Once Schmidt set forth a prima facie case of Sweet Water's indebtedness and the delivery of the goods, as reflected in the remaining invoices, Sweet Water had the burden of presenting evidence of specific facts to refute Schmidt's proof. Kroger Co. v. U. S. Foodservice of Atlanta, 270 Ga. App. 525, 529 (2) ( 607 SE2d 177) (2004); Concept-Nat. v. DiMattina Supply Co., 147 Ga. App. 865, 866 ( 250 SE2d 552) (1978); see OCGA § 9-11-56 (e). Sweet Water's general assertions that it did not purchase any trees from Schmidt and did not owe Schmidt any money is insufficient to meet its burden. Griffin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 177 Ga. App. 852, 854 (3) ( 341 SE2d 499) (1986); Concept-Nat. v. DiMattina Supply Co., 147 Ga. App. at 866; Ambrose v. E. F. Hutton Co., 146 Ga. App. 403, 404 (2) ( 246 SE2d 423) (1978). Because the affidavit of Schmidt's credit manager pierced Sweet Water's general denial, and Sweet Water has failed to set forth evidence of specific facts which show there is a genuine issue for the jury, the court's grant of summary judgment to Schmidt on the remaining invoices was proper.
Appellee presented the sworn statement of its area manager setting forth the amount it claimed was due which, together with attached statements of account that were admissible as business records pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-14, pierced the general denial in appellant's answer. See Ambrose v. E. F. Hutton Co., 146 Ga. App. 403, 404 (2) ( 246 S.E.2d 423) (1978). "[W]here the [business records] conform to the provisions of the Code section, they themselves stand as a witness of the correctness of the account and make a prima facie case which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant debtor to show the items contained in the books, or some of them, are not correct."
Compare Clark v. Assurance Co. of America, 156 Ga. App. 526 (2) ( 275 S.E.2d 111) (1980). Ambrose v. E. F. Hutton Co., 146 Ga. App. 403 ( 246 S.E.2d 423) (1978). Although appellees' records showed that they had charged appellant premiums for providing certain insurance coverage, appellees presented no evidence to show that appellant had authorized the purchase of the insurance coverage. If appellant had authorized the coverage, appellees are entitled to be paid premiums for providing it. If, however, appellant did not authorize the coverage, appellees are not entitled to recover simply because their own records reflect that appellant was charged premiums.
In their affidavits, appellants admitted execution of the note and guaranty, but denied that any amount was owing appellee, claiming that interest charged was incorrect and that credit was not given for numerous payments. These conclusory allegations were insufficient to create an issue of fact for trial. Pollard v. First Nat. Bank, 169 Ga. App. 598 ( 313 S.E.2d 785) (1984); Concept-Nat. v. DiMattina Sup. Co., 147 Ga. App. 865, 866 ( 250 S.E.2d 552) (1978); Hathcock v. Nat. Bank of Ga., 147 Ga. App. 134 ( 248 S.E.2d 206) (1978); Ambrose v. E. F. Hutton Co., 146 Ga. App. 403, 404 (2) ( 246 S.E.2d 423) (1978). However, appellants did set forth in their affidavits as specific averments of fact, the following: that $80,000 had been retained and never disbursed on the loan and that proceeds in the amount of $210,000 from the foreclosure on real estate securing the loan were never credited.
Thus, the trial court did not err in granting Chrysler's motion for summary judgment in such amount. Wilson v. Baxley State Bank, 155 Ga. App. 507 ( 271 S.E.2d 655) (1980); Meade v. Heimanson, 239 Ga. 177, 180 ( 236 S.E.2d 357) (1977); Ambrose v. E. F. Hutton Co., 146 Ga. App. 403, 404 ( 246 S.E.2d 423) (1978). However, for the reasons set forth in Division 2 of this opinion, the trial court did err in extending its grant of summary judgment to include attorney's fees.
In the face of his complete failure to come forward with rebuttal evidence, the grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff was proper. Cf. Ambrose v. E. F. Hutton Co., 146 Ga. App. 403 ( 246 S.E.2d 423) (1978). Judgment affirmed. Birdsong and Sognier, JJ., concur.
The evidence set forth in appellee's affidavit was admissible in accordance with Code Ann. § 81A-156 (e) and Code Ann. § 38-711, which by its own terms, is to be "liberally interpreted and applied." See Ambrose v. E. F. Hutton Co., 146 Ga. App. 403 ( 246 S.E.2d 423); Vaughn Co. v. Saul, 143 Ga. App. 74 (3) ( 237 S.E.2d 622); Smith v. Bank of the South, 141 Ga. App. 114 ( 232 S.E.2d 629); Cotton v. John W. Eshelman Sons, 137 Ga. App. 360 ( 223 S.E.2d 757). The affidavit was thus properly considered by the trial court, and, absent rebuttal evidence by the appellant, showed conclusively that all sums seized from appellant were turned over to federal and state authorities. The appellant was thereafter unable to "rest upon the mere allegations ... of his pleading," and the entry of partial summary judgment, as to the confiscated money, in favor of the appellees was appropriate.