100 S.E.2d 544; 102 S.C. 473, 86 S.E. 1059; 169 F.2d 373; 135 Cal.App. 283, 22 P.2d 582; 176 S.C. 93, 179 S.E. 903; 121 F. Supp. 739; Appelman, Insurance Law and Practice. Augustine T. Smythe, Esq., of Buist, Moore, Smythe McGee, Charleston, for Respondent, cites: As to the OldCharleston policy not having been cancelled prior to theloss: 244 S.C. 411, 137 S.E.2d 412; 259 N.C.S. 181, 130 S.E.2d 311; 246 F. Supp. 509; 213 S.C. 593, 50 S.E.2d 923; 259 S.C. 223, 191 S.E.2d 255; 209 Cal.App.2d 157, 25 Cal.Rptr. 753, 3 A.L.R. 3d 1058; 232 S.C. 1, 10 S.E. 544; 208 Ill. 166, 70 N.E. 31; 102 S.C. 473, 86 S.E. 1059; 169 F.2d 373; 176 S.C. 93, 179 S.E. 903; 121 F. Supp. 739; 6 Appleman, Law and Insurance Practice Sections 4223, 4224, 4225; 45 C.J.S. Insurance Section 444 (b). Charles S. Goldberg, Esq., of Charleston, for Plaintiff.Thomas Dewey Wise, Esq., of Way, Burkett Wise, of Charleston, for Appellant, in Reply. May 20, 1974.
As to Attorneys' fees not beingallowable: 247 S.C. 1, 183 S.E.2d 873; 93 S.C. 30, 75 S.E. 1106; 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403; 248 S.C. 18, 148 S.E.2d 742 (257 S.C. at p. 12). Messrs. James P. Mozingo, III and Baker Ethridge, of Darlington, for Respondent, cite: As to the preponderance, of the evidence supporting the lower Court's findingthat the Nationwide policy had not been substituted for thatof Southern Mutual Church at the time of the loss: 224 S.C. 372, 79 S.E.2d 447; 244 S.C. 411, 137 S.E.2d 412; 329 F.2d 548; 35 Cal.Rptr. 913; 151 Wn. 494, 276 P. 549. As to a necessity that there be a present (asopposed to future) intent to cancel prior coverage beforeacquisition of other insurance will work a substitution ofcoverage as a matter of law: Annotation. "Obtaining NewProperly Insurance as Cancellation of Existing Insurance", 3 A.L.R. 3rd 1072; Supplement to Volume 6, Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Section 4225; 4 Ariz. App. 217, 419 P.2d 347; 196 F. Supp. 604, affirmed 304 F.2d 166; 25 Cal.Rptr. 753; 246 F. Supp. 509; 211 So.2d 379; 381 S.W.2d 797; 390 S.W.2d 622; 259 N.C. 181, 130 S.E.2d 311; 435 F.2d 1029; 322 F.2d 304; 102 S.C. 473, 86 S.E. 1059. As to the findingof the lower Court that "the Nationwide policy was excessinsurance to the Southern Mutual policy which must firstexhaust its coverage" being the law of the case in its presentposture: Rule 8, Section 2, Rules of the Court; 254 S.C. 332, 175 S.E.2d 465; 240 S.C. 116, 124 S.E.2d 777; 184 S.C. 467, 192 S.E. 670. A
Messrs. Floyd Craig, Bill R. Craig and Robert G. Cawson,Jr., of Hartsville, for Appellant, cite: As to it beingfor the trial judge to refuse to strike the allegations of thecomplaint which attempted to set up a cause of action forbreach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act: 173 S.C. 131, 175 S.E. 73; 244 S.C. 411, 137 S.E.2d 412; 166 S.C. 454, 165 S.E. 203, 84 A.L.R. 1336; 228 S.C. 297, 89 S.E.2d 723; 215 S.C. 1, 53 S.E.2d 861; 207 S.C. 150, 35 S.E.2d 160. As to it beingerror for the trial judge to refuse to eliminate plaintiff'sattorney fees as an element of damages from the complaint,when incurred defending a declaratory judgment proceedingto determine which of two insurers had liability coverageon the plaintiff: 385 P.2d 45 (Wash.); 198 F.2d 441; 200 A.2d 532 (N.J.); 161 So.2d 817 (Ala.); 131 So. 541 (Miss.
