Opinion
C. A. PC-2019-11198
08-04-2021
DAVID ALVES, Appellant, v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellee.
For Plaintiff: Catherine Sansonetti, Esq. For Defendant: Deborah A. Barclay, Esq. Iwona R. Ramian, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Catherine Sansonetti, Esq.
For Defendant: Deborah A. Barclay, Esq. Iwona R. Ramian, Esq.
DECISION
THUNBERG, J.
Before the Court is an appeal of a final decision by the Rhode Island Department of Human Services (RIDHS) denying an administrative waiver request for services related to post-secondary education. The Appellant, David Alves (Mr. Alves or Appellant), argues that the Appeals Officer's decision was in error because it upheld an arbitrary and capricious action of the agency. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15.
I
Facts and Travel
Mr. Alves is a twenty-nine-year-old individual who is "profoundly deaf." (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 10.) Mr. Alves has been a client of the Office of Rehabilitation Services (ORS), a sector within the Department of Human Services, since 2008 when he was a high school student. (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 13; Hr'g Tr. at 31.) ORS rendered services to Mr. Alves through the Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) program. (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 15.) According to Mr. Alves's Individual Plan for Employment (IPE), he had sought services in the form of financial assistance/training grants to assist him in attaining his goal of becoming a teacher for the deaf. Id. at 13-15. Mr. Alves also receives approximately $12,000 in SSDI benefits yearly and earns approximately $500 per month as an employee at Rhode Island School for the Deaf. Id. at 13.
As stated in an article on WebMD, profound hearing loss is described as follows: "Profound Hearing Loss: Between 91 and 100 Decibels[:] People with this level of hearing loss spend most of their day in silence when the world around them is bursting with normal-volume sounds. They may still be able to hear extreme booms and other loud sounds, like thunder and fireworks. If you have profound hearing loss, you won't be able to hear: Someone shouting at you; [a] running lawnmower; [m]otorcycles riding by." How Bad Is My Hearing Loss, WebMD (May 6, 2021), https://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/how-bad-is-my-hearing-loss.
According to the Administrative Hearing Decision, "ORS administers the Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) program, a State and Federally funded program whose major function is to access, plan, develop, and provide access to employment opportunities to eligible individuals with physical, emotional and/or intellectual disabilities." (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 15.)
To further his goal of becoming a teacher for the deaf, Mr. Alves pursued a bachelor's degree in deaf studies at Gallaudet University and was awarded his degree in May 2017. Id. at 14. ORS furnished funds to him for tuition, books, and attendant necessary services for prerequisite classes taken at CCRI, as well as education at Gallaudet University. Id. at 13-14. After obtaining his bachelor's degree, Mr. Alves and ORS signed an IPE setting forth the services required to engage in a seventy-two-credit, part-time master's program at Boston University (BU) which was to be completed by December 2019. Id. at 14. ORS funded Mr. Alves's expenses at BU for two summer prerequisite courses in 2017, the fall 2017 semester, and spring 2018 semester. Id.
Gallaudet University is a federally chartered educational institution in Washington, D.C. for the deaf and hard of hearing.
In February 2018, ORS informed Mr. Alves that it would be experiencing a funding decrease which would affect his training grant for the fall 2018 and spring 2019 semesters. Id. In June 2018, 218-RICR-50-00-1.17.3 was enacted, which provided for tuition funding at $2,500 per semester or $5,000 per year, which was based on the CCRI/RIC in-state tuition rates. Id.; see 218-RICR-50-00-1.17.3. Prior regulations had been based on University of Rhode Island rates. (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 14.) The new regulation also provided for an administrative waiver process, where an applicant could seek the additional tuition cost. See 218-RICR-50-00-1.17.3.
