The rule in Tennessee before the adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure was that the failure to correctly identify a defendant in the caption was not a fatal defect if the bill itself stated a cause of action against the defendant. See Altman v. Third National Bank, 30 Tenn. App. 81, 88, 203 S.W.2d 701, 704 (1947); Rose v. Third National Bank, 27 Tenn. App. 553, 564-65, 183 S.W.2d 1, 5-6 (1944). The adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure has not changed this rule.

The Plaintiffs contend that while the Complaint may have named the wrong party defendant initially, the filing of the Complaint nonetheless "commenced" the action under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure for the purposes of the statute of limitations and that they properly "continued" the action in accordance with Rule 3 until they were able to serve process upon the personal representative of Mr. Klein in February 2008. While the failure to correctly identify a defendant in the caption of the complaint is not a fatal defect, it will be fatal to the action if the allegations of the complaint do not state a cause of action against the proper defendant. Goss, 751 S.W.2d at 825 (citing Altman v. Third Nat'l Bank, 30 Tenn.App. 81, 88, 203 s.W.2d 701, 704 (1947); Blanchard v. Terry Wright, Inc., 331 F.2d 467, 469 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 831 (1964)). The Goss court upheld an action predicated on a complaint that listed "The Estate of Annie Myrtle Hutchins" in the caption as defendant and not John E. Hutchins, the personal representative of the decedent, but only because the court found that "[a]n examination of the complaint filed . . . reveals that a suit against the decedent's representative was intended by the plaintiff" and that process was served upon the personal representative's lawyer.

The rule in Tennessee before the adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure was that the failure to correctly identify a defendant in the caption was not a fatal defect if the bill itself stated a cause of action against the defendant. See Altman v. Third National Bank, 30 Tenn. App. 81, 88, 203 S.W.2d 701, 704 (1947); Rose v. Third National Bank, 27 Tenn. App. 553, 564-65, 183 S.W.2d 1, 5-6 (1944). The adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure has not changed this rule.

It was expressly alleged that legal title to the land of the Richardson interest was vested in R.P. Richardson. The proof shows this to be true. The averments of the bill, as amended, and the proof, give the court jurisdiction of the subject matter in so far as it was necessary to allege and prove that R.P. Richardson was the owner of the legal title to the undivided interest in the land sought to be partitioned. It matters not that the caption showed that R.P. Richardson, trustee, brought the suit. Rose v. Third National Bank, 27 Tenn. App. 553, 183 S.W.2d 1; Altman v. Third National Bank, 30 Tenn. App. 81, 203 S.W.2d 701. 3. Cross complainants assign as error that the proceedings relating to the sale to satisfy the decree for attorneys' fees are void and state several reasons in support of this assignment.

This brought it before the court both individually and as trustee in each of the trusts. Rose v. Third National Bank, 27 Tenn. App. 553, 183 S.W.2d 1; Altman v. Third National Bank, Tenn. App., 203 S.W.2d 701. It is insisted that in the earlier part of the decree the Chancellor dismissed the bill and the amended bill, and that this deprived him of jurisdiction of defendants to enter the later parts of the decree.