Alukonis v. Kashulines

10 Citing cases

  1. Alukonis v. Kashulines

    97 N.H. 298 (N.H. 1952)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that a survey of a property did not interrupt the continuity of an adverse possession claim over that property

    The jury found that the plaintiff had acquired title to it by adverse possession. A previous transfer of this case is reported in 96 N.H. 107. Defendants' exceptions to the denial of their motions for a nonsuit, a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were allowed and transferred by Sullivan, J. Further facts appear in the opinion.

  2. Seward v. Loranger

    130 N.H. 570 (N.H. 1988)   Cited 6 times

    Still, while Steele may have retained record title to the submerged land, it is possible that the filling and possession of the filled property by the Smalleys, together with their successors in interest to the southern portion of lot 9, ripened at some point into title through adverse possession that inures to the Lorangers' benefit. See Alukonis v. Kashulines, 96 N.H. 107, 108-09, 70 A.2d 202, 203 (1950) (upholding a finding of title through adverse possession on the basis of tacking of successive adverse possessions); 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession 160, 163, at 879, 884 (1972). One of the requirements of adverse possession, however, is exclusivity, see Fagan v. Grady, 101 N.H. 18, 21, 131 A.2d 441, 443 (1957); Little v. Downing, 37 N.H. 355, 367 (1858), which the Sewards and other property owners might have undermined if they used the Smalley-filled parcel in common with the Smalleys and subsequent owners of the southern portion of lot 9.

  3. Freed v. Cloverlea Assn

    246 Md. 288 (Md. 1967)   Cited 17 times
    Discussing tacking in the context of an adverse possession case

    " Although Sachs, supra, was cited in the brief of one of the parties in a recent New Hampshire decision, Alukonis v. Kashulines, 96 N.H. 107, 108-109, 70 A.2d 202 (1950), it was not mentioned in the court's opinion, an excerpt from which follows: "However, the defendants claim that the plaintiff may not tack the possession of her predecessors because the deeds in her chain of title do not include the strip in question, and cite authority in support of this proposition.

  4. Sturgeon v. Clark

    69 N.M. 132 (N.M. 1961)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that in order to preserve error in jury instruction, objection cannot be made in mere general terms

    Unless it is made to appear that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting plaintiff to accumulate evidence of elements of damage, his actions will not be reversed on appeal. Braack v. Bailey, 32 Wn.2d 60, 200 P.2d 525; Alukonis v. Kashulines, 96 N.H. 107, 70 A.2d 202, 17 A.L.R.2d 1125; Caron v. Hazlett, 321 Mass. 671, 75 N.E.2d 233. Also, the question of the amount of damages, being one of the principal controverted issues, we cannot agree with defendant that in allowing two witnesses to testify concerning the particular facts could be held an abuse of discretion by the trial court. We subscribe to the following language of the Supreme Court of Missouri in the case of St. Louis, Memphis Southeastern Railroad Company v. Aubuchon, 199 Mo. 352, 97 S.W. 867, 868, 9 L.R.A., N.S., 426, 116 Am.St.Rep. 499, 8 Ann.Cas. 822:

  5. Lurvey v. Burrell

    317 S.W.2d 458 (Mo. 1958)   Cited 11 times

    It has also been ruled that a conveyance by deed does not convey land held by adverse possession, not included in the deed, unless there is evidence or some circumstance showing that it was intended to be included. Alukonis v. Kashulines, 96 N.H. 107, 70 A.2d 202, 17 A.L.R.2d 1125, Annotations beginning at page 1130. In the case before us, the deed not only did not include the land in question but after both grantor and grantee were fully aware of the situation, the grantor knowingly did not include the disputed area in the deed and the grantee with knowledge of that fact accepted the deed.

  6. McLaughlin v. Union-Leader

    116 A.2d 489 (N.H. 1955)   Cited 27 times
    In McLaughlin v. Union-Leader Corp., 99 N.H. 492 (1955), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 909 (1957), McLaughlin had a written contract to serve as a newspaper's advertising manager for five years.

    When the same evidence was subsequently offered through the witness McQuaid, it was only cumulative and properly excluded. Alukonis v. Kashulines, 96 N.H. 107. Evidence as to whether a "leave of absence with pay" was "an arrangement used in newspaper circles" was properly excluded. There being no evidence that the parties contracted with reference to any usage, or that the suggested usage was customary or general, or known to the plaintiff, the evidence related to a collateral issue, and it was for the Trial Court to decide "when and how far it [was] profitable to investigate such issues."

  7. Prestrud v. Young

    242 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1951)   Cited 1 times

    These recent Colorado cases seem to be in accord with the great majority of decisions in other jurisdictions in this country, as well as with the principles laid down in the leading texts. See, Rocks Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 273 Pac. 908, 97 A.L.R. 1, including annotation beginning at page 14; Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417, including annotation beginning at page 1430; 8 Am. Jur., pages 802-804, sections 80 to 82, inclusive; 1 Am. Jur., page 880, section 153, page 883, sections 157 and 158; Alukonis v. Kashulines, 96 N.H. 107, 70 A.2d 202, 17 A.L.R.2d 1125. The annotation in 17 A.L.R.2d following the last above mentioned case, beginning at page 1128, deals with the subject, "Tacking adverse possession of area not within description of deed or contract." The above mentioned Colorado cases follow the majority doctrine, namely: "At the present time, making allowance for contrary rulings still apparently adhered to in a few jurisdictions, the cases, especially the later ones, run generally to the effect that in order to permit the tacking of successive adverse possessions of vendor and purchaser of an area not within the premises as described in the deed or contract but contiguous thereto, the composite fact to be established is the intended and actual transfer or delivery of possession of such area to the grantee or vendee as successor in ownership or claim.

  8. Flewelling v. Roby

    82 A.2d 83 (N.H. 1951)   Cited 4 times

    The plaintiff is entitled to tack the ownership and possession made by Rice and Bates in order to sustain his title by adverse possession. Alukonis v. Kashulines, 96 N.H. 107. The invalidity of the plaintiff's deed is not conclusive on the issue of his acquiring title by adverse possession. Barker v. Company, 78 N.H. 160. The fact that the Bates deed was defective did not prevent its recordation from acting as constructive notice that he was in possession of the premises and claiming adversely.

  9. Supronowicz v. Eaton

    224 Conn. App. 66 (Conn. App. Ct. 2024)   Cited 3 times

    Id., at 301–304, 228 A.2d 421.The court in Freed cited to several cases, including the New Hampshire case of Alukonis v. Kashulines, 96 N.H 107, 109, 70 A.2d 202 (1950), which held that "there was evidence [that] the plaintiff was shown the bounds, which included the [disputed area], by her predecessor in title and that this tract had been [enclosed] and cultivated for many years by the plaintiff and her predecessors. This appears sufficient to support the plaintiff’s right to tack."

  10. Tarver v. Naman

    265 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)   Cited 2 times

    See Miller v. Roberson, Tex.Civ.App., 165 S.W.2d 469, writ ref.wom., and authorities there cited. See also Alukonis v. Kashulines, 96 N.H. 107, 70 A.2d 202, 17 A.L.R.2d 1128. The judgment entered by the trial court permitted appellant to recover limitation title to that part of Lot 13, beginning at the alley and enclosed by the fence to the point of its termination on the ground. As previously stated, I think that an officer executing a writ could not go upon the ground and fix with certainty the boundary line from the termination of the fence to Cole Avenue under the testimony here presented.