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Alvarez v. Bloomfield Board of Education

Superior Court of Connecticut
Nov 10, 2015
HHDCV146054235 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2015)

Opinion

HHDCV146054235

11-10-2015

Julian Alvarez ppa Mario Alvarez v. Bloomfield Board of Education


UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Nina F. Elgo, J.

Before this court is a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Bloomfield Board of Education (Board). The defendant claims that the complaint filed by the plaintiff, Julian Alvarez, and ppa Mario Alvarez, should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on mootness. The plaintiff has sued the Board claiming that his due process rights under the state and federal constitutions were violated when he was expelled from attending the Metropolitan Learning Center Magnet School. Because the plaintiff has been readmitted to the school, the defendant asserts that the plaintiff's claims are moot and should be dismissed. The plaintiff objects, arguing that because he seeks damages, his claims are not moot. In response, the defendant maintains that because the defendant is a municipality, the plaintiff is not entitled to seek damages. Finally, the plaintiff further argues that this court cannot decide the motion to dismiss unless it holds an evidentiary hearing.

" A motion to dismiss properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court . . . and mootness implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction." (Citation omitted.) We the People of Connecticut, Inc. v. Malloy, 150 Conn.App. 576, 581-82 n.3, 92 A.3d 961, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 919, 100 A.3d 850 (2014). " Mootness is a threshold issue that implicates subject matter jurisdiction, which imposes a duty on the court to dismiss a case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Batchelder v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 133 Conn.App. 173, 180, 34 A.3d 465, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 913, 40 A.3d 319 (2012). " Mootness presents a circumstance wherein the issue before the court has been resolved or has lost its significance because of a change in the condition of affairs between the parties . . . A case becomes moot when due to intervening circumstances a controversy between the parties no longer exists." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sargent v. Sargent, 156 Conn.App. 109, 114, 113 A.3d 72 (2015).

In the context of injunctive relief, " Connecticut courts have rejected injunctive remedies on the ground of mootness where the issue before the court has been resolved or has lost its significance because of intervening circumstances." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 548, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011). On the other hand, our appellate courts have recognized that " while cessation of allegedly unconstitutional or illegal activity may render moot a claim for injunctive relief, such cessation will not render moot a case that also states a claim for damages resulting from such activity prior to its cessation." Hallas v. Windsor, 217 Conn. 689, 692, 587 A.2d 149 (1991); see also Russo v. Common Council, 80 Conn.App. 100, 102-03 n.2, 832 A.2d 1227 (2003) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief as moot but citing Hallas to note that " [i]f the plaintiff had sought damages arising out of his claim, the issue before us may have been decided differently").

Because the plaintiff does not dispute the fact that he has been readmitted, the issue before this court is a legal one and does not require an evidentiary hearing to resolve. Thus the question before this court is whether the plaintiff has a viable claim for damages such that his claim is not moot.

The defendant argues that because it is a municipality, the plaintiff may not seek damages pursuant to his due process claims under the federal and state constitution. This court agrees. Although our courts have allowed a cause of action for damages against state and federal officers for violation of constitutional rights, they have not extended these actions against state and federal agencies. Although no Connecticut appellate court has ruled on this precise issue, this court is persuaded by numerous superior court authority which has held that the rationale precluding actions against federal and state agencies applies equally as well to municipal agencies.

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), the United States Supreme Court created an implied cause of action for damages against individual federal agents for violations of a right secured under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Id., 397. Relying on Bivens, our Supreme Court in Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 710 A.2d 688 (1998), similarly recognized a private damages claim against state police officers for violations of rights guaranteed under article first, § § 7 and 9, of the Connecticut Constitution. Id., 41.

Both Bivens and Binette, however, implied causes of action for damages against individual officers. With respect to federal governmental agencies, the United States Supreme Court has definitively held that the Bivens remedy does not extend to damages claims against federal agencies. In Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994), the court rejected the proposition that " the category of defendants against whom Bivens -type actions may be brought [should] include not only federal agents, but federal agencies as well." (Emphases in original.) Id., 484. Rejecting the argument that the " 'logic' of Bivens " applies equally to claims against agencies, the court observed that " we implied a cause of action against federal officials in Bivens in part because a direct action against the Government was not available . . . In essence, [the plaintiff] asks us to imply a damages action based on a decision that presumed the absence of that very action." (Citation omitted; emphases in original.) Id., 485. The court further recognized that extending Bivens to claims against agencies would destroy its central purpose of deterring the misconduct of individual officers. " It must be remembered that the purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer . .. If we were to imply a damages action directly against federal agencies, thereby permitting claimants to bypass qualified immunity, there would be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring damages actions against individual officers. Under [the plaintiff's] regime, the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. The court reaffirmed this limitation in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001), which held that actions under Bivens are available only against individuals and not corporate entities acting under color of federal law. Id., 74.

Our appellate courts have not considered whether an identical limitation applies to Bivens -type actions under the Connecticut constitution. Our Supreme Court has, however, consistently looked to Bivens and its progeny when determining whether to recognize a cause of action for damages based on state constitutional claims. See Kelley Property Dev., Inc. v. Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 337-38, 627 A.2d 909 (1993); Binette v. Sabo, supra, 244 Conn. 45-46; ATC Partnership v. Windham, 251 Conn. 597, 613-14, 741 A.2d 305 (1999).

Superior Court cases to consider the issue have uniformly relied on Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. to hold that damages claims based on violations of the Connecticut Constitution cannot be maintained against a municipal entity. See Aselton v. East Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X07-CV-01-0079187-S, (December 3, 2002, Sferrazza, J.) (" [a]pplying the limitations pertaining to Bivens actions as announced by the United States Supreme Court [in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. and Correctional Services Corp.], no Bivens action can be maintained directly against the town of East Hartford for any violations of the state constitution"); O'Connor v. Wethersfield Board of Education, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-0l-0808376 (July 7, 2003, Booth, J.) (35 Conn. L. Rptr. 267, 271) (relying on Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. to hold that " a Bivens action may not be brought directly against a governmental entity"); Feliciano v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-01-0806525-S, (February 21, 2003, Wagner, J.T.R.) (Bivens claim cannot be brought directly against municipality); Bazzano v. Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-98-0584611-S (November 18, 1999, Peck, J.) (" the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost if the court was to imply a damages cause of action directly against the municipality and a supervisor").

This court agrees with the logic and rationale of the above superior court decisions rejecting constitutional damages claims against municipalities and therefore, grants the defendant's motion to dismiss.


Summaries of

Alvarez v. Bloomfield Board of Education

Superior Court of Connecticut
Nov 10, 2015
HHDCV146054235 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2015)
Case details for

Alvarez v. Bloomfield Board of Education

Case Details

Full title:Julian Alvarez ppa Mario Alvarez v. Bloomfield Board of Education

Court:Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Nov 10, 2015

Citations

HHDCV146054235 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2015)