Opinion
No. 05-03-00770-CR.
Opinion Filed February 23, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F01-58653-PM. Affirmed.
Before WHITTINGTON, LANG, and LANG-MIERS.
OPINION
A jury convicted Vincent Ralph Alvarado of aggravated sexual assault with a deadly weapon. The jury assessed punishment at ten years confinement, but recommended that appellant receive ten years community supervision. The State later moved to revoke appellant's community supervision, alleging appellant violated the terms of his supervision. Appellant pleaded not true to the allegations. The trial court found three of the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and sentenced him to eight years confinement. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Appellate review of a probation revocation is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex.Crim. App. 1984); Lee v. State, 952 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.) (en banc). The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the probationer violated the terms and conditions of his probation. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 901. In a revocation proceeding, the trial judge is the sole trier of the facts, credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given the testimony. See Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 897. Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision because appellant is epileptic, cannot read or write, and has an IQ that borders on mental retardation. Appellant argues the trial court should have reinstated his probation with mental illness assistance because appellant did not fully understand what was expected of him under community supervision, and the probation infractions were minor and not done with intent or malice. The State argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's probation because appellant admitted he violated the terms of his probation. In its motion to revoke probation, the State alleged appellant failed to (1) pay probation fees, (2) pay supervision fees, (3) perform community service, (4) complete sex offender treatment, and (5) not have contact with persons under seventeen years of age. At a hearing on the motion, appellant testified he could not pay the fees because he was not working and did not have money. Appellant testified he understood he was required to participate in the sex offender treatment program and that he was to report every Wednesday at nine o'clock. Within a two-and-a-half month period, appellant testified that he missed one session because he had a seizure and three other sessions because he was looking for a job. However, appellant testified he did not tell the psychologist's office he was looking for a job, but that he did not have transportation to the sessions and did not have money to take a bus. Appellant testified he gave a medical history when he was placed on probation. In the history, appellant reported he was previously diagnosed with a seizure disorder that was secondary to excessive cocaine use, and since his cocaine use decreased, he had not had any seizures in over two years, had no serious medical problems, and was not on any kind of prescribed medication. Appellant testified that because the court told him he could be around his fourteen-year-old sister, he thought he could be around all of his family members, including his sixteen-year-old niece. Appellant admitted he had contact with children at a neighbor's house when he used the neighbor's telephone. The evidence is sufficient to show appellant understood what was required of him in regards to the conditions of his supervision. The fact that the trial court had alternatives to revoking appellant's community supervision does not mean the judge abused his discretion in not choosing one of the alternatives. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, §§ 22, 23(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Having reviewed the record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's probation. See Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 901. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.