" United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160.' Silber v. United States, 370 U.S. 717, 718 ( 82 SC 1287, 8 L.Ed.2d 798); accord Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 41 (95 SC 2091, 45 L.Ed.2d 1); Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217, 222 ( 52 SC 315, 76 L.Ed.2d 715); United States v. Tenn. c. R. Co., 176 U.S. 242 ( 20 SC 370, 44 LE 452)." Almond v. State, 180 Ga. App. 475, 480 ( 349 S.E.2d 482). In the cases sub judice, defendant was entitled to speedy trials under OCGA § 17-7-170 and trials before impartial jurors.
Lynd v. State, 262 Ga. 58, 61 n. 2 ( 414 S.E.2d 5) (1992). (Punctuation and citation omitted.)Almond v. State, 180 Ga. App. 475, 478-481 ( 349 S.E.2d 482) (1986). The evidentiary use by the State of the alleged statements made by defense counsel to the investigator implicating Thorne in the robbery, along with defense counsel's own statement at trial as to what he told the investigator about Thorne, was a violation of Thorne's attorney-client privilege.
See Perkins, 288 Ga. at 814(II)(A), 708 S.E.2d 335 (discussing tension between client's control of his own defense and counsel's duty to thoroughly investigate background of his client in death penalty case). See also Pate, 383 U.S. at 385(II), 86 S.Ct. 836 (holding that trial court itself must make inquiry into competence sua sponte if competence appears to be in question); Almond v. State, 180 Ga.App. 475, 477(1), 349 S.E.2d 482 (1986) (noting that a defendant, although generally free to proceed pro se, has a special need for representation during a competency trial); Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14(a) (“When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.”); Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2, comment 4 (“In a case in which the client appears to be suffering from diminished capacity, the lawyer's duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14.”).
Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845(3), 537 S.E.2d 58 (2000) completely supports, if not demands, that we review this error even without objection by counsel at the trial court level. Although the majority cites Paul for the proposition that our review of plain error is limited to death penalty cases and the violation of OCGA § 17-8-57, this misreads what we held in Paul, in which we applied and quoted with approval the Court of Appeals' opinion in Almond v. State, 180 Ga.App. 475, 480, 349 S.E.2d 482 (1986). In the portion of the Almond opinion on motion for rehearing, the Court of Appeals held:
Derrick v. State, 263 Ga. 766 (2) ( 438 S.E.2d 903) (1994). But the Court of Appeals has.Almond v. State, 180 Ga. App. 475, 480 ( 349 S.E.2d 482) (1986). Moreover, this Court has weighed facts against the plain error rule even where it has said that the plain error rule does not apply.
Therefore, as the appellant failed to preserve the right to assert error in the jury charge on appeal, this enumeration of error is deemed waived. The Court of Appeals, however, applied the "plain error" rule in Almond v. State, 180 Ga. App. 475 ( 349 S.E.2d 482) (1986), in which that court considered whether the trial court properly allowed the defendant's appointed counsel to testify with respect to the defendant's competency to stand trial, when no objection was made to the testimony at trial. The Court of Appeals considered the facts of the case to be "exceptional and to seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings."
The trial court did not err by allowing the state to call the lead defense attorney as a witness during this hearing. Unlike the attorney in Almond v. State, 180 Ga. App. 475 (1) ( 349 S.E.2d 482) (1986), the attorney here was not required to reveal information protected by the attorney-client relationship. 23.
(Citation omitted.) Almond v. State , 180 Ga.App. 475, 477 (1), 349 S.E.2d 482 (1986). In making this determination, the trier of fact resolves conflicts in the testimony and weighs the evidence.
(Emphasis supplied.) Paul, supra at 849 (3), citing Almond v. State, 180 Ga. App. 475, 480 ( 349 SE2d 482) (1986). Last year in Milner v. State, we held that a violation of OCGA § 17-8-57 was not plain error even though the trial judge had asked 14 penetrating questions of the defendant on cross-examination. How can we now hold it to be plain error when a trial judge asks four fairly innocuous questions to a witness?
(Punctuation omitted.) Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845, 849 (3) ( 537 SE2d 58) (2000), citing Almond v. State, 180 Ga. App. 475, 480 ( 349 SE2d 482) (1986). OCGA § 17-8-57 provides: