Opinion
No. 04-04-00031-CV
Delivered and Filed: November 3, 2004.
Appeal from the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2003-CI-02487, Honorable Martha Tanner, Judge Presiding.
Reversed and Remanded.
Sitting: Alma L. LóPEZ, Chief Justice, Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Janet Alvarez, seeks, by restricted appeal, to set aside two default judgments entered against her in the underlying personal injury lawsuit. Alvarez claims that the default judgments were improper because she had filed an answer, and therefore error is apparent on the face of the record. We agree, and we reverse and remand.
Background
This case involves a personal injury action originally brought by three plaintiffs, Patricia Snider, Paul Kirk, and Keith McDaniel, against Janet Alvarez arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on January 19, 2001. The lawsuit was filed on January 16, 2003, under Cause No. 2003-CI-00772. On February 18, 2003, before Alvarez had answered or made an appearance, a default judgment was entered in favor of one of the plaintiffs, Snider, against Alvarez. That default judgment is not challenged on appeal. Also on February 18, 2003, an order was granted severing the live claims involving the two remaining plaintiffs into a new cause number. The default judgment taken by Snider continued in the original cause number (No. 2003-CI-00772) and the claims made by Kirk and McDaniel, which had yet to be resolved, were assigned a new cause number (No. 2003-CI-02487). Unaware of the severance order or the new cause number, Alvarez then filed an original answer in the original cause number (No. 2003-CI-00772) addressing the claims of all of the plaintiffs.
On June 3, 2003, Kirk and McDaniel proceeded to take a default judgment against Alvarez in the severed cause number (No. 2003-CI-02487). Alvarez timely filed a notice of restricted appeal as to these default judgments.
Analysis
To attack a default judgment by restricted appeal, four prerequisites must be met: (1) notice of appeal must be filed within six months after the judgment is signed; (2) by a party to the suit; (3) who did not participate at trial; (4)and the error complained of must be apparent on the face of the record. Tex.R.App.P. 30; Quaestor Inv., Inc. v. State of Chiapas, 997 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1999); Norman Communications v. Texas Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997). The first three elements are not disputed. We will therefore focus on the issue of error apparent on the face of the record.
A plaintiff may properly seek a default judgment after the defendant's time to file an answer has expired and the citation and proof of service have been on file with the clerk for at least ten days, excluding the day of filing and the day of judgment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 107, 239. The record before us includes no proof that Alvarez was ever served with citation in the new lawsuit (No. 2003-CI-02487) that was created by the severance in February 2003. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21 (requiring that every pleading, motion, or application for relief must be served on all other parties in the action); Lane Wood Industries, Inc. v. DeMoss, 489 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1973, no writ) (holding that notice of a cross action is not equivalent to notice of the severance of that cross action which creates a new lawsuit and requires independent service for the court to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant); David E. Keltner and Melinda R. Burke, Protecting the Record for Appeal: A Reference Guide In Texas Civil Cases, 17 St. Mary's L.J. 273, 306 (1986) (stating the same rule). Therefore, the trial court's entry of the default judgments in favor of Kirk and McDaniel was erroneous and such error is apparent on the face of the record. Having met all of the elements for restricted appeal, Alvarez is entitled to have the default judgments set aside. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court in Cause No. 2003-CI-02487 and remand for a new trial.
CONCURRING OPINION
The confusion in this case "apparently arose because of the trial court's unusual method of severance." Blankenship v. Robins, 878 S.W.2d 138, 138 n. 1 (Tex. 1994). "Ordinarily, the judgment is severed in order to make it final and then given a new cause number, leaving the remaining parties under the original cause number." Id. In this case, the default judgment taken by Snider was left in the original cause number, and the claims by the remaining plaintiffs were severed into a new cause number.
The majority relies on City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 828 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex. 1992), to hold that the filing of the answer in this case in the original cause number does not defeat its effectiveness. Although I agree that this should be the result, I believe the Texas Supreme Court should clarify the law by overruling Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1985), and by extending its decision in Rodriguez beyond the perfection-of-appeal context to other contexts such as the one presented in this case, i.e., the filing of an answer in the original cause number when the answer should have been filed in the severed cause number.
The Texas Supreme Court has questioned the soundness of its holding in Philbrook on several occasions. See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgmt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. 1994); Blankenship v. Robins, 878 S.W.2d at 138-39; Mueller v. Saravia, 826 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Tex. 1992). In Rodriguez, however, the court continued to assume Philbrook was correctly decided and simply distinguished it by noting that the parties' names associated with the original and severed cause numbers in Philbrook were identical, making the different cause numbers crucial to the proper management of the case. Rodriguez, 828 S.W.2d at 418.
Philbrook was readily distinguishable in Rodriguez because the original cause number 88-CI-14572 was styled Leno Garcia, et al. v. Robert W. Beyer, et al., while the severed cause number 87-CI-23305 was styled Abraham Rodriguez and Alicia Rodriguez v. City of San Antonio. In the instant case, however, Philbrook is not so readily distinguishable. The original cause number 2003-CI-00772 was styled Patricia Snider, Paul Kirk, and Keith McDaniel v. Janet Alvarez, while the severed cause number 2003-CI02487 was styled Paul Kirk, et al. v. Janet Alvarez. Therefore, while I agree with the result reached by the majority, Rodriguez might be questioned as providing ready support for the majority's holding since the factual basis used to distinguish Philbrook is more problematic in this case. For these reasons, I encourage the Texas Supreme Court to clarify the law in an appropriate case by overturning Philbrook and extending the holding in Rodriguez.
Although the severance order directed that the severed cause be styled Paul Kirk and Keith McDaniel v. Janet Alvarez, the default judgments, the notice of default judgment sent by the district clerk's office, and the trial court's docket sheet are styled Paul Kirk, et al. v. Janet Alvarez.