Opinion
Civil Action 2:21-cv-354
05-10-2022
SAMUEL ALSTON, Plaintiff, v. TABB BICKELL, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed due to Plaintiff's failure to prosecute.
II. Report
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff, Samuel Alston (“Alston”), commenced this case on March 16, 2021, when he was housed at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) at Fayette. The Court denied his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis because he failed to submit the required documents. In addition, he erroneously identified the prison where he was confined and submitted a faulty prison account statement. Consequently, the case was administratively closed. The case was later reopened on April 27, 2021, and Alston's Complaint was docketed (ECF No. 4). On May 25, 2021, the Court issued an Order that directed Alston to file the required service forms for each defendant named in the complaint and provided him with a deadline to do so on June 9, 2021 (ECF No. 12). The Court notified Alston that “[f]ailure to comply with this order shall be construed as indicating Plaintiff's decision not to continue prosecution of this case.”
By August 10, 2021, however, Alston had not complied with the Court's order to submit the required service documents. In order to assist him, the Court provided him with the necessary blank forms (ECF No. 13) and again administratively closed the case on August 19, 2021, pending receipt of the service papers (ECF No. 14). In addition to the delinquent service documents, Alston failed to timely submit the necessary service copies of the complaint. On October 7, 2021, Alston asked for and was granted a 14-day extension of time to submit copies of the complaint to the Court (ECF Nos. 15, 16). The Court directed the Marshal to serve the defendants on October 26, 2021 (ECF No. 17) and they were served on November 8, 2021.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim on February 7, 2022 (ECF No. 24). The Court ordered Alston to respond to the motion by March 11, 2022 (ECF No. 26). Plaintiff did not comply with the Court's order, request an extension of time, or otherwise communicate with the Court by this deadline. As a result, on March 30, 2022, the Court issued another order (ECF No. 29) directing Plaintiff to file a response to Defendants' motion to dismiss or otherwise show cause why this case should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the Court's orders no later than April 29, 2022.
Since that time, Alston has not responded to the motion to dismiss, requested an extension of time, or otherwise communicated with the Court. Thus, there is every indication that Alston has abandoned the prosecution of this case.
B. Discusssion
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the involuntary dismissal of an action or a claim, and under this Rule, a district court has authority to dismiss an action sua sponte if a litigant fails to prosecute or to comply with a court order. See, e.g., Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994). In Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the Court of Appeals set forth the following six factors to be weighed in considering whether dismissal is proper under Rule 41(b):
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.Id. at 868 (emphasis omitted).
There is no “magic formula” or “mechanical calculation” to determine whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992). None of the Poulis factors are dispositive and not all of them need to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted. See Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008); Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, the Court must “properly consider and balance” each of the six factors based on the record. Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868). It must also analyze the factors in light of the “strong policy favoring decisions on the merits.” Id.
The first, third, and fourth Poulis factors-the extent of Alston's personal responsibility, his history of dilatoriness, and whether his conduct is willful-each weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. Since the initiation of this lawsuit, Alston has failed to file the necessary documents, has not followed the Court's directions, and has repeatedly ignored the Court's orders. Alston's last communication to the Court was on December 7, 2021, more than five months ago. He is proceeding pro se and is solely responsible for his own conduct. See, e.g., Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002); Winston v. Lindsey, No. 1:09-cv-224, 2011 WL 6000991, *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2011); see also Quadr v. Overmyer, 642 Fed.Appx. 100, 103 (3d Cir. 2016) (the district court correctly concluded that the plaintiff's actions were willful when he would not accept mail from the court, failed to respond to a motion to dismiss, and repeatedly missed deadlines).
The second Poulis factor assesses whether the adverse party has suffered prejudice because of the dilatory party's behavior. “Examples of prejudice include ‘the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.'” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874 (quoting Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984)). Although this factor does not weigh heavily in favor of dismissal at this time, it is not neutral either. Alston's consistent refusal to comply with Court orders and his failure to communicate with the Court frustrates and delays resolution of his claims against the defendants. See Mack v. United States, No. 3:17-cv-1982, 2019 WL 1302626, *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2019) (plaintiff's continued failure to communicate with the district court and inaction “clearly prejudices the Defendants who seek a timely resolution of the case.”). Thus, the second Poulis factor weighs at least slightly in favor of dismissal.
The fifth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. Under the circumstances presented here, where Alston has failed repeatedly to comply with court orders, has not communicated with the Court since December 2021, and appears to have abandoned the litigation, it is unlikely that alternative sanctions would be effective. Bowie v. Perry, No. 1:19-cv-13, 2019 WL 2412488, *2 (W.D. Pa. May 13, 2019) (“alternative sanctions are unlikely to be effective against a party who refuses to communicate with the Court.”), report and recommendation adopted by, 2019 WL 2410796 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2019). As such, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
When evaluating the sixth Poulis factor, the Court must consider the potential merits of Alston's claims. Here, Alston has asserted claims against various defendants for civil rights violations that allegedly occurred when he was processed into the Security Threat Management Unit (“STMU”) of SCI-Fayette, the prison where he was incarcerated. While Defendants assert that Alston has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted, without further inquiry and full evaluation, it is not possible to determine at this time whether Plaintiff might ultimately prevail on any of his claims. Thus, this factor is neutral.
III. Conclusion
In conclusion, the Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal. The Court cannot properly control its docket, move this action forward, and properly protect the rights of all parties because Alston has failed to comply with Court orders and has not communicated with the Court in more than five months. Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss this civil action with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, any party is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).