In cause No. 74831, the motion to interview was granted, but the appellate court subsequently reversed after holding that it had jurisdiction to proceed. ( 240 Ill. App.3d 585.) In cause No. 74897, the motion was denied, and one of the defendant's attorneys was held in contempt after he advised the court that he intended to disregard the court's order and to go forward with the interview. Although the attorney did not appeal, his client did.

Although the express holding of the Petrillo case forbids ex parte conferences between defense counsel and plaintiff's treating physician, we do not believe that our decision here today is contrary to the Petrillo court's underlying reasoning. In support of its argument that we should strictly apply the holding in Petrillo, plaintiff contends that the second division's recent decision in Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center (1992), 240 Ill. App.3d 585, 608 N.E.2d 92, appeal granted (1993), 149 Ill.2d 647, 612 N.E.2d 510, decides this precise issue in plaintiff's favor. In Almgren, plaintiff sought to hold a hospital vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of a resident psychiatrist who treated plaintiff at the hospital.

596, 499 N.E.2d 952, the court held that in order to preserve the sanctity of the physician-patient relationship, ex parte discussions between defense attorneys and plaintiffs' treating physicians were prohibited. The court restricted the defendant to formal discovery from plaintiff's physician. Courts applying Petrillo have expressly held that its reasoning applies to ex parte contacts which occurred before the court announced the Petrillo decision ( Karsten v. McCray (1987), 157 Ill. App.3d 1, 14-15, 509 N.E.2d 1376), and it prohibits ex parte letters from defense counsel to a plaintiff's doctors ( Nastasi v. United Mine Workers of America Union Hospital (1991), 209 Ill. App.3d 830, 839, 567 N.E.2d 1358). In Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center (1992), 240 Ill. App.3d 585, 594, 608 N.E.2d 92, the court explained that the therapist-patient privilege, like the physician-patient privilege, "establishes plaintiff's right to prevent disclosure from [plaintiff's doctor] to defendant's attorney of information unrelated to the case but potentially damaging to plaintiff. That right cannot be protected if defendant's attorney is permitted private discussions with [plaintiff's doctor].

Accordingly, had Diane filed a notice of appeal of the order barring the testimony of Dr. Bergner pursuant to section 10(b) of the Confidentiality Act, we would be required to dismiss her appeal. We note the recent decision of Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center (1992), 240 Ill. App.3d 585, 608 N.E.2d 92, in which the First District Appellate Court found that the Confidentiality Act did not conflict with supreme court rules since orders appealable under the Confidentiality Act are also appealable under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (134 Ill.2d R. 307(a)(1)), which permits interlocutory appeals from orders granting or denying injunctions. ( Almgren, 240 Ill. App.3d at 589, 608 N.E.2d at 94.)