Opinion
Argued February 13, 2001.
March 12, 2001.
In an action for a judgment declaring a deed null and void, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Garson, J.), entered August 16, 1999, which, after an nonjury trial, declared the deed null and void.
Marise Robergeau, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.
Hagan, Coury Associates, Brooklyn, N.Y. (William J. Coury and Paul Golden of counsel), for respondents.
Before: GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, J.P., GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court's determination that the defendant, who was responsible for the management of the grantor's day-to-day affairs, had a special relationship with the grantor is supported by the evidence adduced at trial (see, Hennessey v. Ecker, 170 A.D.2d 650, 651). Therefore, it was incumbent upon the defendant to demonstrate that the acquisition of the subject deed was not the product of undue influence (see, Hennessey v. Ecker, supra). The Supreme Court's determination that the defendant exercised undue influence is supported by the record (see, Matter of Antoinette, 238 A.D.2d 762, 763; Hennessey v. Ecker, supra).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.