Opinion
1 CA-JV 21-0275
02-24-2022
AMANDA D., Appellant, v. HARRINGTON A., C.A., Appellees.
Law Office of Justin Fernstrom, Mesa By Justin Fernstrom Counsel for Appellant Robert D. Rosanelli, Phoenix By Robert D. Rosanelli Counsel for Appellee Harrington A.
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. JS519724 The Honorable Keelan J. Bodow, Judge Pro Tempore
Law Office of Justin Fernstrom, Mesa By Justin Fernstrom Counsel for Appellant
Robert D. Rosanelli, Phoenix By Robert D. Rosanelli Counsel for Appellee Harrington A.
Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PERKINS, JUDGE
¶1 Amanda D. ("Mother") appeals the denial of her petition to terminate Harrington A.'s ("Father") parental rights to their child, C.A., born February 2016. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Mother and Father (collectively "Parents") met in 2014 and lived together before and shortly after C.A.'s birth. Parents separated in 2017. Father visited C.A. in 2017 and 2018, including overnight visits. In March 2019, Mother unilaterally ended Father's parenting time because of her concerns with Father's care of C.A. Father has not seen C.A. since, but he has continued to message Mother asking to see C.A. Mother rebuffed or ignored many of Father's messages.
I. Parents' Communications
¶3 Following their separation in 2017, Parents' text messages show Mother was openly hostile towards Father. Mother repeatedly threatened to stop parenting time and challenged Father to take her to court to establish parenting time. Mother regularly refused Father's efforts to visit C.A. and imposed restrictions designed to limit Father's access to C.A. In March 2019, Mother also blocked Father and his family on social media after cutting off Father's visits with C.A. Parents did not communicate from April 2019 through October 2019. Father then began texting Mother about once every other month until February 2020. Mother did not answer most of Father's messages, but she responded in February 2020 to tell Father he was not welcome to bring C.A. gifts.
II. Prior Legal Proceedings
¶4 In September 2018, Mother petitioned to establish child support. Father separately petitioned to establish legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support. The superior court dismissed Father's petition because he failed to appear at a hearing. In December 2018, the court heard Mother's petition and ordered Father to pay $276 per month in child support. Father has not consistently paid child support. Father filed a second petition to establish parenting time in February 2021.
III. Termination Hearing
¶5 Mother petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights in October 2020. The juvenile court held a two-day termination hearing. In August 2021, the court denied Mother's petition and found Mother interfered with Father's attempts to develop a normal parental relationship with C.A. Mother timely appealed and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶6 To prevail on her petition to terminate Father's parental rights, Mother had to prove abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dept. of Econ. Sec, 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000). We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, but we view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining a denial to terminate parental rights and review that ruling for an abuse of discretion. Kenneth B. v. Tina B., 226 Ariz. 33, 36, ¶ 12 (App. 2010).
¶7 We will uphold the juvenile court's findings of fact "if supported by adequate evidence in the record." Christy C. v. Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec, 214 Ariz. 445, 451-52, ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (quoting State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 247 (1979)). "The juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings." Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dept of Econ. Sec, 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002).
¶8 Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by finding Father did not abandon C.A. Abandonment is:
[T]he failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, including providing normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial finding that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child. Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause
for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment.A.R.S. § 8-531(1).
¶9 We do not measure abandonment by a parent's subjective intent, but by the parent's conduct. Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 18. Mother may not restrict Father from interacting with C.A. and then petition to terminate his rights for abandonment. See Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292, 297, ¶ 21 (App. 2013).
¶10 Mother contends Father did not vigorously pursue parenting time during C.A.'s life. Yet the record shows Mother consistently rebuffed Father's efforts to assert parenting time by placing barriers in between Father and C.A. Mother repeatedly refused Father contact with C.A., challenged Father to take her to court to assert his parental rights, threatened to call the police, and imposed conditions on Father's visits. Mother herself acknowledged she did not always respond to Father's communications. In its ruling, the juvenile court found Mother's testimony about their communications not credible, and the court did not believe she intended to "offer visits or maintain a normal parental relationship between Father and [C.A.]."
¶11 The juvenile court's ruling highlighted the contentious text messages Parents shared over the years they tried to coparent C.A. Mother essentially asks us to reweigh the evidence and reach a new conclusion on her level of interference. We decline to do so. See Joelle M. v. Dept of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 525, 528, ¶ 18 (App. 2018). The record contains adequate evidence to support the juvenile court's findings and we find no abuse of discretion.
¶12 Finally, Mother asserts termination was in C.A.'s best interests. Because the juvenile court properly found no statutory ground for termination, it did not analyze best interests. We find no error. See Alma S. v. Dept of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149-50, ¶ 8 (2018) (section 8-533(B) sets out a "two-step inquiry" that requires finding a ground for termination before evaluating the child's best interests).
CONCLUSION
¶13 We affirm.