f Appellant to comply with thenotification requirement of Section (46-702) (7) (h), Codeof Laws of South Carolina, 1962: Black's Law Dictionary; 223 N.Y.S. 726; 130 Misc. Rep. 235; 257 Fed. 715; Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged, Second Edition; 42 Ala. App. 351, 165 So.2d 128; 188 359; 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206; 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645; 238 F. Supp. 125, aff'd, 238 F.2d 508; Op. Atty. Gen. (1958-1959) 84; 171 A.L.R. 550; 34 A.L.R.2d 1297. As to filing by an insurer with theSouth Carolina Highway Department of a Form SR-22which indicates thereon the effective dates of the policyterm stated in the policy not being sufficient compliance withthe ten-day notice requirement of Section 46-702 (7) (h),Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962: 38 F. Supp. 159; 372 Pa. 578, 94 A.2d 748. As to the Appellant beingbarred from claiming that its certified policy was not inforce on August 30, 1964, the date of the accident, by reasonof its own notice of termination of the policy: 244 S.C. 411, 137 S.E.2d 412; 306 Mass. 95, 27 N.E.2d 683; 171 A.L.R. 550, 34 A.L.R.2d 1297; 215 S.C. 90, 54 S.E.2d 523; 289 Mass. 384, 194 N.E. 119. August 4, 1966.
S.C.L.Q. 123; 155 S.C. 47, 151 S.E. 920; 55 S.C. 198, 33 S.E. 359. As to error on part of trialJudge in admitting evidence that was hearsay; evidence thatviolated Sec. 26-402 of the Code; in overruling waiver; ingiving plaintiff the benefit of alleged incorrect (past) legaladvice as to the law, with no showing as to a mistake offact: 16 S.C. 625; 1 McCord Eq. 148; 2 Hill 562; 245 S.C. 461, 141 S.E.2d 129; 233 S.C. 49, 103 S.E.2d 732; 151 S.C. 309, 149 S.E. 14; 221 S.C. 172, 69 S.E.2d 705; 32 S.C. 410, 11 S.E. 339; 30 S.C. 490, 9 S.E. 525. As to doctrine of laches being applicable underthe facts of instant case: 245 S.C. 13, 138 S.E.2d 410; 242 S.C. 298, 130 S.E.2d 850; 200 S.C. 67, 20 S.E.2d 237; 186 S.C. 93, 195 S.C. 122; 54 S.C. 388, 32 S.E. 448; Harp. 9; 143 S.C. 277, 141 S.E. 448; 39 Am. Jur., Parent and Child, Secs. 48, 95; 27 Am. Jur., Infants, Secs. 121, 122, 124; 26 S.C. 474, 2 S.E. 483; Speers Eq. 309; 2 Strob. Eq. 40; 9 Rich. Eq. 184; 143 S.C. 156, 143 S.E. 267; 4 S.C. 353; 244 S.C. 411, 137 S.E.2d 412; 197 S.C. 379, 15 S.E.2d 665; 211 S.C. 233, 4 S.E.2d 442; 227 S.C. 548, 118 S.E.2d 324; 61 S.C. 393, 39 S.E. 540; 161 S.C. 263, 159 S.E. 627. As to errors in order of trial Judge settling case forappeal: 166 S.C. 194, 164 S.E. 613. Messrs. Neely Otter, of Anderson for Respondent, cite: As to rule that personalty must be exhausted in payment ofdebts, before the realty can be resorted to for that purpose: Bailey Eq. 397. As to when interest will begin to run on abequest: 97 C.J.S. 270, Par. 1348. As to where the presumptionis that there was no consideration, considerationmust be proven: 126 S.E. 429, 131 S.C. 140. As to rulethat equity regards and treats that as done which in goodconscience ought to be done: 103 S.E. 551, 115 S.C. 306.