Courts in a majority of the jurisdictions in which the question has been considered have held that under the felony-murder doctrine a participating felon is not guilty of murder when the killing is done by a person other than the participating felon or his co-felons. E.g., People v. Antick, 15 Cal.3d 79, 87, 539 P.2d 43, 48, 123 Cal.Rptr. 475, 480 (1975); People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365, 373, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 917 (1965), vacated on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951 (1967); People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133-34, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 445-46 (1965); Alvarez v. District Court In For the City County of Denver, 186 Colo. 37, 38-39, 525 P.2d 1131, 1131-32 (1974); Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 98-100, 88 S.W. 1085, 1086 (1905); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 514-15, 209 N.E.2d 308, 314 (1965); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541, 544-46 (1863); People v. Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 30-31, 120 N.W.2d 766, 774-75 (1963); Sheriff, Clark County v. Hicks, 506 P.2d 766, 768 (Nev. 1973); State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 226, 374 A.2d 20, 30 (1977); People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 50, 167 N.E.2d 736, 738-39, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331-33 (1960); State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 661-62, 122 S.E. 568, 570 (1924); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 227-35, 261 A.2d 550, 555-58 (1970); Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 495-96, 137 A.2d 472, 476 (1958), see Annot. 56 A.L.R.3d 239 (1974). The rationale underlying this rule is the "agency" theory of felony murder.
The defendants next contend that the court misstated the law of felony murder in its instructions to the jury. In particular, they argue that the language contained in instruction 16 to the effect that the defendants could be found guilty "even if one or more of the defendants did not actually commit the act that caused said death" is contrary to 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-3-102(1)(b) as it has been interpreted by this court in Alvarez v. District Court, 186 Colo. 37, 525 P.2d 1131 (1974) (legislature intended to limit felony murder to deaths directly caused by a participant in the felony transaction). Paragraphs one and two of instruction 16 provide: "If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from all the facts and circumstances that the deceased, JACK SUDDERS, died from a gun shot wound inflicted by one or more of the defendants during the act of robbery or immediate flight therefrom then you must find the defendants guilty of Count 3 of the information. "
Whatever name is used, this theory has been rejected in several jurisdictions. (See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Redline (1958) 391 Pa. 486 [ 137 A.2d 472]; Commonwealth ex. rel. Smith v. Myers (1970) 438 Pa. 218, [ 261 A.2d 550, 56 A.L.R.3d 217]; Alvarez v. District Ct. in for City Cty. of Denver (1974) 186 Colo. 37 [ 525 P.2d 1131]; People v. Wood (1960) 8 N.Y.2d 48 [201 N YS.2d 328, 167 N.E.2d 736]; State v. Garner (1959) 238 La. 563 [ 115 So.2d 855]; State v. Harrison (1977) 90 N.M. 439 [ 564 P.2d 1321]; People v. Austin (1963) 370 Mich. 12 [ 120 N.W.2d 766]; Sheriff, Clark County v. Hicks (1973) 89 Nev. 78 [ 506 P.2d 766]. But see Blansett v. State (Tex.Crim. 1977) 556 S.W.2d 322.
and restricts criminal culpability [2011-2796 (La. 13]to deaths directly caused by the defendant and co-felons, and rejected the “proximate cause” test, which holds the defendant responsible for all deaths that foreseeably result from the acts of defendant and co-felons. People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130, 137 (1965); Alvarez v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver, 186 Colo. 37, 525 P.2d 1131, 1132 (1974); Comer v. State, 977 A.2d 334, 340 (Del.2009); State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 233 P.3d 71, 78 (2010); State v. Sophophone, 270 Kan. 703, 19 P.3d 70, 77 (2001); Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438, 444 A.2d 1034 (1982); Com. v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308, 314 (1965); State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 882 (Minn.
The majority of states considering this issue have found no felony murder liability when a non-felon commits the killing. People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965) (co-felon killed by robbery victim); Alvarez v. District Court, 525 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Colo. 1974) (en banc) (victim mistaken for robber and shot by police); State v. Crane, 279 S.E.2d 695, 696 (Ga. 1981) (accomplice killed by burglarized homeowner); Commonwealth v. Moore, 88 S.W. 1085 (Ky.Ct.App. 1905) (victim of attempted robbery accidentally killed bystander); State v. Garner, 115 So.2d 855, 864 (La. 1959) (bar patron accidentally killed bystander while defending bystander against defendant's assault); Campbell v. State, 444 A.2d 1034, 1042 (Md. 1982) (no felony murder where co-felon is killed by victim or police); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 209 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1965) (police officer accidentally shot bystander); People v. Warren, 205 N.W.2d 599 (Mich.Ct.App. 1973) (declining to apply agency theory when defendant killed co-felon); State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 1992) (bystander killed by shot fired by someone in group adverse to defendant); State v. Rust, 250 N.W.2d 867 (Neb. 1977) (co-felon shot by police); Sheriff v. Hicks, 506 P.2d 766, 768 (Nev. 1973) (vict
See Severs, 759 S.W.2d at 938; Crane, 279 S.E.2d at 697;State v. Bonner, 411 S.E.2d 598, 604 (N.C. 1992). See State v. Jones, 859 P.2d 514, 515 (Okla.Crim.App. 1993); State v. Bonner, 411 S.E.2d 598, 599 (N.C. 1992);Minnesota v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 1992); State v. Severs, 759 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1988);Campbell v. State, 444 A.2d 1034, 1042 (Md. 1982); State v. Crane, 279 S.E.2d 695, 696 (Ga. 1981); Weick v. State, 420 A.2d 159, 161-62 (Del. 1980); Jackson v. State, 589 P.2d 1052, 1052-53 (N.M. 1979); State v. Rust, 250 N.W.2d 867, 875 (Neb. 1977); Alvarez v. Denver, 525 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Colo. 1974);Clark County Sheriff v. Hicks, 506 P.2d 766, 768 (Nev. 1973);People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965);Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 476, 482-83 (Pa. 1958);Commonwealth v. Moore, 88 S.W. 1085, 1086 (Ky. 1905). A minority of jurisdictions have adopted the so-called "proximate cause" theory in felony murder cases, but generally only when such a theory is mandated or supported by the jurisdiction's statutory language.
Other states have rejected liability based on lack of agency in the context of a killing committed by police officers or another third party trying to apprehend a felon and killing either the felon or another person. See Alvarez v. District Court In and For City and County of Denver, 525 P.2d 1131 (Colo. 1974); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 209 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d 550 (Pa. 1970) and Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1958).
They have asserted that no deterrence value attaches when the felon is not the person immediately responsible for the death, or have contended that an expansive felony murder rule might unreasonably hold the felons responsible for the acts of others — for instance, when an unarmed felon is fleeing the scene and a bystander is hit by the bad aim of the armed victim (see, People v Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781-782, 402 P.2d 130, 134; State v Bonner, 330 N.C. 536, 541-542, 411 S.E.2d 598, 601). See, e.g., Wilson v State ( 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100); People v Washington ( 62 Cal.2d 777, 402 P.2d 130); Alvarez v District Ct. ( 186 Colo. 37, 525 P.2d 1131); Weick v State ( 420 A.2d 159 [Del]); State v Crane ( 247 Ga. 779, 279 S.E.2d 695); People v Morris ( 1 Ill. App.3d 566, 274 N.E.2d 898); Commonwealth v Moore ( 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085); State v Garner ( 238 La. 563, 115 So.2d 855); Campbell v State ( 293 Md. 438, 444 A.2d 1034); Commonwealth v Balliro ( 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308); People v Austin ( 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766); State v Bonner ( 330 N.C. 536, 411 S.E.2d 598); Sheriff, Clark County v Hicks ( 89 Nev. 78, 506 P.2d 766); State v Canola ( 73 N.J. 206, 374 A.2d 20); Jackson v State ( 92 N.M. 461, 589 P.2d 1052); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v Myers ( 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550); State v Severs ( 759 S.W.2d 935 [Tenn Crim App]); State v Hansen ( 734 P.2d 421 [Utah]); Wooden v Commonwealth ( 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811). While all of these cases have imposed limitations on felony murder liability when a nonparticipant is directly responsible for the killing, in some the limitation apparently applies only when one of the c
State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 374 A.2d 20, 23 (1977). See, e.g., People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130 (1965); Alvarez v. Denver, 186 Colo. 37, 525 P.2d 1131 (1974); Weick v. State, 420 A.2d 159 (Del. 1980); State v. Crane, 247 Ga. 779, 279 S.E.2d 695 (1981); State v. Garner, 238 La. 563, 115 So.2d 855 (1959); Campbell v. State, 293 Md. 438, 444 A.2d 1034 (1982); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308 (1965); State v. Majors, 237 S.W. 486 (Mo. 1922); State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 912, 98 S.Ct. 313, 54 L.Ed.2d 198 (1977); Sheriff, Clark County v. Hicks, 89 Nev. 78, 506 P.2d 766 (1973); Jackson v. State, 92 N.M. 461, 589 P.2d 1052 (1979); People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 167 N.E.2d 736 (1960); State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970); State v. Severs, 759 S.W.2d 935 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1988); Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981). This rule is sometimes referred to as the "agency" theory of felony murder:
isting Felony or Other Unlawful Act Committed by Defendant, 56 A.L.R.3d 239, 2 at 242 (1974); see also Wayne R. LaFave Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, 7.5, at 217 (1986) ("[I]t is now generally accepted that there is no felony-murder liability when one of the felons is shot and killed by the victim, a police officer, or a bystander."). See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 850-52, 68 S.W.2d 100, 101-02 (1934) (adopting agency theory, but holding it does not apply where felon uses victim as a "shield"); People v. Antick, 15 Cal.3d 79, 87, 539 P.2d 43, 48 (1975), superseded by constitutional amendment on another point, People v. Castro, 38 Cal.3d 301, 696 P.2d 111 (1985); People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781-82, 402 P.2d 130, 133-34 (1965) (Traynor, C.J.) ("[t]o invoke the felony-murder doctrine when the killing is not committed by the defendant or by his accomplice could lead to absurd results," describing fact situation almost identical to that here); Alvarez, Jr. v. Dist. Ct., 186 Colo. 37, 525 P.2d 1131 (1974) (no felony murder liability under statute where robbery victim is mistakenly killed by police officer); Weick v. State, 420 A.2d 159, 162-63 (Del. Supr. 1980) (no felony murder liability under statute when accomplice is killed by robbery victim); State v. Crane, 247 Ga. 779, 780, 279 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1981) (no felony murder under statute when accomplice is killed by burglarized homeowner); People v. Morris, 1 Ill. App.3d 566, 570, 274 N.E.2d 898, 901 (1971), and People v. Hudson, 6 Ill. App.3d 1062, 1064-65, 287 N.E.2d 41, 43 (1972) (no felony murder liability when accomplice killed by felony victim); Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 100-02, 88 S.W. 1085, 1086-87 (1905) (no felony murder liability when robbery victim kills bystander while opposing robbery; contrary result "would be carrying the rule of criminal responsibility for the acts of others beyond all reason"); State v. Garner, 238 La. 563, 586-87, 115 So.2d 855, 864 (1959) (no felony murder liability when bar patron acciden