While a July 23, 2018 form states that Mr. Alves did not apply for financial aid for the fall 2018 semester, the record also demonstrates that he completed a FAFSA form for federal funding. (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 14, 17; Hr'g Tr. at 14, 29-30.) In August 2018, Mr. Alves requested an Administrative Waiver in the amount of an additional $5,895 for the fall 2018 BU semester. (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 14.) ORS Administrator Joseph Murphy denied the Administrative Waiver request, but granted $2,500 for tuition and $300 for books needed in the fall 2018 semester. Id. Mr. Alves requested mediation and, subsequently, an administrative hearing concerning the denial of his Administrative Waiver. Id. at 14-15. He also graduated early with his master's degree from BU in January 2019. Id. at 15. While Mr. Alves graduated with enough credits to earn his master's degree, he did not complete the seventy-two-credit program required to obtain a teaching certificate. (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 18; Hr'g Tr. at 35-38.) The Appeals Officer noted in the decision that Mr. Alves did not inform ORS of this early graduation as was required. (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 15.) Mr. Alves's family had assisted him in paying the balance of his tuition costs in a sum representing the denied amounts. Id.
On February 20, 2019, an Administrative Hearing was held before Louanne Marcello, Appeals Officer for the Agency. Id. at 15, 19. In addition to Mr. Alves, the witnesses who testified at the hearing were: Karen Davis, Acting Assistant Administrator for ORS; Paul Hughett, Vocational Rehabilitation Counselor for ORS; and Joseph Murphy, ORS Administrator.
The Appeals Officer first addressed Mr. Alves's argument that 218-RICR-50-00-1.17.3, adopted on June 19, 2018, violates 34 C.F.R. § 361.50, which prohibits ORS from establishing arbitrary or absolute fees for services. Id. at 16. The Agency argued that while the federal regulations prevent an absolute limit on grant amounts, it may set forth certain parameters for any financial assistance it provides. Id. The Appeals Officer noted that ORS is serving approximately 3, 800 individuals, and that a pending wait list exists due to federal funding reductions, which prompted the enactment of the new regulation. Id. She determined that "[d]espite the fact the State is utilizing a lower undergraduate tuition amount to determine the graduate level tuition assistance . . . such is not arbitrary as it is based on the tuition of the State colleges, and it is not absolute as it can be increased through a waiver if an individual's needs establish that it should be." Id.
Next, the Appeals Officer addressed the specific review of Mr. Alves's waiver request; whether the agency properly considered the fact that Mr. Alves failed to fully explore alternative funding options; and the fact that he had no outstanding loans or other financial obligations. Id. at 17. The Appeals Officer analyzed 34 C.F.R. § 361.54 and determined that "[w]hile the Federal regulations state that ORS cannot apply a financial needs test for VR services . . . ORS did not apply a financial needs test as they granted [Mr. Alves], and he accepted the $2,500 tuition award for the Fall 2018 semester." Id. at 18. The Appeals Officer went on to conclude that "in the absence of an application for and/or denial of additional alternative funding resources, [Mr. Alves] has not established the financial need for additional tuition funding . . . ." Id.
Last, the Appeals Officer discussed Mr. Alves's early graduation from BU with his master's degree after completing forty-four credits, rather than the seventy-two-credit certificate program which would have fulfilled his stated employment goal. Id. at 18-19. The Appeals Officer noted Mr. Alves's argument that the stated completion date on the IPE was incorrect, but found that this did not "impact[] the issue regarding the Fall 2018 semester tuition." Id. at 18.
Ultimately, the Appeals Officer determined that ORS's denial of the Administrative Waiver was proper and therefore denied Mr. Alves's request for relief. Id. at 18-19. Mr. Alves now appeals that decision. Mr. Alves argues that the Appeals Officer's decision was in error because it "sustained an arbitrary and capricious action of the VR agency" and violated § 42-35-15(g) as to procedure. (Pl.'s Mem. at 9.) He takes issue with the $5,000 limit on services, arguing that the agency improperly applied "a financial needs test" and failed to establish written procedures for determining waiver applications. Id. at 9-13. Mr. Alves therefore requests that the Court set aside the agency's decision and instruct them to recalculate the tuition amount Mr. Alves requires. Id. at 13. RIDHS responds that the Appeals Officer's decision is based on competent evidence in the record and, therefore, should be upheld. (Def.'s Response Br. at 17.)
II
Standard of Review
Section 42-35-15 of the Rhode Island General Law defines the parameters for appeals of agency decisions in this Court. See § 42-35-15. Review of the agency decision "shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record." Id. Furthermore, pursuant to § 42-35-15(g):
"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
"(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
"(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
"(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
"(4) Affected by other error of law;
"(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
"(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
The Supreme Court has further stated that "[i]n essence, if 'competent evidence exists in the record, the Superior Court is required to uphold the agency's conclusions.'" Auto Body Association of Rhode Island v. State Department of Business Regulation, 996 A.2d 91, 95 (R.I. 2010) (quoting Rhode Island Public Telecommunications Authority v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 650 A.2d 479, 485 (R.I. 1994)).
III
Analysis
1
$5,000 Fee Schedule Limit
Mr. Alves argues that the agency violated 34 C.F.R. § 361.50 by placing an absolute limit of $5,000 on tuition. (Pl.'s Mem. at 11.) He further states that his individual needs were not addressed in his waiver request. Id. at 12. In his reply, Mr. Alves argues that the fee schedule is so low that it effectively denies the necessary service. (Pl.'s Reply at 2.) RIDHS counters that evidence supports the Appeals Officer's finding that ORS does not place an absolute cap on funding. (Def.'s Response Br. at 17-18.) RIDHS argues that by using terms like "fee schedules" and "rates of payment," the government clearly recognizes a need to provide dollar figures for services. Id. at 18. The agency states that the baseline rate for tuition is not absolute or arbitrary as it allows for cost containment. Id. at 19. RIDHS cites to Tucker v. RIDHS, PC-2017-4015, where the court determined that the absolute monetary limit was not in contravention of federal regulations. Id. at 20. Further, RIDHS argues that because Mr. Alves ultimately completed the program and received a master's degree, the fee schedule was not so low as to effectively deny the service. Id. at 21.
Under 34 C.F.R. § 361.50(c)(2), "[t]he State unit may establish a fee schedule designed to ensure a reasonable cost to the program for each service, if the schedule is (i) [n]ot so low as to effectively deny an individual a necessary service; and (ii) [n]ot absolute and permits exceptions so that individual needs can be addressed." Moreover, "[t]he State unit may not place absolute dollar limits on specific service categories or on the total services provided to an individual." Section 34 C.F.R. § 361.50(c)(3) (emphasis added). Additionally, "written policies may not establish any arbitrary limits on the nature and scope of vocational rehabilitation services to be provided to the individual to achieve an employment outcome." Id. § 361.50(a). Section 218-RICR-50-00-1.17 governs Rhode Island's Vocational Rehabilitation Services. Pursuant to 218-RICR-50-00-1.17.3(C)(2)(c), "[a]fter utilizing the financial awards, grant aid, scholarships, or other comparable benefits, ORS will fund up to $5,000 per academic calendar year." This regulation also provides that "[a]n Administrative Waiver may be considered." Id.
RIDHS cites Tucker v. Rhode Island Department of Human Services, No. PC-2017-4015, 2019 WL 3281729 (R.I. Super. July 16, 2019), in which a justice of this court heard a somewhat similar argument. Specifically, the plaintiff in Tucker argued that ORS Policy Sec. 115.28-the policy in effect prior to the enactment of the 2018 regulation-set an absolute dollar amount of $13,362, in violation of the federal regulations. Tucker, 2019 WL 3281729, at *4. The court found that the ORS policy "does place dollar limits on its tuition and books as tuition is set at the baseline rate of the University of Rhode Island's graduate tuition" but that "the policy does not place an absolute dollar limit predominantly because" it "allows for individuals to waive the baseline rate under 'individualized extenuating circumstances.'" Id. at *5. The court also noted that the "rate is not arbitrary as it is set at the monetary cost of the State of Rhode Island's only state university." Id. As to the plaintiff's argument that the fee schedule was so low that it effectively prohibited her from obtaining services out of state, the court noted the Appeals Officer's conclusion that ORS granted a waiver for rental expenses which removed barriers to the plaintiff's continued access of out-of-state training. Id. at *6. The court agreed with this conclusion, holding that "[t]he funds ORS distributed for Tucker's living expenses relieve her from other obligations that would hinder her from paying her tuition expenses" and that "the amount ORS granted did not, in fact, prohibit her" from receiving services. Id.
