Moreover, it is unlikely that two incidents occurring over a decade apart are sufficient to create a pattern for purposes of a Monell claim. See Alphabet v. City of Cleveland, 2006 WL 3241785, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2006) (finding that “four complaints of unconstitutional conduct by different officers over the span of four years can hardly be deemed a ‘numerosity of incidents,' or a ‘widespread extent of practices' that would render the risk of similar harm so obvious that the City should have known of it.”). Additionally, the City points out that both incidents predate the City's 2015 consent decree with the U.S. Department of Justice and, therefore, could not have been relevant to the City's use-of-force training or policies at the time of the herein incident.
There is no requirement that such a policy be in writing. Alphabet v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:05 CV 1792, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83490, *6, 2006 WL 3241785 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2006) ("The policy or custom need not necessarily be a formal, written policy."); citing Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 441-442 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Strayhorn v. Caruso, No. 11-15216, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132396, *11 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2012) ("Under Monell, '[m]unicipal policy need not be a written ordinance; it may be a 'statement' or 'decision' by a high-ranking official . . . 'whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.'"); quoting Hescott v. City of Saginaw, 894 F. Supp.2d 977, 989 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
"Certainly, plaintiffs are allowed to bring § 1983 actions on the basis of complaints and allegations of police misconduct, if all other pleading requirements are met." Markey v. City of Chicago, 1991 WL 101639, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 1991) (citing Williams v. City of Chicago, 658 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1987), wherein the plaintiff survived the City's motion to dismiss a § 1983 claim with seven citizen complaints against police officer); see also Hoskin, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 982 n.3 (rejecting the defendants' argument "that the plaintiff has not sufficiently pled facts to establish the City's knowledge because there were only complaints of unlawful searches, rather than final adjudications that the searches were unlawful," stating that "[t]his argument hardly justifies a discussion" because "[a] lack of formal adjudications would be a logical symptom of" the alleged policy of ignoring complaints about unlawful searches); Alphabet v. City of Cleveland, 2006 WL 3241785, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2006) ("To simply assume that the sustainment of a complaint by the City's Office of Professional Standards is necessary to render a complaint relevant, in light of Plaintiff's allegations, lacks reasonableness.").
True, Peet involved a single police investigation, but other courts have held that a handful of incidents over a period of time does not show a custom or practice. See, Alphabet v. City of Cleveland, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 83490 at ** 19-20 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (collecting cases). While it appears that three incidents may not be enough to show a custom or practice, it is obvious that the cases are fact-driven and this Court has limited facts upon which to base a final decision.