Brown v. City of Laconia, supra; Atwood v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Company, supra. In reaching this conclusion, the Court has followed the mandate imposed upon it by American Fidelity Company v. Provencher, 90 N.H. 16, 3 A.2d 824 (1939) that the construction of the policy is for the Court, and the depositions herein have, therefore, been excluded from consideration. The Court adds, however, that a review of these depositions indicates considerable confusion on the parts of the insured, the insurance agent, and the representative of the underwriter as to the meaning of the Aetna policy, and the testimony therein would, therefore, be given little weight by the Court, even if found to be admissible.

Defenses as to coverage have been allowed in some cases even as to "proof policies." See Zurich General Accident Liability Ins. Co. v. Taylor, D.C.W.Va. 1941, 38 F. Supp. 159; Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Violano, 2 Cir., 1941, 123 F.2d 692; Adkins v. Inland Mutual Ins. Co., 1942, 124 W. Va. 388, 20 S.E.2d 471, 663; Cf., Gergely v. Pioneer Mutual Casualty Co., Ohio App. 1947, 74 N.E.2d 432 (policy avoided); Celina Mutual Casualty Co. v. Citizens' Casualty Co., Md. 1950, 71 A.2d 20; American Fidelity Co. v. Provencher, 1939, 90 N.H. 16, 3 A.2d 824 (policy avoided). It is plain that Sec. 321A.21(6)(a), Code of Iowa has relevance only to policies "required" prior to the reinstatement of operating or registration privileges of those who have demonstrated their financial irresponsibility by failing to satisfy a motor vehicle accident judgment, or their dangerous capacities as drivers by being convicted of a crime in connection with motor vehicles.

Thus in Ocean Accident Guarantee Corporation v. Olson, 87 F.2d 465, 467 (8th Cir 1937), the court said: Cf., American Etc. Co. v. Provencher, 90 N H 16, 3 A.2d 824 (1939), where the policy excluded coverage if the vehicle was "used for the transportation of persons, material or merchandise for others for any consideration whatever." It was established that the insured was carrying persons for a charge.

An omnibus insured can have no greater rights under an automobile liability insurance policy than a named insured so that if he is using the insured automobile for some purpose outside of the designated uses of the policy such third party is excluded from coverage of the policy. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Self, 5 Cir., 93 F.2d 139; Gudbrandsen v. Pelto, 205 Minn. 607, 287 N.W. 116; Williams v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 44 F.2d 704, 705; Western Casualty Surety Co. v. Odom, D.C., 21 F. Supp. 574, 575; Snyder v. National Union Indemnity Co., 10 Cir., 65 F.2d 844; American Fidelity Co. v. Provencher, 90 N.H. 16, 3 A.2d 824; Habedank v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 128 N.J.L. 338, 125 A.2d 889. Johnston, McCall Johnston, Mobile, for appellee New Amsterdam Cas. Co.

The effect of the statement contained in paragraph 2 of the statutory endorsement, that the policy provisions required by the statute are incorporated in the policy by reference, is therefore limited to the provisions of paragraph (b) of subsection VII. That paragraph requires indemnity with respect to the "presence of" the insured in any "motor vehicle" other than his own against liability arising out of accidents which occur in New Hampshire. Paragraph 2 of the statutory endorsement thus "had the effect of incorporating in the policy only such statutory requirements as were applicable to the situation." American c. Co. v. Provencher, 90 N.H. 16, 19. Hence the coverage afforded the insured by the policy and statutory endorsement insured him in the operation of any "motor vehicle" not owned by him. The statutory definition of "motor vehicle" encompasses motorcycles (RSA 268:1 IX) and accordingly the coverage extended to motorcycles not owned by the insured.

The words used are all current in every day use, and expressly exclude coverage not only while the motor vehicle covered by the policy is used for rental or livery purposes, but also while it 'is being used for . . . the carrying of persons for a consideration'". See also State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Self, 93 Fed. 2d 139; American Fidelity Co. v. Provencher, 90 N.H. 16; Topkis v. Rosenzweig Continental Casualty Co., 333 Pa. 529; Sumida v. Pacific Automobile Ins. Co., 51 Cal.App.2d 472. Since Piette's automobile, at the time of the accident, was admittedly being used to carry persons for a charge, it follows that the exclusion clause would be operative.