Section 1983 provides “a civil remedy for ‘deprivations of federally protected rights,’ statutory or constitutional, ‘caused by persons acting under color of state law.’ ” Amanda C. v. Case, 275 Neb. 757, 765, 749 N.W.2d 429, 437 (2008), quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds,Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). We have previously stated that
Wang Anderson's reliance on Amanda C. ex rel. Richmond v. Case, 749 N.W.2d 429, 435 (Neb. 2008), in which a child sued a DHHS case worker for misleading her father into surrendering his parental rights, is both factually and legally inapposite, particularly given that the basis for liability in that case was collateral estoppel. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Wang Anderson's substantive due process claim as to the Millard Defendants.
As the Nebraska Supreme Court has held, an act need not be the sole cause of harm to qualify as a proximate cause. Amanda C. ex rel. Richmond v. Case , 275 Neb. 757, 749 N.W.2d 429, 441 (2008). And "[w]hen multiple causes act to produce a single injury, any one of those acts can still qualify as a proximate cause of that harm[.
Def.'s Br. Rule 50(b) Mot., ECF No. 194, Page ID 6551, 6557. As the Court explained in its Memorandum and Order on summary judgment, there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. Memorandum and Order, ECF No. 123, Page ID 4316 ("an act need not be the sole cause of harm to qualify as a proximate cause") (quoting Amanda C. ex rel. Richmond v. Case, 749 N.W.2d 429, 441 (Neb. 2008). The jury concluded both Singh's and Galloway's negligence proximately caused the collision, and the Court finds that the jury's conclusion was sufficiently supported by the evidence.
Until such time as a final judgment is entered, collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) also does not apply.SeeAmanda C. ex rel. Richmond v. Case, 749 N.W.2d 429, 437 (Neb. 2008) ("Collateral estoppel is applicable where (1) an identical issue was decided in a prior action, (2) the prior action resulted in a judgment on the merits which was final, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is to be applied was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior action, and (4) there was an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue in the prior action.")
See id.Amanda C. v. Case , 275 Neb. 757, 749 N.W.2d 429 (2008).
Second, the Nebraska Legislature has recognized the critical importance of the parent-child relationship in the welfare and development of the child and that the relationship between the child and each parent should be equally considered unless it is contrary to the best interests of the child.Amanda C. v. Case , 275 Neb. 757, 749 N.W.2d 429 (2008). See, Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts , 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters , 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925) ; Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923) ).
The district court, therefore, erred in failing to dismiss the § 1983 claim against Fassett for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Amanda C. v. Case, 275 Neb. 757, 749 N.W.2d 429 (2008). See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed. 2d 45 (1989).
She alleged Roark was acting in the scope and course of his employment as a deputy with the Lancaster County Sheriff's Department.Amanda C. v. Case, 275 Neb. 757, 749 N.W.2d 429 (2008). See id.
See State v. Sommers, supra note 8. See Amanda C. v. Case, 275 Neb. 757, 749 N.W.2d 429 (2008). See, also, State v. Muro, supra note 5.