We reverse. "To prove a prima facie case of negligence in a slip and fall case, a plaintiff is required to show that the defendant created the condition which caused the accident or that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition" ( Kalogerides v. Citibank, 233 A.D.2d 298; see Bradish v. Tank Tech Corp., 216 A.D.2d 505, 506; Alvarez v. Compass Retail, 237 A.D.2d 473, 474). Here, the defendant established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law ( see generally Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324).
"To prove a prima facie case of negligence * * * a plaintiff is required to show that the defendant created the condition which caused the accident or that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition" (Bradish v. Tank Tech Corp., 216 A.D.2d 505, 506; see Juarez v. Wavecrest Mgt. Team Ltd., 88 N.Y.2d 628, 646; Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836, 837). The defendants Kipp's Pharmacy and San Realty Corp. (hereinafter the Kipp's defendants) and Vassallo established their burden on their respective motions for summary judgment by demonstrating that they neither created nor had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous electrical condition which allegedly caused the fire (see Alvarez v. Compass Retail, 237 A.D.2d 473, 474). In response, the plaintiffs failed to raised a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557). The affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs were speculative and conclusory in nature (see Clarke v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 293 A.D.2d 701, 702; Scola v. Sun Intl. N. Am., 279 A.D.2d 466, 467; Arce v. New York City Hous. Auth., 265 A.D.2d 281, 282; Matter of Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. Barile, 86 A.D.2d 362, 366).
We affirm. "To prove a prima facie case of negligence in a slip and fall case, a plaintiff is required to show that the defendant created the condition which caused the accident or that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the condition" (Alvarez v. Compass Retail, 237 A.D.2d 473, 474). "To constitute constructive notice, a defect must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit defendant's employees to discover and remedy it" (Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836, 837). The defendant submitted evidence that there was no prior record of any overhead leaks or pedestrian accidents on the platform to support a claim that it either created or had actual or constructive notice of the allegedly hazardous condition (see Alvarez v. Compass Retail, supra; see generally Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320). The affidavit of the plaintiff's expert, based on an inspection 20 months after the accident, failed to establish that a defect existed in the water collection system on the date in question.
A landowner cannot be held liable unless it had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition for such a period of time that, in the exercise of reasonable care, it should have corrected it ( see, Putnam v. Stout, 38 N.Y.2d 607, 611-612). Jameco, as a movant for summary judgment, had the initial burden of establishing the lack of actual or constructive notice ( see, Lowe v. Olympia York Cos. [USA], 238 A.D.2d 317; Alvarez v. Compass Retail, 237 A.D.2d 473; see also, Lesocovich v. 180 Madison Ave. Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 982). Proof of lack of actual notice alone was insufficient ( see, Reinemann v. Stewart's Ice Cream Co., 238 A.D.2d 845). It was also incumbent on Jameco, as movant, to show lack of constructive notice, in that the condition which caused the accident was not visible or apparent for a sufficient length of time to permit Jameco, in the exercise of reasonable care, to remedy the defect ( see, Reinemann v. Stewart's Ice Cream Co., supra; Cobrin v. County of Monroe, 212 A.D.2d 1011). It cannot be ascertained from the record when the snow which caused the accident fell, nor how long the allegedly dangerous condition existed. Indeed, Jameco cleared the parking lot of snow, indicating that it had notice of the snow accumulation for a sufficient length of time to take action.
Chase, as movant for summary judgment, had the initial burden of establishing the lack of actual or constructive notice. See, Lowe v. Olympia & York Companies, 238 A.D.2d 317 (2nd Dept.1997); Alvarez v. Compass Retail, Inc., 237 A.D.2d 473 (2nd Dept.1997); see also, Lesocovich v. 180 Madison Ave. Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 982 (1993). There is no evidence that Chase received complaints concerning the conditions at issue, and therefore Chase's motion must be granted on the issue of actual notice.
Cornell, as movant for summary judgment, had the initial burden of establishing the lack of actual or constructive notice. See, Lowe v. Olympia & York Companies, 238 A.D.2d 317 (2nd Dept.1997); Alvarez v. Compass Retail, Inc., 237 A.D.2d 473 (2nd Dept.1997); see also, Lesocovich v. 180 Madison Ave. Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 982 (1993). There is no evidence that Cornell did not receive any complaints concerning the condition at issue.
Defendants, as movants for summary judgment, had the initial burden of establishing the lack of actual or constructive notice. See, Lowe v Olympia & York Companies, 238 AD2d 317 (2nd Dept. 1997); Alvarez v Compass Retail, Inc., 237 AD2d 473 (2nd Dept. 1997); see also, Lesocovich v 180 Madison Ave. Corp., 81 NY2d 982 (1993). Defendants' uncontroverted testimony that they did not receive any complaints concerning the condition at issue and plaintiff's testimony that she never notified them, nor anyone else to her knowledge, necessitates the granting of summary judgment on the issue of actual notice of the condition.
Defendants, as movants for summary judgment, had the initial burden of establishing the lack of actual or constructive notice. See, Lowe v. Olympia & York Companies, 238 A.D.2d 317 (2nd Dept.1997); Alvarez v. Compass Retail, Inc., 237 A.D.2d 473 (2nd Dept.1997); see also, Lesocovich v. 180 Madison Ave. Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 982 (1993). Defendants' uncontroverted testimony that they did not receive any complaints concerning the condition at issue and plaintiff's testimony that she never notified them, nor anyone else to her knowledge, necessitates the granting of summary judgment on the issue of actual notice of the condition.