I would further conclude that the reasoning in my Alonzo opinion should apply also to all types of arguments that could be made by a party that prevailed at trial. 158 S.W.3d 515 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (Keller, P.J., dissenting to dismissal of petition). We should keep in mind that the trial on the merits is the "main event rather than a tryout on the road."

In appellate courts, however, preservation of error is of fundamental importance to the proper and efficient functioning of the judicial system. See Alonzo v. State, 158 S.W.3d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (Keller, P.J., dissenting). As Presiding Judge Keller has explained, "[D]ecision-making at the appellate level must take into account not only the parties' interests but also those of the trial court."

In Haley v. State we implicitly adopted Presiding Judge Keller's position, and even reached the merits of the procedural default question ourselves, rather than to remand it, though the court of appeals had never rendered a "decision" with respect to that question. 158 S.W.3d 515 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (Keller, P.J., dissenting).Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 698 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Jones v. State, 942 S.W.2d 1, 2 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997).

The Court should do this because the State did raise it in its petition for discretionary review, it is an important issue to the bench and bar, and it has been suggested that preservation of error is a systemic requirement. See, e.g., Alonzo v. State, 158 S.W.3d 515, 516 (Tex.Cr.App. 2005) (Keller, P.J., dissenting). Appellant did not claim in the trial court that the aggravated assault by threat offense was not a lesser-included offense of the charged murder offense.

Thus, both trial and appellate courts have the authority to exercise discretion and consider claims and arguments that were not timely made in that particular court as long as they are made while the parties are still in that particular court and the court otherwise has jurisdiction to hear them. Alonzo v. State, 158 S.W.3d 515, 516 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (Keller, P.J., dissenting to dismissal of the State's petition for discretionary review).Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 151 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (op. on reh'g) (error preservation is a "systemic requirement" that appellate courts should address even when not raised by the parties on appeal or when raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing).

"[P]reservation of error is a systemic requirement that a first-level appellate Court should ordinarily review on its own motion." Alonzo v. State, 158 S.W.3d 515, 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Taylor also complains that the trial court erred when it denied his request to include a limiting instruction in the jury charge regarding the jury's consideration of testimony related to the underlying assault charge.

"[P]reservation of error is a systemic requirement that a first-level appellate Court should ordinarily review on its own motion." Alonzo v. State, 158 S.W.3d 515, 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). An appellant will be able to raise, on appeal, objections to the refusal to grant challenges for cause, if the voir dire record reflects that an objection was submitted either during the voir dire or at the time of the trial court's ruling and that the objection was not abandoned.

"[A] preservation of error is a systemic requirement that a first-level appellate Court should ordinarily review on its own motion." Alonzo v. State, 158 S.W.3d 515, 516 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). An appellant will be able to raise, on appeal, objections to the refusal to grant challenges for cause if the voir dire record reflects that an objection was submitted either during the voir dire or at the time of the trial court's ruling and that the objection was not abandoned. Zimmerman v. State, 860 S.W.2d 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993).

See TEX.R. EVID. 802, 803. Stevens relies on Alonzo v. State, 67 S.W.3d 346 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. dism'd as improvidently granted), 158 S.W.3d 515 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005), to support her argument that hearsay, which does not quite fit the hearsay exceptions, should be nonetheless allowed: (1) if there is inherent trustworthiness of the hearsay; (2) if there is corroborating evidence that the hearsay is truthful; (3) if the hearsay is important to the determination of guilt/innocence; (4) if the State had an opportunity to examine the declarant of the hearsay; and (5) if the State is unable to demonstrate the unreliability of the hearsay. Id. at 360.

"Use immunity" is within the discretion of the prosecutor. Graham v. State, 994 S.W.2d 651, 656 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Alonzo v. State, 67 S.W.3d 346, 360 (Tex.App.(Waco 2001), pet. dism'd, 158 S.W.3d 515 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). We know of no authority, nor have we been cited to any, that would require the trial court to order the offer of "use immunity" to one who asserts, or who might assert, a Fifth Amendment privilege.