Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 02-3805, SECTION: "R" 5
December 12, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the motion of defendants, Justin Vickers and the United States of America, to dismiss plaintiff Tammie Holley's claims as time-barred. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES defendants' motion.
I. Background
Plaintiffs allege that on September 11, 2000, they were driving in plaintiff Tammie Holley's car when they were rear-ended by Justin Vickers, a United States Marshal. Plaintiffs aver that Holley was driving at the time. Plaintiffs assert that they filed claims with the United States Marshals Service and it denied Holley's claim on June 25, 2002 and denied Altamirano's claim on June 26, 2002. As a result, Holley was required by law to present her claims in federal court within six months after the final notice of denial was mailed, i.e., by December 24, 2002. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
Altamirano filed suit against Vickers and the United States on December 24, 2002. On April 15, 2003, Altamirano and Holley amended the complaint to add Holley as a plaintiff. The United States now moves to dismiss the suit filed by Holley as time-barred.
II. Discussion
Altamirano and Holley amended the complaint to add Holley's claims on April 15, 2003, almost four months after the December 24, 2002 deadline. If, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), the amended complaint relates back to the date of original filing dated December 24, 2002, then Holley's claims are timely.
Rule 15(c), as amended in 1991 and 1993, provides for relation back of amendments under the following circumstances:
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of original pleading when
(1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action, or
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). Although Rule 15(c) does not address the relation back of amendments that propose to add or substitute plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit has looked to Rule 15(c) when faced with such situations. See Summit Office Park v. United States Steel Corporation, 639 F.2d 1278, 1282 (5th Cir. 1981); Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1968); see also In the Matter of Mike's, Inc., 2002 WL 1767425, at *2 (E.D.La.). Indeed the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 15(c) states that "the attitude taken in [the rule] toward change of defendants extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c), Advisory Committee Note; but see Newell v. Harrison, 779 F. Supp. 388, 391 (E.D.La. 1991) (Sear, J.); see also Sanderson v. H.I.G. Capital Mgmt., Inc., 2001 WL 96384, at *4 (E.D.La.) (Sear, J.) (noting that "there is a split in the jurisprudence; some courts have interpreted 15 (c) to permit the addition of a new plaintiff, while others have not" and then applying Rule 15(c) to determine that the amendment seeking to add a plaintiff did not relate back to the original complaint.)
An amendment that seeks to add a new plaintiff has been found to relate back (1) when it substitutes the real party in interest, Allied Int'l, Inc., v. Int'l Longshoremen's Assoc., 814 F.2d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1987), (2) when the new plaintiff shares an identity of interest with the original plaintiff so as to put the defendant on notice that the new plaintiff was always involved with the litigation, Besig v. Dolphin Boating and Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 1271, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982), In re Campbell Soup Co. Securities Litig., 145 F. Supp.2d 574, 603 (D.N.J. 2001), (3) when the claims of the new plaintiff are identical to those of an original plaintiff and the defendant was on notice of the claim, Andujar v. Rogowski, 113 F.R.D. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), and (4) when the original plaintiff asserts a claim in a different capacity if the defendant was already on notice of the claim, Williams, 405 F.2d at 238-39. Conversely, an amendment that seeks to add a new plaintiff asserting a different type of claim will not relate back. See Summit Office Park, 639 F.2d at 1282; Leachman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 694 F.2d 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Sanderson, 2001 WL 96384, at *4; WRIGHT MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1501; see also Lemasters v. K-Mart, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 518, 519 (E.D.La. 1989); Atlantis Plastics Corporation v. Sammons, 558 A.2d 1062, 1065 (Del.Ch. 1989). The Fifth Circuit has noted that "notice is the critical element involved in Rule 15(c) determinations." Williams, 405 F.2d at 236. In Besig, the Ninth Circuit held that "[r]elation back poses no prejudice when an amendment restates a claim with no new facts." 683 F.2d at 1278.
In Olech v. The Village of Willowbrook, the court articulated a four-factor inquiry to determine whether the Rule 15(c) requirements of fair notice and lack of prejudice have been met. "These factors include whether or not (1) the new plaintiff's claim arose out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the original complaint; (2) the new plaintiff shares an identity of interest with the original plaintiff; (3) the defendants have fair notice of the new plaintiff's claim; and (4) the addition of the new plaintiff causes the defendants prejudice." Olech v. The Village of Willowbrook, 138 F. Supp.2d 1036, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (internal citations omitted); see also Allied Intl., 814 F.2d at 35-36.
In this case, the claims that Holley asserts clearly arise "out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c). Altamirano's and Holley's claims arise out of the same car accident. Both Altamirano's and Holley's claims arise out of the same alleged negligence of Vickers in the accident. Both allege head, neck and back injuries, and seek damages for medical expenses, physical and mental pain and suffering, and loss of earnings, service and society.
The Court finds that defendants had notice of Holley's claims. To begin with, Holley asserts that she filed a claim with the United States Marshall Service on June 25, 2001 that the government has already reviewed and denied. Moreover, the original complaint specifically identifies Holley as the driver of the car in which Altamirano was a passenger, and thus the defendants knew of Holley's connection to the suit.
Finally, the Court finds that any prejudice to the defendants is minimal at best. The factual basis underlying the claims is the same, and the allegations of negligence are identical. Defendants were on notice of Holley's involvement in this case, and defendants' response to the allegations in this suit is not materially altered by the addition of Holley's claims.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the amended complaint relates back to the original filing date, and Holley's claims are therefore timely.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendant's motion to dismiss Holley's claims.