Accordingly, the above quoted language in Almond does not control here. 161 Ga. App. 363, 365 ( 288 SE2d 129) (1982). (Emphasis in original.)

However, replacement-cost-less-depreciation is not the only method available to prove the value of property taken. See Almond v. MARTA, 161 Ga. App. 363 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 129) (1982). The value of improvements may also be shown by evidence of market value, and as we stated in Division 1, a condemnee can testify concerning the market value of improvements if he can show he has knowledge, experience or familiarity with the value of such improvements.

There was sufficient evidence in this case to authorize a jury to find that the condemned property constituted a "unique" location for a self-service laundromat in the Augusta area. See Kessler v. Dept. of Transp., 142 Ga. App. 170 ( 235 S.E.2d 636) (1977); but compare Almond v. MARTA, 161 Ga. App. 363, 365 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 129) (1982). The evidence did not demand such a finding.

A person who conducts an established business in a location which cannot be duplicated suffers a loss which is particular and unique, with the result that the market value of the property does not represent just and adequate compensation. Heilman v. Dept. of Transp., 162 Ga. App. 547, 548 (1) ( 290 S.E.2d 189) (1982); but compare Almond v. MARTA, 161 Ga. App. 363, 365 (2) ( 288 S.E.2d 129) (1982) (holding that difficulty in replacing a location is not a test of "uniqueness"). If the business property is unique, and there is a total destruction of the business at the site condemned, the condemnee is entitled to compensation for business losses as a separate element of compensation. Cobb County v. Crain, 172 Ga. App. 594 ( 323 S.E.2d 890) (1984). Aside from issues concerning the unique relationship between a business and condemned property in order to recover business damages, the property owner may recover compensation for the value of his property where the property has a unique value to him such that fair market value does not represent just and adequate compensation.

For one thing, the charge limited the jury's utilization of the replacement-cost-less-depreciation method to those situations where the market or income approach is "not suitable." In Almond v. MARTA, 161 Ga. App. 363, 364 ( 288 S.E.2d 129) (1982), this court noted that there were three recognized methods of establishing the market value of a designated piece of property: the comparable sales or "market" approach, the income approach, and the replacement-cost-less-depreciation approach. It is clear from the holding in Almond v. MARTA, supra at 363 (1), that all three methods are of equal efficacy, assuming, of course, that there was evidence of record which would authorize a charge as to each.

Theo, supra, p. 521. A seemingly contradictory statement was issued in Almond v. MARTA, 161 Ga. App. 363 ( 288 S.E.2d 129), in which this court stated, "The fact that the condemnee was having difficulty in replacing this location in the same general area is not a test of the `uniqueness' of the building." Id., p. 365.