Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland

50 Citing cases

  1. Orozco-Lopez v. Garland

    11 F.4th 764 (9th Cir. 2021)   Cited 39 times
    Holding "that a reasonable fear hearing before an IJ is a type of ‘removal proceeding’ included in § 1362"

    "Congress has authorized reinstatement of prior removal orders as [a] streamlined process through which certain noncitizens may be removed from the country." Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland , 993 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2021). As we recently explained, through reinstatement, "Congress sought to expedite the removal of those who reenter the United States illegally after having been removed at least once before."

  2. Hermosillo v. Garland

    80 F.4th 1127 (9th Cir. 2023)   Cited 12 times

    "A reasonable possibility" requires a noncitizen to show "at least a ten percent chance of being persecuted or tortured." Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 2021).

  3. Ojeda v. Garland

    112 F.4th 1241 (9th Cir. 2024)

    The IJ refused to consider the evidence, explaining that "all [he] can do" is review evidence presented to the asylum officer and that "it would be fundamentally unfair to conduct a de novo review of a record that contained additional evidence and testimony that the asylum officer could not consider in the first instance." Though the IJ cited our decision in Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2021), which permits an IJ to exercise discretion to consider new evidence at a reasonable fear hearing, the IJ erroneously held that he could not review new evidence. The IJ thus did not exercise his discretion when refusing to consider the new evidence of rape and country conditions.

  4. Alonso-Juarez v. Garland

    80 F.4th 1039 (9th Cir. 2023)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that § 1252(b) is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule

    Third, on the merits, we reject Alonso's argument that the reasonable fear screening procedures established by regulation are inconsistent with the statutory provisions governing withholding of removal. To the extent our holding in Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2021), was unclear on this point, we clarify today that the reasonable fear screening proceedings are not inconsistent with the statutory provisions governing withholding of removal. We therefore deny Alonso's petition.

  5. M.R.A. v. Garland

    No. 23-2596 (9th Cir. Oct. 1, 2024)

    8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(c), (g)(2); Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th Cir. 2021) (defining reasonable possibility in this context). Any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that M.R.A. met this standard.

  6. Perlaza v. Warden

    1:24-cv-00693-EPG-HC (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2024)

    “[T]he form on which DHS issues expedited removal orders [is] Form I-860[.]” Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2021).

  7. Esteban v. Garland

    No. 21-730 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 2024)

    We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and review the IJ's factual determinations for substantial evidence. See Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2021). Esteban also argues that his underlying removal order from 2009, which was reinstated, was invalid based on a defective Notice to Appear ("NTA").

  8. Mendoza-Linares v. Garland

    51 F.4th 1146 (9th Cir. 2022)   Cited 22 times
    Describing the operation of § 1252

    That "reasonable fear" standard matches the one applied under the regulations governing the expedited screening of aliens who, under INA § 241(a)(5), have had a previously executed removal order reinstated against them and who are statutorily ineligible for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(a), (c) ; see Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland , 993 F.3d 1187, 1190–92, 1195 (9th Cir. 2021) (describing the "reasonable fear" screening process applicable to aliens subject to reinstated removal orders). An alien has a "reasonable fear" of persecution or torture if he or she establishes "a ‘reasonable possibility’ of persecution or torture, which has been defined to require a ten percent chance that the non-citizen will be persecuted or tortured if returned to his or her home country."

  9. Guerrier v. Garland

    8 F.4th 1066 (9th Cir. 2021)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that § 242(D) ‘ "does not apply to the jurisdictional limitations codified elsewhere’ in the section, including the aforementioned limitation in subparagraph circumscribing judicial review of expedited removal orders" (quoting Garcia de Rincon , 539 F.3d at 1138 )

    The statute "provides that ‘no court shall have jurisdiction to review’ an expedited removal order except as provided in subsection (e)" of section 1252. Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland , 993 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting § 1252(a)(2)(A) ). In turn, subsection (e) limits judicial review to three issues: " ‘whether the petitioner is an alien’; ‘whether the petitioner was ordered removed’ under an expedited removal order; and whether the petitioner can prove that he or she has lawful status in the United States as an asylee, refugee, or permanent resident."

  10. Martinez v. Garland

    Civil Action 8:20-cv-0977-PX (D. Md. Sep. 7, 2021)

    [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to review-(i) except as provided in subsection (e), any individual determination or to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or relating to the implementation or operation of an order of removal pursuant to section 1225(b)(1) of this title. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i); see also Guerrier, 2021 WL 3611775, at *3 (limiting judicial review of expedited removal orders to enumerated challenges under 1252(e)); Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2021) (same). Subsection (e), in turn, states that judicial review of expedited removal orders “is available in habeas corpus proceedings” but “shall be limited to determinations” of “whether the petitioner is an alien”; “whether the petitioner was ordered removed under” under section 1225(b)(1); and whether the petitioner has been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence, has been admitted as a refuge ... or has been granted asylum.”