Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-3805, Section: "R" (2).
December 22, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
The government moves the Court for a new trial under Rule 59(a). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the government's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court held a bench trial to determine whether Tammie Holley was entitled to damages for injuries arising out of an automobile accident with U.S. Marshall Justin Vickers on September 11, 2000. The Court found that Holley was entitled to damages for medical expenses and pain and suffering. The government contended in its trial brief that Holley could not recover her medical expenses. This is because State Farm paid for Holley's medical expenses and ultimately settled out-of-court with the government for reimbursement in the amount of $2,739.00. The government asserted that State Farm became subrogated to Holley's rights by virtue of the settlement. The government, however, introduced no evidence of a subrogation agreement between State Farm and Tammie Holley. Because there was no proof of subrogation, the Court awarded Holley damages for her medical expenses.
The government now moves the Court to open its judgment to take additional evidence. Specifically, the government offers a copy of the insurance policy between State Farm and Holley. The policy contains a subrogation clause which subrogates State Farm "to the extent of [its] payment to the right of recovery the injured person has against any party liable for bodily injury." (Def.'s Mot. New Trial, Ex. A at 22.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
A motion for a new trial must clearly establish a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence. Simon v. U.S., 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986)). The court should not order a new trial except for substantial reasons.
B. Discussion
The government has identified no error of law or mistake of fact to justify a new trial. As the Court explained in the trial order, "[t]he Louisiana Civil Code provides that subrogation takes place only by written contract executed between the parties or by operation of law under certain limited conditions." Watters v. State, 768 So.2d 733, 737 (La.App. 2000) (citing Martin v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 638 So.2d 1067 (La. 1994)). As the government correctly points out in its brief, when there is no subrogation, the injured party can collect twice: once from her insurer and once from the tortfeasor. The government never offered the insurance policy into evidence as proof of conventional subrogation. Moreover, the government never even identified the insurance policy as the basis for subrogation. Instead, the government pointed to a settlement agreement from a lawsuit between State Farm and the United States. This agreement refers to State Farm as subrogee of Tammie Holley. The document, however, is signed only by State Farm's attorney. The government also pointed to a stipulation of dismissal filed in the action between State Farm and the government. That document also refers to State Farm as subrogee of Holley. It is signed only by counsel for State Farm and the Assistant United States Attorney. The government provided no policy or contract signed by Holley to the effect that she relinquished her right of action to State Farm. See, for example, Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sonnier, 406 So.2d 178, 179 (La. 1981) (providing the subrogation clause from the insurance policy); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Lee, 625 So.2d 706, 709 (La.App. 1993) (providing the insurance contract between the insured and the insurer containing subrogation clauses); Smith v. English, 586 So.2d 583, 592 (La.App. 1991) (same). Therefore, the government did not offer sufficient proof of conventional subrogation by a written agreement between Holley and State Farm.
Because the government failed to introduce evidence of conventional subrogation by written agreement at trial, the Court was left to consider whether subrogation occurred by operation of law. The Court concluded that subrogation did not occur by operation of law in this case. The Court's conclusion was not an error of law, and the government does not argue that it was. Because there was no evidence of conventional subrogation by written agreement and subrogation did not occur by operation of law, the Court made neither an error of law nor a mistake of fact when it declined to reduce Holley's damages to exclude her medical expenses.
Furthermore, although the government refers to the policy as "new evidence" in its brief, the government is not entitled to a new trial on the basis that the policy is newly discovered evidence. To prevail on a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the moving party must demonstrate that it was excusably ignorant of the evidence at the time of trial even though it exercised diligence to discover the evidence. Gov't Fin. Svs. One Ltd. P'ship v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767, 775 (5th Cir. 1995). The government has not demonstrated to the Court that it could not have discovered the policy before or during trial even though it employed diligent efforts to obtain it. See Peyton Place, 62 F.3d at 775 (affirming the district court's denial of a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a) because the movant failed to show that it could not have obtained the evidence before trial through the exercise of diligent efforts). Accordingly, the government is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the government's motion for a new trial.