Opinion
C.A. No. 99-C-03-020 RRC.
Submitted: October 2, 2000.
Decided: December 4, 2000.
Upon Defendant's Motion for New Trial. DENIED.
This 4th day of December, 2000, upon consideration of the submissions of the parties, it appears to this Court that:
1. Donna Amalfitano (Plaintiff) brought suit against Shawn M. Baker (Defendant) for personal injuries and damages sustained by Plaintiff in an automobile accident on April 9, 1997.
2. On June 26 and 27, 2000 Plaintiffs personal injury action was tried before a jury. Liability was uncontested at trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant, finding the amount of damages Plaintiff was entitled to for the April 9, 1997 accident was $0.
3. On August 10, 2000 Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Rule 59(a). Defendant filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion for a New Trial, to which Plaintiff filed a timely Reply.
4. When considering a motion for a new trial, the jury's verdict is presumed to be correct. When considering a motion for a new trial, the Court must determine whether the jury's verdict is against the great weight of the evidence. A jury's verdict should not be disturbed unless it is manifest that it was the result of passion, prejudice, partiality or corruption, or that it was clearly in disregard of the evidence or applicable rules of law. The verdict must be manifestly and palpably against the great weight of the evidence or for some reason, or a combination of reasons, justice would miscarry if it were allowed to stand.
Lacey v. Beck, Del. Super., 161 A.2d 579, 580 (1960).
James v. Glazer, Del. Supr., 570 A.2d 1150, 1156 (1990).
Storey v. Camper, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 458, 465 (1979).
McCloskey v. McKelvey, Del. Super., 174 A.2d 691 (1961).
5. Plaintiff claims she is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the jury return a verdict for $0 damages. Plaintiff claims that because Plaintiff produced uncontradicted medical evidence at trial, the jury was required to return a verdict for at least minimal damages.
According to the parties' submitted motions, Plaintiff presented two medical experts at trial. Plaintiffs family physician, Dr. Gregory Papa, M.D. testified, and Dr. Shane Palmer, a chiropractor who examined Plaintiff on referral from Dr. Papa also testified. Defendant did not present an expert or any other witnesses.
Defendant argues that there was sufficient evidence and an adequate legal basis to support the jury's conclusion that the minimal impact between the parties' vehicles caused no compensable injury to Plaintiff. Defendant claims Plaintiff's injuries are the result of prior accidents unrelated to the April 9, 1997 accident. In support of Defendant's position, Defendant cites ample Delaware case law, which upheld a jury's finding of $0 damages when presented with evidence of a preexisting condition, minimal impact, and minimal physical signs.
Defendant's Motion at ¶ 9 (relying on the holding of Gier v. Santucci, Del. Super., No. 522, 1992, Horsey, J. (June 7, 1993) (ORDER).
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial at ¶ 8.
6. "The function of a damage award in a civil litigation is to provide just and full compensation to a plaintiff who suffers injury or loss by reason of the conduct of a tortfeasor." However, "[a] jury is free to accept or reject in whole or in part testimony offered before it, and to fix its verdict upon the testimony it accepts."
Maier v. Santucci, Del. Super., 697 A.2d 747, 749 (1997) (citing Jardel Co Inc. v. Hughes, Del. Supr., 523 A.2d 518 (1987)).
Gier v. Kananen, Del. Super., No. 522, 1992, Horsey, J. (June 7, 1993) (ORDER). (citing Debernard v. Reed, Del. Supr., 277 A.2d 684, 685-686 (1971)).
Despite the fact that liability was uncontested, the issues of proximate cause and damages still had to be determined by the jury. Plaintiff testified that she was involved in previous accidents occurring in 1987, 1988 and a 1992 motor vehicle accident. The 1992 accident caused Plaintiff strain and sprain type injuries to her neck and lower back. These injuries were similar to the injuries Plaintiff complained of from the April 9, 1997 accident. Therefore, a reasonable jury could have found that the injuries complained of were not caused by or related to the April 9, 1997 automobile accident involving Defendant.
Cooper v. Daniels, Del. Super., CA. No. 96C-11-149, 1999 WL 1441996, Cooch, J. (1999) (holding that after the trial court had directed judgment as a matter of law in favor of a plaintiff on the issues of negligence and proximate cause (where the jury's sole function was to determine the amount of plaintiffs damages) plaintiffs motion for a new trial was granted).
Plaintiff's Motion at ¶ 2.
"Findings of a Jury are not to be disturbed if there is `any competent evidence upon which the verdict could reasonably be based'." Turner v. Vineyard, Del. Supr., 80 A.2d 177, 179 (1951).
Conclusive evidence is not necessarily uncontradicted evidence. Plaintiff did present uncontradicted evidence at trial. Notwithstanding that fact, the jury could still have found that the injuries Plaintiff complained of were not the result of the April 9, 1997 car accident. After reaching this conclusion, the jury was free to return a verdict of $0 damages.
Plaintiff relies upon Maier v. Santucci, Del. Supr., 697 A.2d 747 (1997) as support for her Motion. However, in Maier, the Supreme Court of Delaware held, "where the evidence conclusively establishes the existence of an injury, however minimal, a jury award of zero damages is against the weight of the evidence and it is an abuse of discretion to deny a new trial." 697 A.2d at 748 (emphasis added). That case may be distinguished from the case here as the evidence in Maier was conclusive evidence, not merely uncontradicted.
As Plaintiff states in her motion, Dr. Papa testified that the signs of injury to Plaintiff were based on subjective and objective signs. Therefore, Dr. Papa, at least in part' relied on subjective signs of injury. The Supreme Court of Delaware has previously held, "[w]hen experts, in the process of formulating an opinion, rely upon the subjective representations of the plaintiff, determination of the credibility of the plaintiffs representations is solely within the province of the jury and the jury may accept or reject these representations as it sees fit." Thus, the jury in Plaintiff's case was free to accept or reject the representations of injury to Plaintiff. Having concluded that Plaintiff did not sustain injuries from the April 9, 1997 accident, or that they were otherwise not deserving of compensation, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Plaintiff be awarded zero damages.
Plaintiff's Motion at ¶ 3.
Gier v. Kananen, Del. Supr., No. 522, 1992, Horsey, J. (June 7, 1993) (ORDER).
In Gier v. Kananen , the Supreme Court of Delaware found "the jury's refusal to award damages reasonable given the fact that the damage to [Plaintiff's] car was minimal, [Plaintiff] also sustained injuries in other various accidents, the doctor's testimony was based at least in part on [Plaintiff's] subjective representations and [Plaintiff's] credibility was questionable." Similar to the situation in Gier, the doctor's testimony was based in part on Plaintiff's subjective representations and Plaintiff had sustained similar injuries from previous accidents.
Del. Supr., No. 522, 1992, Horsey. J. (June 7, 1993) (ORDER).
7. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.