RIDHS also cites to Wasser v. New York State Office of Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities, 683 F.Supp.2d 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), to support its position. In that case, the court considered a policy allowing for tuition reimbursement not to "exceed the cost of the least expensive public institution in New York offering an academic program necessary to achieve the student's vocational goal." Wasser, 683 F.Supp.2d at 219. The plaintiff challenged the tuition reimbursement he received, which was funded at the state rate, but did not cover the higher costs of Brooklyn Law School. Id. The court noted that the plaintiff could have received the same services at a state institution. Id. Ultimately, the court found it appropriate for the state to "reimburse tuition rates only up to the cost of a public institution." Id. at 220. It noted that "[t]his policy accords with . . . [the] obligation to 'appropriately factor in the cost of providing services,' so that it may use its limited resources to provide benefits to the maximum number of clients." Id. (quoting Murphy v. VESID, 705 N.E.2d 1180, 1185 (N.Y. 1998)).
In the instant matter, the Appeals Officer found that "[d]espite the fact the State is utilizing a lower undergraduate tuition amount to determine the graduate level tuition assistance, this Appeals Officer finds that such is not arbitrary as it is based on the tuition of the State colleges, and it is not absolute as it can be increased through a waiver if an individual's needs establish that it should be." (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 16.) There is competent evidence to support the finding that the fee schedule does not place absolute limits on funding. Indeed, the regulation specifically provides for a waiver process, which Mr. Alves completed, after which he was denied relief. See 218-RICR-50-00-1.17.3(C)(2)(c).
Mr. Alves also argues that the fee schedule "is so low that it does not even permit the pursuit of a graduate degree in-state, which effectively denies that VR service." (Pl.'s Reply at 3.) There is evidence in the record that a reduction in funding caused the agency to look to CCRI and RIC undergraduate tuition rates to set the fee schedule, rather than looking to the previously utilized URI graduate tuition rates. (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 16.) Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Mr. Alves received $2,500, which was $5,895 shy of the full tuition needed for the fall of 2018. Id. at 14. However, as RIDHS points out, since Mr. Alves was able to attend BU in the fall of 2018 and received his master's degree, ORS's fee schedule did not prevent him from moving forward that semester. Moreover, while ORS used CCRI and RIC tuition rates, this does not necessarily render the fee schedule "arbitrary."
2
Financial Needs Test
Mr. Alves argues that, because he is an SSDI recipient, the agency improperly applied a financial needs test in violation of 34 C.F.R. § 361.54(b). (Pl.'s Mem. at 9.) Mr. Alves states that the fact that he receives SSDI benefits is undisputed. Id. at 9-10. RIDHS contends that it is compliant with regulations as it relates to Mr. Alves's receipt of SSDI benefits. (Def.'s Response Br. at 27.) RIDHS acknowledges that ORS may not require Mr. Alves to participate in the cost of VR services, but argues there is no evidence in the record that ORS required Mr. Alves to participate in the cost of services in order to receive them. Id. at 28. RIDHS also argues that it had no obligation to provide a more generous training grant because it may be reimbursed for services under the Ticket to Work regulations. Id. at 32.
Pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 361.54(b)(3)(ii), "[t]he designated State unit may not apply a financial needs test, or require the financial participation of the individual . . . [a]s a condition for furnishing any vocational rehabilitation service if the individual in need of the service has been determined eligible for Social Security benefits under titles II or XVI of the Social Security Act." The Appeals Officer found that Mr. Alves receives SSDI benefits, but that "ORS did not apply a financial needs test as they granted him, and he accepted the $2,500 tuition award for the Fall 2018 semester." (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 18.) Thus, there is competent evidence in the record to support this finding. The regulation clearly prohibits a financial needs test "as a condition for furnishing" services, but Mr. Alves was not denied the offered services. See id. Rather, ORS furnished Mr. Alves $2,500 toward his fall 2018 semester, in accordance with its fee schedule. Id.
