Opinion
B321500
11-07-2023
AMAL K., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ADILA K., Defendant and Appellant.
Adila K., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. LQ021531, Michael R. Amerian, Judge. Affirmed.
Adila K., in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ASHMANN-GERST J.
Defendant and appellant Adila K. (Adila) appeals from the trial court's May 24, 2022, order permanently renewing a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.).Finding no error, we affirm.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we refer to the parties by their first names and last initials. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1), (11).) No disrespect is intended.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated.
BACKGROUND
I. Original DVRO
On May 16, 2017, plaintiff and respondent Amal K. (Amal) obtained a five-year DVRO protecting her and her minor daughter from Amal's mother, Adila.
II. Request to permanently renew the DVRO
On March 22, 2022, Amal filed a request to permanently renew the DVRO. Amal asserted that she was afraid of future abuse by Adila because Adila had been "relitigating" the original DVRO and "continue[d] to [harass]" Amal.
III. Hearing
The trial court heard Amal's renewal request on May 24, 2022. The court asked each party if she was "ready to go forward with the hearing" that day. Adila responded, "Yes, yes, your Honor." Amal also answered in the affirmative.
Amal testified that she was "afraid" and had left the state because of Adila. Amal feared that, without the DVRO, Adila would "continue or resume her prior conduct of calling police, terrifying [Amal's] daughters with false accusations of claims such as [Amal] being a prostitute" and "a drug addict, which [Adila] ha[d] done before." Amal was worried about her safety because Adila knew where she lived.
The trial court noted that it had "read and reviewed the declaration" Adila submitted in opposition to Amal's request.
The declaration does not appear in the appellate record.
Adila then testified that she had never harassed Amal and was "busy" with her own life. Adila denied having any communication with Amal. Adila testified that she had been negatively affected by the DVRO when she travelled domestically and internationally, as she was questioned by agents regarding whether she had children travelling with her. She argued that Amal did not have any evidence of harassment and asked the trial court if it had looked at a police report. The court responded that it had.
In reply, Amal contended that Adila had filed an appeal and was "harassing [her] with filings." The trial court explained to Amal that Adila had not been declared a vexatious litigant and therefore "ha[d] a right to file documents until a court says otherwise."
IV. Trial court order
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Amal's request to permanently renew the DVRO. Although the court was not convinced that Adila had violated the original DVRO or that there had been a significant change of circumstances, it believed that Adila was, "clearly, still . . . focused on [Amal] in a manner, just by virtue of her continued filings . . . over the last several years regarding this case." The court explained that it was "not holding against [Adila] the fact that she [wa]s trying to exercise those rights" because "[t]hat by [itself] is not harassing[.]" It did show, however, that Adila "ha[d] not moved on in the manner that she claim[ed]" or "at least the court [did not] find her credible in that regard."
"The [trial] court believe[d] that the nature of [Adila's] conduct was so profoundly abusive and disturbing of [Amal's] peace that [Amal's] continued fear of [Adila] [wa]s reasonable under the totality of the circumstances ...." The court had "considered the burdens" imposed by the DVRO that Adila had described and found that they were "not of the nature where the court believe[d] that it would outweigh the reasonable fear held by" Amal. The court described the "nature of the abuse" as "so bizarre, so deranged, and so disturbing ...."
V. Appeal
Adila timely appealed from the trial court's order permanently renewing the DVRO.
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant law
The purpose of the DVPA "is to prevent acts of domestic violence, abuse, and sexual abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence." (§ 6220.) To effectuate this purpose, a trial court may issue a DVRO upon a showing "to the satisfaction of the court, [of] reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse." (§ 6300, subd. (a).) The duration of an initial DVRO may not exceed five years, but it "may be renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five or more years, or permanently, at the discretion of the court, without a showing of further abuse since the issuance of the original order." (§ 6345, subd. (a).)
"The legal standard for renewal of a DVRO is whether the protected party entertains a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. [Citation.] '[T]his does not mean the court must find it is more likely than not that abuse will occur if the protective order is not renewed. It only means the evidence demonstrates it is more probable than not there is a sufficient risk of future abuse to find the protected party's apprehension genuine and reasonable.' [Citation.] An imminent and present danger of abuse is not required; there must only be a reasonable apprehension that 'abuse will occur at some time in the future if the protective order is allowed to expire.' [Citation.]" (Michael M. v. Robin J. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 170, 179 (Michael M.).)
