; Prince v. Brake Rebuilders & Friction Products, Inc., 2012 OK 104, ¶ 17, 298 P.3d 529, 532, citing Okla. Const., Art. 5, § 54 (“Additionally, accrued rights and proceedings begun pursuant to statute are protected against the repeal of those statutes.”); American Airlines v. Crabb, 2009 OK 68, ¶ 10, 221 P.3d 1289, 1291–1292 (No subsequent amendment can operate retrospectively to affect in any way the substantive rights and obligations which are so fixed by workers' compensation statutes in force on the date of injury because they form a part of the contract of employment). ¶ 33 In one recent opinion we cited opinions from 2003 and 2006 for the proposition that we examine whether the challenged statute acts to increase or diminish the amount of recoverable compensation or alter the elements of the claim or defense by imposition of new conditions; and if it does, prospective application of the law is constitutionally required regardless of retroactive statutory language.
Id. ¶ 5 In American Airlines Inc. v. Crabb, 2009 OK 68, 221 P.3d 1289, a 2005 amendment redefined cumulative trauma, adding language throughout the specific statute. We held that the addition of the language “the major cause of which results from,” added a new element to the claim which was not part of the definition in effect on the date of the injury.
Id. ¶5 In American Airlines Inc. v. Crabb, 2009 OK 68, 221 P.3d 1289, a 2005 amendment redefined cumulative trauma, adding language throughout the specific statute. We held that the addition of the language "the major cause of which results from," added a new element to the claim which was not part of the definition in effect on the date of the injury.
This determination requires a comparison of both versions to identify any changes to existing law, and if so, whether the changes are purely remedial or procedural, in which case the amended statute would operate retroactively. American Airlines Inc. v. Crabb, 2009 OK 68, ¶ 14–16, 221 P.3d 1289, 1292–93;Welch, 1989 OK 117, ¶¶ 21–26, 776 P.2d 847. If the changes are substantive, its operation is prospective only. Id.
The Court reasoned: In American Airlines Inc. v. Crabb, 2009 OK 68, ¶¶ 14-16, 221 P.3d 1289, 1292-93, the Court found the addition of the phrase "major cause of the injury" in the amended statutory definition of "compensable injury" added a new element to the claim, intruded on substantive rights, and could not be applied retroactively. After-enacted legislation that "alters the elements of a claim or defense by imposition of new conditions affects the parties' substantive rights and liabilities."
The Court reasoned:In American Airlines Inc. v. Crabb , 2009 OK 68, ¶¶ 14-16, 221 P.3d 1289, 1292-93, the Court found the addition of the phrase "major cause of the injury" in the amended statutory definition of "compensable injury" added a new element to the claim, intruded on substantive rights, and could not be applied retroactively. After-enacted legislation that "alters the elements of a claim or defense by imposition of new conditions affects the parties' substantive rights and liabilities."
The Commission noted that since 1985, in cumulative trauma cases, "the law in effect on the date of awareness determined substantive rights, while the date of last exposure/employment triggered the limitations period." In support of this statement of law, the Commission cited American Airlines, Inc. v. Crabb , 2009 OK 68, ¶ 10, 221 P.3d 1289. Pursuant to the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act (AWCA), specifically 85A O.S. Supp. 2016 § 45(G), "Benefits for a cumulative trauma injury or occupational disease or illness shall be determined by the law in effect at the time the employee knew or reasonably should have known that the injury, occupational disease or illness was related to work activity."
This exception cannot be invoked, however, if the amendment represents more than a mere procedural reform and intrudes upon substantive rights." Am. Airlines Inc. v. Crabb, 2009 OK 68, ¶ 12, 221 P.3d 1289 (citations omitted). We interpret these statements to mean that, so long as the legislative amendment is procedural or remedial and does not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy accrued or contractual rights, it applies even when the amendment occurs during the pendency of an appeal.
This exception cannot be invoked, however, if the amendment represents more than a mere procedural reform and intrudes upon substantive rights." Am. Airlines Inc. v. Crabb, 2009 OK 68, ¶ 12, 221 P.3d 1289 (citations omitted). We interpret these statements to mean that, so long as the legislative amendment is procedural or remedial and does not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy accrued or contractual rights, it applies even when the amendment occurs during the pendency of an appeal.
This exception cannot be invoked, however, if the amendment represents more than a mere procedural reform and intrudes upon substantive rights." Am. Airlines Inc. v. Crabb, 2009 OK 68, ¶ 12, 221 P.3d 1289 (citations omitted). We interpret these statements to mean that, so long as the legislative amendment is procedural or remedial and does not create, enlarge, diminish, or destroy accrued or contractual rights, it applies even when the amendment occurs during the pendency of an appeal.