Both parties also reference the "Ticket-to-Work" program, which allows a VR agency to collect reimbursement of certain costs for VR services provided to individuals receiving Social Security, provided the recipient meets certain criteria. See Def.'s Response Br. at 31; Pl.'s Reply at 6; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.2101. RIDHS argues that the fact that a VR agency may be reimbursed for these services does not require them "to provide a more generous training grant to [Mr. Alves]." (Def.'s Response Br. at 32.) Mr. Alves responds that under this program, ORS could "recap agency expenditures from the federal government . . . and experience a windfall by which to use funding for other clients in the future." (Pl.'s Reply at 6-7.) However, the potential that ORS may be able to recover some of the funding granted to an SSDI recipient does not require it to provide a more substantial grant.
3
Comparable Benefits
Next, Mr. Alves argues that private sources of financial aid are not within the definition of comparable benefits under 34 C.F.R. § 361.5(b)(8), and there is no requirement that an ORS client apply for student loans. (Pl.'s Mem. at 10.) Mr. Alves says that the VR agency ignored the fact that he completed a FAFSA, and that he met his obligation under 20 U.S.C. § 723(a)(5) to try to secure assistance. Id. at 10-11.
In her decision, the Appeals Officer cited 34 C.F.R. § 361.48, which states that "no training services in an institution of higher education may be paid for with funds under this part unless maximum efforts have been made by the State unit and individual to secure grant assistance in whole or part from other sources." See Administrative Hr'g Decision at 17 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 361.48(b)(6)). She went on to note that Mr. Alves had completed the FAFSA "but chose not to apply for any other funding." Id.
"Comparable services and benefits" are defined under 34 C.F.R. § 361.5(c)(8) as:
"(A) Provided or paid for, in whole or in part, by other Federal, State, or local public agencies, by health insurance, or by employee benefits;
"(B) Available to the individual at the time needed to ensure the progress of the individual toward achieving the employment outcome in the individual's individualized plan for employment in accordance with § 361.53; and
"(C) Commensurate to the services that the individual would otherwise receive from the designated State vocational rehabilitation agency."
Additionally, "comparable services and benefits do not include awards and scholarships based on merit." Id. Moreover, under 34 C.F.R. § 361.53(a), "[t]he vocational rehabilitation services . . . must assure that prior to providing an accommodation or auxiliary aid or service or any vocational rehabilitation services, except those services listed in paragraph (b) of this section, to an eligible individual . . . the State unit must determine whether comparable services and benefits . . . exist under any other program[.]" Several VR services are exempt from the determination of comparable benefits; however, unlike the provision in § 361.54(b)(3)(ii), there is no specific bar for SSDI recipients. See 34 C.F.R. § 361.53. RIDHS argues that "[a]s a result, . . . requiring [Mr. Alves] to expend the maximum efforts to secure grant assistance does not equate to applying a financial needs test, nor is [RIDHS] exempt from expending maximum efforts to secure grant assistance." (Def.'s Response Br. at 29.)
Similarly, 218-RICR-50-00-1.17.3(C)(2) provides that "[t]o the maximum extent possible, the costs of training must be met, wholly or in part, with grant aid and other comparable services and benefits and resources other than vocational rehabilitation funding." Furthermore, the regulations state that "[t]he Promise Grant, Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FASFA), Student Aid Report (SAR), family contributions, work study, or accepted loans will be considered as part of a student's financial aid package." See 218-RICR-50-00-1.17.3(C)(2)(b). However, the regulation makes clear that "[t]he student is not required or obligated to accept a loan to reach an unmet need for school or training, but are encouraged to do so, as ORS does not typically cover all of the costs associated with attending college." Id.
