Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-1588
04-24-2019
ROBERT JOHN ALTAVILLA, Plaintiff v. LARKSVILLE BOROUGH POLICE, OFFICER SHAWN REILLY, OFFICER NICHOLAS RIEBEL and MATT EVANS Defendants
(CAPUTO, J.)
() REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is a pro se civil rights action, initiated upon the filing of the original, fee-paid complaint in this matter by Plaintiff Robert John Altavilla (hereinafter referred to as "Altavilla") on September 7, 2017, asserting claims against Defendants Larksville Borough Police, Officer Shawn Reilly, Officer Nicholas Riebel (collectively referred to as the "Police Defendants") and Matt Evans. The events giving rise to the complaint stem from Altavilla's March 9, 2017 involuntary commitment ("302"), pursuant to section 7302 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act ("MHPA"). (Doc. 1 at 6, 10). Leading up to his 302 commitment, Altavilla contacted the United States Department of Defense ("DoD") on December 18, 2016 and claimed that government lasers were burning him from a satellite. (Doc. 1 at 9-10). Altavilla then provided the DoD with a photograph of his head to demonstrate where the lasers had purportedly burned him. (Doc. 1 at 9). Nearly three months later, on March 9, 2017, the DoD contacted the Larksville Police Department and informed Officer Andrew LaBar ("Officer LaBar") of the exchange with Altavilla. (Doc. 1 at 9). After obtaining a copy of the telephone conversation and photograph, Officer LaBar issued a 302 mental health warrant for Altavilla in accordance with the MHPA. (Doc. 1 at 9). Officers LaBar, Riebel, and Reilly then took Altavilla into custody for an emergency mental health evaluation, and transported Altavilla from his home to Wilkes-Barre General Hospital. (Doc. 1 at 9).
Altavilla motioned to correct the name of Matt Evans to Andrew LaBar ("Officer Labar"). (Doc. 10). In its previous Report and Recommendation, the Court outlined the process by which Altavilla could add Officer Labar as a defendant in his complaint. (Doc. 23 at 9-10). Altavilla has yes to file an amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
In the complaint, Altavilla alleges that the Police Defendants violated his civil rights when they came to his home and executed the 302 order. (Doc. 1 at 6). Altavilla contends that the Police Defendants unlawfully imprisoned him without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. (Doc. 1 at 6-7; Doc. 14). Altavilla seeks money damages in the amount of $20,000 from Larksville Borough and the indefinite suspension of the Officers involved in implementing the 302 order. (Doc. 1 at 7, 11). The Police Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of improper service as well as failure to state a claim, along with a brief in support, on November 27, 2017. (Doc. 8; Doc. 9). The undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation, allowing Altavilla thirty days to effect proper service. (Doc. 23 at 12 ¶ 3). The Court adopted the Report and Recommendation in part, denying the motion to dismiss as moot. (Doc. 34 at 1 ¶ 2).
The Court notes that Altavilla neglected to check the box for either "Diversity of citizenship" or "Federal question" under the "Basis for Jurisdiction" section of the complaint, and thereby failed to assert the Court's jurisdiction on this matter. (Doc. 1 at 3). Upon review of the complaint, it is clear that no diversity of citizenship exists, as Altavilla has not established that the Parties of are diverse citizenship or that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different States.").
The Police Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) after Altavilla effected proper service. (Doc. 28 at 1; 2 ¶ 5-7). The Police Defendants submit that Altavilla's claim must be dismissed as probable cause existed to take Altavilla into custody, Officers Reilly and Reibel are entitled to Qualified Immunity, and the Larksville Borough Police is not a proper defendant in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("1983") suit. (Doc. 28 at 3-4). In response, Altavilla submits that the warrants were frivolous, and that there was no harm to the household or the general public that would have provided the basis for the warrants. This matter is now ripe for review. (Doc. 29); (Doc. 30); (Doc. 31); (Doc. 33); (Doc. 35). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). "Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff's claims lack facial plausibility." Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). Although the Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court is generally limited to the allegations set forth in the pleadings, although it may also consider documents attached to the complaint and matters of public record. Opposition briefs to a motion to dismiss may not be used to amend a complaint. Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir.1988). To determine the sufficiency of a complaint a court must take three steps. Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d. Cir. 2010). First, the court must take note of the elements required to state a claim. Id. Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). And finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id.
But See Gordon v. Kartri Sales Co., Inc., No. 3:17-CV-00320, 2018 WL 1123704, *3-4 (M.D. Pa. March 1, 2018) (noting the tension between the documentary integrity envisioned by Zimmerman and the court's duty to liberally construe a pro se litigant's complaint).
Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Additionally, "the statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and of the grounds upon which it rests." Bayer v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. CIV.A. 3:13-1900, 2014 WL 3670499, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 2014) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)). It is not the responsibility of the defendant to translate the claims of the plaintiff for the Court. Nor is it the responsibility of the Court to translate the statutes, vague assertions, case citations, and general grievances of the plaintiff into a complaint. III. DISCUSSION
A. STATEMENT OF VENUE AND JURISDICTION
Because the complaint raises a 1983 claim based on a constitutional violation, subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The events giving rise to this claim occurred in Larksville, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania and thus venue is proper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b)(2); Kocher v. Larksville Borough, 926 F.Supp. 2d 579, 605 (M.D. Pa. 2013).
B. FALSE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT CLAIMS
"The plain language of section 1983...solely supports causes of action based upon violations, under the color of state law, of federal statutory law or constitutional rights. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state statutes." Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3d Cir.1990) (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1980)). "To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause." James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). To state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he was detained; and (2) that the detention was unlawful. James, 700 F.3d at 682-83 (3d Cir. 2012). An unlawful detention is an unreasonable one where the officers lack reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 204-207 (3d Cir. 2003); Donegan v. Livingston, 877 F. Supp. 2d 212, 219-21 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (collecting cases). Officers have probable cause for an arrest if "at the moment the arrest was made ... the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." Kauffman v. Barbagello, No. 1:13-CV-00659, 2013 WL 6388487, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2013); quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). The Court must determine whether "the objective facts available to the officers at the time of arrest were sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that an offense was being committed." United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1205 (3d Cir.1984).
The entirety of Altavilla's claim against the Defendants is as follows:
I am suing larksville boro police department for false imprisonment 302ing without warrant coming to my house because the department was contacted via the department of defense. The three officers violated my 4 amendment of the constitution since I was sitting in my house bothering no one posing no threat to anyone. I am asking for money in the amount determined via a judge and for the 3 officers involved in this matter to be suspended from our department indefinitely.
(Doc. 1 at 6-7).
Attached to his complaint is the incident report completed by the Defendants, in which Defendant Labar describes the call from the Department of Defense, and that he believed it was in Altavilla's best interest that he be seen by a professional concerning his safety and...of others, and on that basis he obtained a 302 from crisis at Wilkes-Barre General Hospital. (Doc. 1 at 9).
Liberally construing his complaint, it appears that Altavilla raises Fourth Amendment false arrest and false imprisonment claims against the officers who came to his house and committed him on an involuntary basis pursuant to a warrant obtained under § 7302 of the MHPA. (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 23 at 3 n. 2). Stripping away the conclusory allegations that he was falsely imprisoned and that his 4th amendment rights were violated, Altavilla alleges that he was sitting at his house, not bothering anyone, and posing no threat to anyone, when the Defendants arrested him and transported him to an involuntary commitment. Nothing in the incident report contradicts these allegations; indeed, while the report notes that it was "in Altavillas best interest, that he be seen by a professional concerning his safety and of others" it does not indicate anywhere that at any time Altavilla posed a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself.
The pertinent portions of the MHPA define a person subject to involuntary emergency examination and treatment as follows:
Whenever a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, he may be made subject to involuntary emergency examination and treatment. A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself, as defined in subsection (b)....
"Clear and present danger" is established by a showing that within the past 30 days the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another and that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be repeated. 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7301(b). "Section 7302 of the MHPA permits the issuance of a warrant for an involuntary emergency examination." Doby v. Decrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 864 (3d Cir. 1999). Under the statute,
Upon written application by a physician or other responsible party setting forth facts constituting reasonable grounds to believe a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, the county administrator may issue a warrant requiring a person authorized by him, or any peace officer, to take such a person to the facility specified in the warrant.
50 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7302(a)(1).
However, the MHPA also provides civil and criminal immunity for peace officers participating in an involuntary commitment process, so long as their conduct is without "willful misconduct or gross negligence." Kauffman v. Barbagello, No. 1:13-CV-00659, 2013 WL 6388487, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2013); 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7114(a). Thus, the MHPA shields the conduct of Defendants unless Altavilla is able to establish that they engaged in "willful misconduct or gross negligence." Id. "Willful misconduct" occurs "when the danger to the plaintiff, though realized, is so recklessly disregarded that, even though there be no actual intent, there is at least a willingness to inflict injury, a conscious indifference to the perpetration of the wrong." Kauffman, 2013 WL 6388487, at *10; citing Doby, 171 F.3d at 875. Gross negligence is characterized by "facts indicating more egregiously deviant conduct than ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference.... The behavior of the defendant must be flagrant, grossly deviating from the ordinary standard of care." Id.
The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not whether the Plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Smierciak v. City of Pittsburgh Police Dep't, No. 2:18-CV-00734-MJH, 2018 WL 6790312, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 26, 2018); citing Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000). Although Altavilla's complaint is quite brief, it names the defendants, it identifies the cause of action, and it supplies the factual basis for that claim - that the Defendant officers came into his house for a 302 commitment without cause or reason. However, Altavilla has not met the pleading standard for willful misconduct or gross negligence. Although he alleges that the officers came to his house for the 302 commitment without cause or reason, he fails to specifically plead that they engaged in willful misconduct or gross negligence such that their conduct would not be shielded by the qualified immunity protection of the MHPA. See Kauffman, 2013 WL 6388487, at *10. As such, it is recommended that Altavilla's claims against the Defendant officers be dismissed without prejudice.
Though Defendants have made different qualified immunity arguments (albeit also relying on Kauffman, supra), and have not specifically addressed the immunity provision in the MHPA, a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint where it is "clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that any amendment would be futile." Rouse v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 2:17-CV-1454, 2018 WL 3209430, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-CV-1454-AJS, 2018 WL 2325731 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2018); Bethea v. Nation of Islam, 248 Fed. Appx. 331, 333 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (citing Chute v. Walker, 281 F.3d 314, 319 (1st Cir. 2002)). It is clear from the face of the complaint as it stands that Altavilla cannot prevail due to the immunity provision in the MHPA. Further, it is recommended that Altavilla be given leave to amend his complaint in accordance with this Report and Recommendation. As such, the Court declines, at this time, to address the other grounds for dismissal for qualified immunity raised by the Defendants.
C. LARKSVILLE BOROUGH POLICE AS A DEFENDANT
Altavilla states that he is "suing larksville [sic] police department for false imprisonment..." but only describes the conduct of the Defendant officers who came to his house. (Doc. 1 at 6-7). Larksville Borough Police, a sub-unit of local government, moves to dismiss itself from this action, arguing that it's an improper entity in a 1983 claim. (Doc. 29 at 11 ¶ C). Larksville Borough Police cannot be held liable for the conduct of persons it supervises pursuant to respondeat superior. Brickell v. Clinton County Prison Bd., 658 F.Supp.2d 621, 626-27 (M.D.Pa.2009). In order for Altavilla to successfully allege a constitutional claim under § 1983 against this Defendant, he must raise a Monell claim alleging that the Police Department is a governmental entity and thus a "person" under § 1983 and, alleging that either a policy or lack of policy of the Department led to the violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F.Supp.2d 581, 587 (M.D.Pa.2008). Thus, Defendant Larksville Borough Police would be "subject to liability [in a § 1983 action] to the extent [it] maintain[ed] an unconstitutional custom or policy that caused the alleged constitutional violation." Id. (citation omitted). However, Altavilla has failed to identify any policy or custom adopted by the Department that caused his injury, and as such, it is recommended that his claim against the Larksville Borough Police be dismissed without prejudice. IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Third Circuit has instructed that district courts generally must permit a curative amendment if a complaint filed pro se is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the Third Circuit has also acknowledged that a district court possesses "substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend." Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000).
As the complaint in its current form does not clearly set forth any cognizable claims, dismissal is warranted. However, out of an abundance of caution, and to preserve Altavilla's rights as a pro se litigant, the Court will allow him an opportunity to file a single, unified, legible complaint setting forth factual allegations and legal claims in a manner that can be reviewed by the Court and, if necessary, answered by defendants.
The amended complaint must be a pleading that stands by itself without reference to the original complaint. Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (emphasis added). Further, the amended complaint must be "simple, concise, and direct" as required by Rule 8(d)(1) of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. It must also be limited to those claims that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences as averred, albeit vaguely, in the original complaint. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with the aforementioned requirements will result in the dismissal of this action in its entirety. V. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Doc. 28) be GRANTED. It is also recommended that plaintiff be granted 21 days from the date of the District Court's adoption of this Report and Recommendation to file a complete and amended complaint, and that the matter be remanded to the undersigned.
Dated: April 24, 2019
/s/ _________
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated April 24, 2019. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Dated: April 24, 2019
/s/ _________
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States Magistrate Judge