Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ¶ 12, 154 P.3d 808 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ¶ 34, 424 P.3d 95 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Brown v. Div. of Water Rts. of Dep't of Nat. Res., 2010 UT 14, ¶ 21, 228 P.3d 747.
Our precedent firmly establishes that this traditional rule safeguards core principles, among them the separation of powers mandated by the Utah Constitution and the integrity and efficiency of the judiciary as a whole.See, e.g., Welsh v. Lambert, 54 P. 975, 975 (Utah 1898) (dismissing appeal for lack of standing); Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ¶ 2, 424 P.3d 95 ("Standing is a question of subject matter jurisdiction that raises fundamental questions regarding a court's basic authority over the dispute." (cleaned up)).
But our reliance on the test in that case was consistent with established caselaw. See, e.g., Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of W. Jordan, 2017 UT 45, ¶ 34, 424 P.3d 95; Brown v. Div. of Water Rts. of Dep't of Nat. Res., 2010 UT 14, ¶ 17, 228 P.3d 747; Hogs R Us v. Town of Fairfield, 2009 UT 21, ¶ 8, 207 P.3d 1221; Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ¶¶ 19-20, 148 P.3d 960. Justice Pearce points out that these cases refer to two possible paths to standing, infra ¶ 100, "the traditional test and an alternative test," Utah Chapter of Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 18.
Our law of standing in Utah is an outgrowth of the doctrine of "separation of powers." Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan , 2017 UT 45, ¶ 30, 424 P.3d 95. The requirement of standing is jurisdictional in the sense that it defines the limits of the judicial power in our "tripartite" system of government.
But that does not affirmatively establish that the Utah takings clause actually encompasses all that Boggess hopes it does. See Lujan , 2020 UT 5, ¶ 49 n.7, 459 P.3d 992 (explaining that we may "depart from the federal formulation if and when we are presented with state constitutional analysis rooted in the original meaning of the Utah [Constitution]" (emphasis added)); Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan , 2017 UT 45, ¶ 17, 424 P.3d 95 (declining to "conduct an independent analysis of the Utah takings clause" where the parties "do not undertake an independent analysis of the language of the Utah provision, cite authority interpreting it, or otherwise present an independent rationale for a takings violation as a matter of state law").¶47 This was the basis for the Ferrebee court's construction of the Utah just compensation clause.
In so holding we do not rule out the possibility of a determination, in a future case in which the question is squarely presented, that state constitutional standards under the Utah due process clause differ from federal due process standards under Neil v. Biggers , 409 U.S. 188, 201, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). See Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan , 2017 UT 45, ¶ 16, 424 P.3d 95 (explaining that even where "the Utah clause is similar to the federal clause, we do not presume that federal court interpretations of federal Constitutional provisions control the meaning of identical provisions in the Utah Constitution" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Jensen ex rel. Jensen v. Cunningham , 2011 UT 17, ¶ 46, 250 P.3d 465 (emphasizing that even though "some of the language of our state and federal constitutions is substantially the same, similarity of language does not indicate that this court moves in ‘lockstep’ with the United States Supreme Court’s [constitutional] analysis" (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We are of course not bound to follow precedent on federal due process in our formulation of state due process standards.
¶18 Standing is generally a mixed question of fact and law "because it involves the application of a legal standard to a particularized set of facts." Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan , 2017 UT 45, ¶ 10, 424 P.3d 95 (citation omitted). However, "the question of whether a given individual or association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question of law."
And such a lack of standing may not be cured by forfeiture or waiver by the parties.See Living Rivers v. Exec. Dir. of the Utah Dep’t of Envtl. Quality , 2017 UT 64, ¶ 27, 417 P.3d 57 (explaining standing is an issue that can be raised sua sponte by the court and is not subject to waiver); Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of W. Jordan , 2017 UT 45, ¶ 2, 424 P.3d 95 (same); State v. Tuttle , 780 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 1989) (same).¶28 We need not and do not resolve this question conclusively.
2013 UT 18, ¶ 16 & n.10, 299 P.3d 1098 (quoting 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties § 30 (2d ed. 2012) ("Standing in the state courts is a judge-made doctrine ....")); see also id. ¶ 12 n.4 (noting that although separation of powers concerns support certain standing requirements, "these concerns do not reflect an absolute, constitutionally[ ]imposed jurisdictional requirement, but rather a historical and pragmatic conviction that particular disputes are most amenable to resolution in particular forums" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, while we have described standing as "rais[ing] fundamental questions regarding [our] basic authority over [a] dispute," Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of W. Jordan , 2017 UT 45, ¶ 2, 424 P.3d 95 (citation omitted), it is not necessarily a constitutional limit on our judicial power, cf. United States v. Windsor , 570 U.S. 744, 757, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013) (noting that "[r]ules of prudential standing, by contrast [to Article III requirements], are more flexible rule[s] ... of federal appellate practice" (third and fourth alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶60 It appears that we have never examined whether the Utah Constitution requires adversity between parties as a jurisdictional prerequisite.
"[T]he question of whether a given individual or association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question of law." Alpine Homes, Inc. v. City of West Jordan , 2017 UT 45, ¶ 10, 424 P.3d 95 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). ANALYSIS