In her decision, the Appeals Officer determined that "[w]hen ORS received [Mr. Alves's] waiver request, there was a team meeting to discuss his needs, income, resources to include grants and scholarships available to him and the agencies [sic] financial situation at the time." (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 17.) She also noted that according to ORS's review, "while [Mr. Alves] did apply for Federal funding through the FAFSA, he did not fully explore alternative funding resources, including any grants, scholarships or loans that may have been available to him." Id. Last, the Appeals Officer found that ORS considered that Mr. Alves's "educational needs had been fully funded in the past, he had no outstanding loans or other financial obligations relative to his educational pursuits." Id. She agreed with the agency that Mr. Alves had not established the financial need for additional funding from ORS and that it, therefore, properly denied the waiver. Id. at 17-18.
While, as discussed above, the federal regulation is clear that ORS may not apply a financial needs test as a condition for furnishing services, other regulations also make clear that the agency may look to other sources of funding prior to issuing "auxiliary funding." See 34 C.F.R. § 361.53(a); see also 34 C.F.R. § 361.54(b). As the Appeals Officer notes in her decision, Mr. Alves was informed that his funding may not reach 100 percent before that semester, and he admits that he was encouraged to look to other sources of funding to aid in covering the costs of his training program. (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 17-18.) There is evidence in the record that Mr. Alves does not have extensive financial resources-he collects about $12,000 per year in SSDI benefits and earns approximately $500 per month teaching at the School for the Deaf. Id. at 13. Furthermore, there is testimony that Mr. Alves's family contribution on the FAFSA was zero and that after ORS' waiver denial, his family loaned him the remainder of tuition, which he has not started paying back to them. (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 15, 17; Hr'g Tr. at 36.) On the other hand, as the Appeals Officer noted, ORS considered that Mr. Alves did not have other outstanding loans or financial obligations related to his training. (Administrative Hr'g Decision at 17.) In sum, there is competent evidence in the record to support the finding that the agency was permitted to look to Mr. Alves's other sources of aid or lack of application for other aid as part of the financial consideration of the waiver.
4
Waiver Standard
Lastly, Mr. Alves argues that the VR agency violated federal law by failing to establish standards by which it grants waivers. (Pl.'s Mem. at 12.) He faults the agency for lacking a "uniform methodology for determining who will be granted a waiver." Id. at 13. In response, RIDHS addresses the specifics of Mr. Alves's waiver request and argues that federal regulations "support" the "person centered approach for services." (Def.'s Response Br. at 23.) RIDHS also cites to 218-RICR-50-00-1.17.3(C)(2), contending that the funding is more like a "last resort" and that clients need to seek alternative avenues for funding post-secondary degrees. Id. at 23-24. RIDHS says that Mr. Alves was aware of the amount of his training grant, enrolled, and attended his program without barriers. Id. at 27.
In Tucker, the plaintiff similarly argued that "the waiver process is arbitrary because there is no implemented sub-regulatory procedure to guide granting waivers in a uniform manner but is approved by a subjective ad hoc group of agency employees." Tucker, 2019 WL 3281729, at *5. The Tucker court rejected that argument, stating that 34 C.F.R. § 361.50(a) "requires a written policy merely covering the nature and scope of each vocational rehabilitation service and criteria to be provided." Id. The trial justice stated that "[t]he waiver request does not implement arbitrary limits because the waiver can only be granted on a case-by-case basis." Id. Here, the ORS regulation clearly sets out the "nature and scope" of the VR service for post-secondary education and training. See 218-RICR-50-00-1.17.3. A waiver necessarily requires consideration on an individualized basis. See Tucker, 2019 WL 3281729, at *5. While the Appeals Officer noted this argument and listed the factors considered by the agency in deciding the waiver, she did not specifically address whether the failure to have written policies for deciding the waiver was improper. See Administrative Hr'g Decision at 17. However, she found that the agency properly denied the waiver request, so it is implicit in that finding that the agency followed the proper procedure in deciding the waiver. There is competent evidence in the record to support this finding.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the Appeals Officer's decision upholding the denial of Mr. Alves's waiver request for post-secondary education services was supported by competent evidence in the record. Therefore, the Court affirms the agency's decision and denies the appeal. Counsel shall prepare an order for entry.