Opinion
Civil Action 24-CV-1574
06-20-2024
LAMAR ALSTON, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY GEORGE LITTLE, et al. Defendant.
ORDER
MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, J.
AND NOW, this 20th day of June, 2024, upon consideration of Plaintiff Lamar Alston's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 6), Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement (ECF No. 7), Motion for Status (ECF No. 10), Motion to Stay Case (ECF No. 11), Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 12), Motion to Produce Documents (ECF No. 13), and pro se Complaint (ECF No. 1), it is ORDERED that:
1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
2. Lamar Alston, #LL1980, shall pay the full filing fee of $350 in installments, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), regardless of the outcome of this case. The Court directs the Superintendent of SCI Phoenix or other appropriate official to assess an initial filing fee of 20% of the greater of (a) the average monthly deposits to Alston's inmate account; or (b) the average monthly balance in Alston's inmate account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of this case. The Superintendent or other appropriate official shall calculate, collect, and forward the initial payment assessed pursuant to this Order to the Court with a reference to the docket number for this case. In each succeeding month when the amount in Alston's inmate trust fund account exceeds $10.00, the Superintendent or other appropriate official shall forward payments to the Clerk of Court equaling 20% of the preceding month's income credited to Alston's inmate account until the fees are paid. Each payment shall refer to the docket number for this case.
3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to the Superintendent of SCI Phoenix.
4. The Complaint is DEEMED filed.
5. The Complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for the reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum, as follows:
a. Alston's claims relating to his enrollment and participation in the Intensive Management Unit and to deductions from his institutional account are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
b. Alston's remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
6. The Motion for Status and Motion to Stay Case are DENIED as moot.
7. The Motion to Appoint Counsel is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
8. The Motion to Produce Documents, construed as a request for a copy of the initial Complaint, is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Alston a copy of the Complaint (ECF No. 1).
9. Alston may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state the basis for Alston's claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting his amended complaint, Alston should be mindful of the Court's reasons for dismissing the claims in his initial Complaint as explained in the Court's Memorandum. Upon the filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court.
10. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Alston a blank copy of the Court's form complaint for a prisoner filing a civil rights action bearing the above civil action number. Alston may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so.
11. If Alston does not wish to amend his Complaint and instead intends to stand on his Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs' decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).
12. If Alston fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Alston intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff's intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).
The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff's intention to stand on his complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 Fed.Appx. 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend his complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 Fed.Appx. 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff's conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).