However, we find that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Great Southern. First, as Great Southern concedes, the trial court lacked the authority to award attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with the zoning litigation, as those sums did not "arise out of the present action." Alston v. Stubbs, 170 Ga. App. 417, 419 ( 317 S.E.2d 272) (1984). In addition, the award of fees and costs incurred in connection with the contract litigation must be reversed because Great Southern "failed to prove the actual costs of the attorney and the reasonableness of those costs."

Additionally, even when litigation resulting from transactional legal malpractice terminates in the former client's favor, the client can still sue for actual damages resulting from the attorney's malpractice, such as legal fees. Alston v. Stubbs , 170 Ga.App. 417, 419-420 (3), 317 S.E.2d 272 (1984). Applying the proper standard for the evaluation of proximate cause in this transactional legal malpractice case, I conclude that the grant of summary judgment to Taylor English was proper on Lalonde's claim for lost business opportunities resulting from the dissolution of the company.

Marcoux v. Fields, 195 Ga. App. 573, 574 ( 394 S.E.2d 361). See Rogers v. Hurt, Richardson, Garner, Todd Cadenhead, 203 Ga. App. 412, 415 (2) ( 417 S.E.2d 29); Alston v. Stubbs, 170 Ga. App. 417, 419 (3) ( 317 S.E.2d 272); Alterman Foods v. G. C. C. Beverages, 168 Ga. App. 921, 924, supra. The effect of this exception is to put a plaintiff in the same position he would have occupied had the plaintiff not been forced to litigate with a third party.

Since the recovery of such expenses of litigation pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 may not be had where such expenses do not arise out of the present action, the trial court properly [granted summary judgment to appellee on this count]." Alston v. Stubbs, 170 Ga. App. 417 (1) ( 317 S.E.2d 272) (1984). Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Where the alleged malpractice, as in the present case, consists of allegedly negligent examination or certification of title to real estate, one may recover from the attorney his "actual damages." Ware v. Durham, 246 Ga. 84 (1) ( 268 S.E.2d 668) (1980); Alston v. Stubbs, 170 Ga. App. 417, 420 ( 317 S.E.2d 272) (1984). The terms of the note provided for interest after maturity until paid, with all costs of collecting including attorney fees.

1. No expenses of litigation incurred in other lawsuits can be awarded pursuant to section 13-6-11. Only expenses of litigation incurred in the present lawsuit can be awarded under this section. Alston v. Stubbs, 170 Ga. App. 417, 419, 317 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1984); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Coburn, 132 Ga. App. 859, 862, 209 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1974); Randolph v. Merchants Mechanics Banking Loan Co., 58 Ga. App. 566, 573, 199 S.E. 549, 553-54 (1938). 2.

However, while the requirement that there be a legal duty in order to find liability in an attorney malpractice claim is ordinarily satisfied by the contractual privity between the attorney and the client, attorneys have been held to owe a duty of reasonable care to parties who are not their clients and are not in privity with them under certain circumstances.See Orr v. Floyd, 95 Ga. App. 401, 97 S.E.2d 920 (Ct.App. 1957); see also Simmerson v. Blanks, 149 Ga. App. 478, 254 S.E.2d 716 (Ct.App. 1979); Ware v. Durham, 246 Ga. 84, 268 S.E.2d 668 (1980); Alston v. Stubbs, 170 Ga. App. 417, 317 S.E.2d 272 (Ct.App. 1984). An interesting question arises as to whether such a legal malpractice claim speaks in tort or contract. While the claim arises out of the contractual relationship between the attorney and its client, it is bottomed on a legal duty which the attorney owes to third parties. Fortunately, the question has no practical significance in the resolution of the Objection.