Opinion
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION. (See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 32.1)
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. D.C. No. 8:08-cv-00929-AG-MLG. Andrew J. Guilford, District Judge, Presiding.
For AMERICAN BOARD OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, Plaintiff - Appellee: Penny Marie Costa, Attorney, Freeman, Freeman & Smiley, LLP, Los Angeles, CA; Corey Field, Attorney, Ballard Spahr LLP, Los Angeles, CA; Cecilia Isaacs-Blundin, Esquire, Attorney, Hara Kay Jacobs, Esquire, Attorney, Ballard Spahr LLP, Philadelphia, PA.
BRADLEY D. MITTMAN, M.D., DBA Frontrunners Board Review, AKA Frontrunners Publishing, Defendant - Appellant, Pro se, Laguna Niguel, CA.
Before: FISHER, GOULD and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Bradley D. Mittman, M.D., DBA Frontrunners Board Review, AKA Frontrunners Publishing, appeals pro se from the district court's default judgment in the American Board of Internal Medicine's (" ABIM" ) action alleging violations of the Copyright Act and state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Patelco Credit Union v. Sahni, 262 F.3d 897, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in entering default judgment as a sanction for Mittman's repeated failure to comply with his discovery obligations. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi) (district court may enter default judgment as a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order); Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 788 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth factors that a district court must consider before imposing the sanction of default). The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees in connection with ABIM's motions to compel because Mittman's nondisclosures in response to discovery requests were not substantially justified. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A) (district court must require the party whose conduct necessitated a successful motion to compel to pay reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, unless the party's nondisclosure was substantially justified).
The district court properly dismissed Mittman's counterclaim as time-barred because Mittman filed it after the statute of limitations had run. See Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008) (reviewing de novo); Pace Indus., Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1987) (four-year statute of limitations for Sherman Antitrust Act claims; only a " new and independent act" that inflicts " new and accumulating injury" will restart the limitations period).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mittman's motion for reconsideration because Mittman provided no new evidence or argument supporting the motion. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration).
Mittman's contention that the district court failed to consider his arguments and filings is unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.