See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133, 135-36 (N.D. 1978) (using means scrutiny test); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, Ohio Com.Pl. 3 Ohio Op.3d 164, 167, 355 N.E.2d 903, 911 (Ct.C.P. Montgomery County 1976); Graley v. Satayatham, Ohio Com.Pl., 74 Ohio Op.2d 316, 320, 343 N.E.2d 832, 837-38 (Ct.C.P. Cuyahoga County 1976) (both Ohio cases using a strict scrutiny test). In American Bank Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 104 Cal.App.3d 219, 226-235, 163 Cal.Rptr. 513, 516-22 (1980), a three-judge panel of the California court of appeals quoted and adopted the strict scrutiny analysis of Graley, asserting but not explaining how the same reasoning would apply under the rational basis test. As other cases make clear, the method of analysis makes a critical difference.

The principles of strict scrutiny do not apply, the statute is rational, and it is valid under the Federal Constitution. This point also serves to distinguish the recent decision of the California Court of Appeal in American Bank Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 104 Cal.App.3d 219, 163 Cal.Rptr. 513 (1980), in which the court invalidated a medical malpractice recovery limitation. The limitation invalidated in that case under the California Constitution restricted the amount of compensatory damages that were recoverable.

In Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 53 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977), the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the case for fact finding on whether there was really a medical malpractice crisis and whether the means adopted were reasonable related to the solution of the problem. Trial courts in Ohio held statutes unconstitutional in Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op.3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Com.Pl. 1976); and Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op.2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (Com.Pl. 1976), as did a California intermediate appellate court in American Bank Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 104 Cal.App.3d 219, 163 Cal.Rptr. 513 (1980), hearing granted, May 29, 1980. The cases which have found no constitutional problems have been broad attacks upon compulsory arbitration systems which were created and made a condition precedent to maintaining an action in court.

We find the dissent much better reasoned in its detailed showing that the statute arbitrarily classified medical malpractice tortfeasors differently from other tortfeasors, malpractice victims differently from other plaintiffs, and malpractice plaintiffs with insurance differently from self-insured malpractice plaintiffs. The dissent quoted very persuasively from American Bank Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 104 Cal.App.3d 219, 163 Cal.Rptr. 513 (1980). Because the equal protection issues pertinent to the medical malpractice statutes are not present here, we will not discuss those Iowa and California opinions in detail.

A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." See also American Bank Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 104 Cal.App.3d 219, 163 Cal.Rptr. 513, 517 (1980). It is my persuasion that the authorities demonstrate that reasonable rationality as a test cannot be fulfilled where the determinant is accident of place.

`[T]o find that the protection and special dispensation given to health delivery tortfeasors by the challenged legislation is in the best interest of public health is illogical to the point of irrationality.'" Boucher v. Sayeed, R.I., 459 A.2d 87, 94 (1983) (quoting from American Bank Trust Co. v. Community Hospital of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc., 104 Cal.App.3d 219, 163 Cal. Rptr. 513, 522 (1980)). We have said previously that "[t]he continued availability and vitality of * * * causes of action [against health care providers] serve an important public policy — the preservation of quality health care for the citizens of this state."

See Note, Rhode Island Medical Liability Mediation Panels: Constitutional Challenges and Impact on Informed Consent, 15 Suffolk L.Rev. 563, 565 (1981); Medical Malpractice Panels: A Judicial Evaluation of their Practical Effect, 42 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 939, 958 (1981). Concerning the public-health contention, we agree with the observation made in American Bank Trust v. Community Hospital, 104 Cal.App.3d 219, 163 Cal.Rptr. 513, 522 (1980), that if the medical profession is less accountable than formerly because of the special treatment it is afforded by preliminary-hearing laws, then a relaxation of medical standards may occur with the public as the victim. "[T]o find that the protection and special dispensation given to health delivery tortfeasors by the challenged legislation is in the best interest of public health is illogical to the point of irrationality."

For Opinion on Rehearing, see 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670. Opinion, 104 Cal.App.3d 219, 163 Cal.Rptr. 513, vacated. Thomas R. Fellows, Robinson & Wood, San Jose, for defendant and appellant.

We have held, however, that the right to recover for one's injuries is not a fundamental right, Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, supra at 666, 406 A.2d at 707, and courts in other jurisdictions have reached a similar conclusion in examining their states' medical malpractice statutes. See American Bank Trust v. Community Hospital, 163 Cal.Rptr. 513, 517 (Cal.App. 1980); Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399, 410 (Idaho 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 600 (Ind. 1980). Furthermore, none of the classifications created by RSA ch. 507-C (Supp.