"In evaluating whether the requesting party has a reasonable apprehension of future abuse, the trial court ordinarily should consider the evidence and findings on which the initial DVRO was based. [Citation.] '[T]he underlying findings and facts supporting that order often will be enough in themselves to provide the necessary proof to satisfy that test.' [Citation.] 'Also potentially relevant are any significant changes in the circumstances surrounding the events justifying the initial protective order. For instance, have the restrained and protected parties moved on with their lives so far that the opportunity and likelihood of future abuse has diminished to the degree they no longer support a renewal of the order?' [Citation.] 'Also relevant are the seriousness and degree of risk, such as whether it involves potential physical abuse, and the burdens the protective order imposes on the restrained person, such as interference with job opportunities.' [Citation.]" (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 180.)
It is "unnecessary for the protected party to introduce or the court to consider actual acts of abuse the restrained party committed after the original order went into effect." (Ritchie v. Konrad (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1284.)
II. Standards of review
Generally, "[t]he trial court's ruling on a request to renew a domestic violence prevention restraining order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling exceeds the bounds of reason. [Citation.]" (Eneaji v. Ubboe (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1463.)
"'To the extent that we are called upon to review the trial court's factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard of review.' [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.) Under this standard, "[o]ur sole inquiry is 'whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,' supporting the court's finding. [Citation.] 'We must accept as true all evidence . . . tending to establish the correctness of the trial court's findings . . ., resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment.' [Citation.]" (Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 822823 (Sabbah).)
III. Analysis
On appeal, a lower court's order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is the appellant's burden to overcome this presumption of correctness by affirmatively showing error. (See ibid.) We decline to consider issues raised in an opening brief that are not properly presented or sufficiently developed to be cognizable. (See People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 214, fn. 19, abrogated in part on other grounds by People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 555, fn. 5; Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach).) "It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness." (Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852.) A litigant's election to act in propria persona on appeal does not entitle her to leniency as to the rules of practice and procedure. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)
As far as we can discern, much of Adila's opening brief pertains to the issuance of the original DVRO or previous attempts to dissolve that DVRO. But the instant appeal is from the May 24, 2022, order permanently renewing the DVRO, and "[i]n challenging a renewal order, the restrained party is not permitted 'to challenge the truth of the evidence and findings underlying the initial order[.]' [Citation.]" (Lister v. Bowen (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 333.) Nor are we permitted to review "issues that could have been raised in an appeal from the original restraining order ...." (Malatka v. Helm (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1084.) Thus, we do not address claims of error concerning these earlier orders.
As to the renewal order, Adila asserts in conclusory fashion that her right to due process was violated and that the trial court's ruling was based "on evidence that denie[d] Adila a chance to tell her side of the matter." Nothing in the record before us supports these contentions. Adila was asked at the beginning of the May 24, 2022, hearing if she was prepared to proceed, and she responded that she was. The court afforded Adila the opportunity to present evidence and argue her position. The court expressly acknowledged reading Adila's declaration in opposition to Amal's renewal request and had looked at a police report that Adila had submitted. Adila fails to articulate what further process she was due. (See Benach, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852 [appellant bears the burden of supporting a point with reasoned argument].)
Finally, Adila argues that the DVRO was renewed without any evidence. We disagree, as substantial evidence supports the finding that Amal "entertain[ed] a reasonable apprehension of future abuse." (Michael M., supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 179.) Amal testified that, despite moving out of state, she feared Adila's continued abuse. The trial court was entitled to believe and rely on this testimony. (See Sabbah, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 823 ["'"'it is the exclusive province of the [trier of fact] to determine the credibility of a witness ....'"'"]; see also ibid. ["The testimony of a single witness may provide sufficient evidence"].) The court also properly relied on the evidence and findings on which the original DVRO was based. (See Michael M., supra, at p. 180.) And, the court found that Adila was not credible when she testified that she had moved on with her life, which suggested that the opportunity and likelihood of future abuse had not diminished. (Ibid.)
The trial court weighed this substantial evidence against Adila's testimony regarding the burdens imposed on her by the DVRO. The court found that Amal's reasonable fear of abuse outweighed those burdens. As the appellate court, we are not permitted to reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. (M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1145.)
Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's renewal order and that no abuse of discretion appears.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur:, P. J. LUI, J. CHAVEZ