Opinion
Submitted June 5, 2000
August 21, 2000.
In an action, inter alia, to enjoin the defendants from, among other things, interfering with access to the plaintiffs' premises, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jackson, J.), dated February 4, 1999, as, upon reargument, (a) adhered to a determination in an order dated March 30, 1998, denying their motion for a preliminary injunction, (b) adhered to so much of a determination in an order dated February 25, 1998, as granted those branches of the motion of the defendants Helpers of God's Precious Infants, Inc., Phillip Reilly, Dorothy Rothar, Michael Marino, and Rose Diaz, which was for summary judgment dismissing the sixth, seventh, eighth, eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth causes of action insofar as asserted against them, and (c) adhered to so much of a determination in an order dated March 18, 1998, as granted (i) those branches of the motion of the defendants Mary Elias and Life Center of N Y, Inc., and (ii) those branches of the cross motion of the defendant Thomas V. Daily which were for summary judgment dismissing the sixth, seventh, eighth, eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth causes of action insofar as asserted against them.
Edward Land, New York, N.Y., for appellants.
Kathleen M. O'Connell, New York, N.Y., for respondents Helpers of God's Precious Infants, Inc., Philip Reilly, Dorothy Rothar, Michael Marino, and Rose Diaz, and Robert P. Whelan, New York, N Y, for respondent Life Center of N.Y., Inc. (one brief filed).
Wingate, Kearney Cullen, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Thomas O. Rice and Richard Cea of counsel), for respondent Thomas V. Daily.
Before: GUY JAMES MANGANO, P.J., THOMAS R. SULLIVAN, HOWARD MILLER, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must show a probability of success on the merits, danger of irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction, and a balancing of the equities in his or her favor (see, Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso, 75 N.Y.2d 860; Appio v. Lynn Off. Supplying, 222 A.D.2d 541; Fulop v. Sea Gate Assn., 216 A.D.2d 523). Here, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the likelihood of success on the merits. In addition, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they would suffer irreparable injury if a preliminary injunction were not granted. Finally, the balancing of the equities favors the defendants. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.
In addition, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the sixth, seventh, eighth, eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth causes of action insofar as asserted against the respondents. Even accepting every fact alleged as true and construing the complaint liberally (see, Waste Distillation Technology v. Blasland Bouck Engrs., 136 A.D.2d 633; Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 375), the plaintiffs' complaint and the opposing papers to the respondents' respective motions and cross motions do not contain the requisite allegations and proof that the respondents committed acts of unfair competition and tortious interference with contract, or violated the New York Civil Rights Law § 40-c, or antitrust laws.